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Diaspora and Transnationalism

Editors
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SADANANDA SAHOO

Migration and Diasporas
An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Contents

Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal

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Editors' Note

Global Research Forum on Diaspora and Transnationalism (GRFDT) is delighted to introduce its biannual publication "Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal. We would like to share with our readers that when GRFDT was launched in 2012, the need of a journal was acutely felt by our founders as well as academicians and scholars associated with us to address the current issues of Diaspora and migration. It however, took us more than six years to reach this stage when we could proudly announce the launch of the journal. The time in between was an enriching experience as we learnt a lot during the International conferences that we have been organizing regularly, which has also gone in shaping the tone and tenor of this journal. Our interactions with academicians, researchers, policy makers and diplomats during our conferences, through newsletter and informal meetings set the vision of the journal, which is now in your hands. The Journal has attempted to bring out up-to-date, high-quality and original research papers alongside relevant and insightful reviews in the areas of migration and diaspora. Although there is a growing body of literature in the area, there is still a dearth of journals to cater to the interdisciplinary nature of the subject. The journal attempts to fill up that gap.

As we know, Diasporas are dynamic and have diverse formations. They are diverse in context of countries of origin, historical experiences, nature of skill or profession, collective narratives of communities and differing relationships to homelands and host lands. They are dynamic because the core of the concept has changed and grown over the years and continues to do so owing to the increasing international migration of people who are making foreign lands as their home while at the same time remaining connected with their homeland. Consequently, there is an ongoing process of engagement with the home as well as the host country for which Diasporas have devised different methods and instruments. The growth of multiple identities ranging from identification with family, village, region, and two or more nations simultaneously has been facilitated by modern communication technology. It has strengthened the ideas of transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. The migrants continuously utilize computer-based and mobile technologies to communicate, interact, exchange information, promote cultural and religious practices, and enhance political mobilization across borders.

The virtual connectivity of the diaspora groups has also helped the real or the practical connectivity with the countries of origin while residing in different part of the world. This new dimension further strengthens the concept "long distance nationalism" as it gives an opportunity to the diaspora groups, of gaining political information, participating and running political campaigns etc and thereby affecting the political and economic developments in the home country. In the countries of adoption also, the migrants claim for their space, rights and control over and ownership of resources. Problems arise when they appear to be taking over jobs, resources etc. and their presence is despised by the natives. In this context, citizenship becomes an important issue and a continuing struggle for the migrants. It is a political instrument that leads to access to economic and social rights hence become critical for the survival of the migrants/diaspora groups.

The complexities of the host country further push the migrants towards identification with the home country and they are forced to return even after generations of living there. India is a good example of witnessing return migration. Nevertheless, it is not always a joyful experience as the migrants return to a completely changed landscape of the home country and have to navigate through the issues of identity.

A substantial body of diaspora research has been built on empirical and comparative case studies. Each diaspora group is formed under a different context. African diaspora, which originally, is a result of slave trade, is also witnessing dynamism as African communities are migrating in the modern times as semi-skilled labourers, skilled professionals or business people. The initial preferred destinations like Western Europe and North America has also changed over the years as more and more people are migrating to the Developing countries in Asia owing to new opportunities. None of the Diasporas are a uniform and homogenous group and the experiences of each group differ from the other. Hence, Diaspora Studies continue to grow with new vigour and vitality. The complexities of migration and diaspora in the globalised world are new challenges for the academics. It is in this context an interdisciplinary engagement is necessary.

In this inaugural issue of the Journal, there are six research papers cutting across disciplines and regions and covering diverse range of issues. The first paper titled "Ascription, Aspiration and Achievement: Malaysian Indian" by Ravindra K Jain examines the three interrelated concepts among

people of Indian origin in the Malaysia in the context of new politico-economic and social dynamics that is shaping up in recent times.

The second paper by Luciana L. Contarino Sparta "The Emergence of Long Distance International Displacements and Restrictive Migratory Laws: A Review of Legal Expressions Based on Racist and National Discrimination" extensively debates on the issue of discriminatory regulatory system in the Developed European countries as well as in USA towards to citizens of less industrialised countries such as Asia, Africa and South America.

The third paper by Zeynep Aydar "Digitalization of long distance nationalism, diaspora and their on-line political participation via internet" brings out an interesting area of diasporic engagement with homeland through virtual platform. Though diasporas are often politically active groups, they have been traditionally restricted in their engagement with homeland due to lack of any viable communication platform. However, with the advancement of social media and digital technology, the gap between the homeland the diaspora is shrinking. The nationalist movement of Turks and Kurds are examples of such long distance nationalism that actively promoted and perpetuated through virtual platform.

In the fourth paper "Managing Migration in the Time of Economic Crisis: Example of Four EU Countries" Yasin Kerem GÜMÜŞ discusses about the impact of market economy on EU migration policy especially during the time of Economic recession. The paper compares various European countries and their migration management strategies during the economic crisis in the recent past.

The fifth paper "Frontier Heritage Migrants: Finding Home in Globalizing India" is by Melissa Tandiwe Myambo who coined the phrase "Frontier Heritage Migrants" to capture a new phenomenon of return migrants in the globalising India with a new urban cosmopolitan space that matches with the taste of western and globalised Indians.

The last paper by José de Jesús López Almejo "Diasporas Lobbying the Host Government: Mexican Diaspora as a Third Actor of the Bilateral Relationship between Mexico and the U.S" explores diaspora strategies to mobilise and lobby in the home as well as host countries through various formal, informal and non-formal ways. The author examines that these

lobbying are done by very small elite group within the diaspora and has a far-reaching impact on bilateral relation, remittances and other social and cultural arena.

This issue has seven book reviews that covers such as Development and Transnational Engagement, Globalization, Culture, Digital Diasporas and Diaspora Politics.

We would like to mention that GRFDT team has been continuously engaged in debates and discussions through its regular seminars and conferences in which scholars from various disciplines and various regions of the world have been participating and sharing their views and ideas. It has been a long pending need to have an Interdisciplinary journal where scholars could share their research, findings and initiate debates on the issues. It is overwhelming to see the idea taking shape today. We owe our gratitude to the entire GRFDT team as well as to the eminent Editorial Board Members who have been a great intellectual and moral support to us.

Wishing you all a very Happy Reading experience.

Amba Pande
Sadananda Sahoo

Ascription, Aspiration and Achievement: Malaysian Indian Trajectory

Ravindra K Jain*

The sociological thesis of my presentation for Malaysian Indians may be looked upon as a transition from ascription towards aspirations and moving to achievements. As policy recommendation I am helped by Schumpeter's concept of the impact of innovation as "creative destruction"" where creation and destruction are not polar opposites, but in a relationship of continuum. Hence it is not the same as Lenin's famous dictum, "there can be no real reconstruction without destruction", justifying total revolution. In pursuing the goal of achievement to the middle class status for Malaysian Indians this policy is guided by the imperatives of human choice, agency, and pragmatism within the macro-framework of a liberal democratic state and civil society.

Ascription

Let me first look at ascription which for the dominant Hindu population of the former Malayan and present Malaysian Indian community in the past related to caste or jati and, among other statuses, as a proletarian and subaltern community on rubber plantations. In what follows I endeavour to move away, as did the majority Indian community, from the major bugbear of ascribed identity, that of caste, to new aspirations. I would first like to dispose of the old chestnut of caste in Malaysian Indian politics.

I do not elaborate here the conceptual distinctions and relationship between ethnicity, class and culture. The only point that I would wish to make, however, is that ethnic identity as Indians in Malaysia and even sub-ethnic identities as Tamil, Telugu, Sikh, Malayalee, Sindhi etc. within the Indian group contribute to a rich diversity so long as it remains cultural and does not get contaminated by divisive politics. The same could be said of sub-

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sub-ethnic identity, for example, caste in the Tamilian group. I notice that in a recent internet blog my Malaysian sociologist colleague, Prof. P. Ramasamy, has made precisely this point and, indeed asserted that caste among Malaysian Indians is of no consequence in politics though it may still have some cultural relevance in domestic and community ritual affairs. If this is so, I am very happy to note it. This observation conforms with and confirms one of my own generalizations about comparative Indian diaspora, namely, that whereas the role of caste in politics in India, for example, shows politicization of culture, caste and its associated religious observances-- as one of the markers of cultural identity in pluralistic overseas Indian settings-- may be interpreted as "culturalization of politics".

Let me expand my cryptic remarks about the politicization of culture in India as contrasted to the culturalization of politics in the diaspora. To take up, somewhat more fully, Prof. Ramasamy's remarks about caste among the Malaysian Indians what he said was that caste was of far more relevance for Malaysian Indians of the previous generations than it is for the youth today. And, also, if I may further expand on what he said, caste was still important in the politics of parties like the M.I.C. and the I.P.F. The first part of his statement is unexceptionable; this is also what I understood him to be saying. The second part needs some explanation. Firstly, here Prof. Ramasamy is speaking strictly not as a sociologist but as a Malaysian Indian politician, as leader of a political party (Pakatan Rakyat) opposed to the M.I.C. (or even of an all Malaysia political party, the D.A.P., opposed to the ruling B.N. of which the M.I.C. is a component). Now, even if I concede to him the point that in the MIC leadership elections there is caste conflict— the Gounders vs. the Mukkulathors—the point I would wish to make is that here it is a political tussle between two sub-sub-ethnic groups of Indians (a caste division among Tamils). Numerically, in terms of democratic party-political electoral politics in Malaysia, what consequences in terms of real parliamentary representation does this caste conflict have? We are talking here of a further minority, the Tamils, (though undoubtedly a sub-ethnic majority within the Malaysian Indian ethnic group (about 8% of the total population of Malaysia). Further, if it be said that this minority within a minority represents the old educated Indian middle class and a smaller proportion of the upwardly mobile "new" Indian middle class, this too may be conceded. <u>But in the first-past-the-post electoral Malaysian democracy (without ethnically proportional representation) this does not constitute a significant, decisive, profile in the Malaysian parliament as a whole.</u>

Considering the above, I can only come to the conclusion that in effect what the Malaysian Indian professor is actually worried about is the perceptional message this caste politics conveys to Malaysian Indians and to non-Indian Malaysians in general, namely, that there is no unity among Malaysian "Indians". However, as I have already pointed out, this caste conflict (or even between linguistic-cum-regional categories like the Telugu and the Tamil) is actually not pan- Malaysian Indian; here then is the play of the figure of thought and speech called synecdoche (where a part stands for the whole). This stereotypical illusion is further strengthened by what Malaysian Indians read about India as the proto-typical situation. It is further exacerbated by those political propagandists who go on to say, that if this is the situation within the Indian ethnic group, what can we expect by way of its contribution to the inter-ethnic project of One Malaysia? In the light of my analysis, do I need to add that this is the illogic of a non-sequitur?

The position with regard to caste among Malaysian Indians, on the ground, is very different from that suggested by its populist political synecdoche. This is based on my own longitudinal anthropological research of the last fifty years and more. Caste by name and certain associated behavioural stereotypes is still there. In marriage and certain communal activities there have been changes and upheavals, but by and large caste endogamy and a certain restricted amount of occupational specialization is still practised. There is a notional ritual hierarchy of castes. However, when it comes to actual mobility among castes and large groups of castes (like the non-Brahmin and the Adi Dravida); there is evidence not only of its obsolescence but of actual reversals.

About this last phenomenon, I have written ironically of "a caste war" among the Malaysian Indian estate workers and ex-estate workers of Tamilian origin in the Batang-Berjuntai - Kuala Selangor region of coastal West Malaysia (Jain, 2011). May I add in parenthesis that this "war" can be seen in analogy to what is known as "the war on terror" in the parlance of global politics of our day? To illustrate, here in this region unfettered by rules of purity and pollution in their choices of occupations and interactions, the numerically dominant proletarians and ex-proletarians of the Adi Dravida castes have gained exceptional mobility even outdoing their non-Brahmin cohorts. The cinema hall in the town, the bus-company and the position of priest-cum-marriage registrar in the Thandayudpani temple are owned by members of these castes. Here, if I may say so there is a mes-

sage for India: in this caste war the tables are turned through socio-economic and political mobility of the traditionally downtrodden without the stultifying and caste-enhancing "prison-like" political bait of Reservations for the dalits in contemporary India.

The overall message, therefore, is that in the respect spoken of above, if one does not intellectually replicate and superimpose the Indian reality on to the Malaysian one, an altogether new and dynamic scenario emerges. The challenge is to counteract the entrenched mind-set, the stereotypes, by ground reality. And this to my mind is what sociological research is all about as it could open up new horizons for assessing the possibilities of Malaysian Indian mobility sui generis and also in consonance with the findings of comparative Indian diasporic communities. As to the action forward, especially, for political mobility the Malaysian Indian minority would do well to not only look at the parliamentary democratic process and dispensations of the ruling party but also at the inter-ethnic NGOs.

What I have said so far may be epitomized by what is widely known as the soft power of culture in politics. I termed this as the "culturalization of politics" in Indian diaspora in contrast to the better known, but slowly changing, "politicization of culture" in India itself. For the Malaysian Indian diaspora, I have discussed this phenomenon with special reference to caste or jati when it does not operate within an all-encompassing caste <u>system.</u> To sum up the forward looking facet of my argument thus far, not the bugbear of caste but interethnic and intra-ethnic eco-geographical regions and social classes would be the framework for assessing the problems and prospects of Malaysian Indian politico-economic mobility.

Aspiration

Aspirations for the community that we are discussing were signalled in the very recent past by HINDRAF (with its mixed impact), new electoral choices, and social mobility processes in general. The flip side was displacement, unemployment, criminality, drugs, poverty, urban slum-dwelling, etc. Some issues are real and substantive others are mainly perceptional (as I would argue later) as they are bound to be in a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, pluralistic society. Of course, there is a two-way interaction or interface between hard reality and the perceptions.

What are the solutions, in the negative domain, of the many problems as listed above, and in the positive domain, of the moves towards mobility? The latter, as Prof. Shamsul has perceptively pointed out in the Foreword to a recently edited volume (Jayasooria and Nathan, 2016), should never be judged by the numerical minority that is the Indian community in Malaysia. As political processes in the nation and moves towards professionalization and socio-economic mobility clearly indicate, the Malaysian Indian community's present contribution and future potential is far greater than its small numerical strength in the total population. With this in mind, let me return to the real hard problems faced by the vast majority displaced from erstwhile plantations and now constituting the lumpen population in urban slums. One way of tackling these problems, as the authors/contributors to the above stated volume have demonstrably opined, is that the solutions are contained in the proper analytical diagnosis of the problems themselves. This leads me to the heart of the problematic, namely, the problems, prospects and processes of mobility of the majority of the Malaysian Indian community into the ranks of a Middle Class in Malaysia.

In this context, we speak of the inter-ethnic or multi-ethnic situation in the nation state of Malaysia. As sociologists, we may look upon the predicament of Malaysian Indians who constitute a considerable proportion of the socio-economically deprived community either in the perspective of an ethnic minority or in that of a deprived socio-economic lower class for which the avenues of mobility are either closed or very meagre. The latter perspective fitted the majority population of Malaysian Indians before the structural adjustment/liberalization/market reforms (note: this is the language of Indian economic transformation; you may substitute it with Malaysian Economic Plans) of the 1980s and 1990s. To borrow a phrase from the anthropologists of plantation economies and societies in Latin America, this was an era of "closed resources" for the Malaysian Indian proletarians and subaltern groups. How has the situation changed, in sociological terms, following the structural changes that I just noted? The displacement of Indian proletarians from plantations was accompanied, whether our more radical sociological colleagues like it or not, by a simultaneous process of the opening up of resources. In other words, theoretically at least, once the fetters of an involute plantation economy were removed, along with its inevitable opening up of the market economy, there should or could have been greater opportunities for the displaced plantation workers for socio-economic mobility.

What happened in practical terms? The findings here are mixed, if not ambivalent. Scholars studying Malaysian Indian poverty emphasise 'persistent poverty 'of this class even in the changed economic scenario while, at the same time, commenting on its growing aspirations and awareness, they speak of a new "middle class" emerging from this very category. My own research findings (though mainly in the Batang Berjuntai—Kuala Selangor region) resolve this conundrum through evidence that both these processes were simultaneously at work. One may therefore conclude at this stage that there was no inherent/inbuilt/structural red-line preventing limited socioeconomic mobility even among the ex-estate proletarians of the Malaysian Indian population.

It will be noticed that in my sketch so far I have spoken only of the proletarians and subalterns experiencing long term "persistent poverty" as a working class. I have not considered in these remarks, about the opportunities and their utilization by Malaysian Indians of the other classes, viz., white collar workers, those in service occupations, traders, professionals etc. Apart from some statistics on the rural-urban divide, there is very little by way of detailed data on the incomes and savings of these classes. (I shall later make a reference to the significance of having data regarding savings by the Malay middle class during the period of economic upswing).

When we begin to break the supposedly homogeneous Malaysian Indian ethnic group into its changing and differential socio-economic profile of the present and the future, of opportunities and the outcomes, this is precisely where the political rub lies. Unfortunately the discourse of discriminatory bugbear of being a numerical and uniformly discriminated minority begins to loom so large that its situation vis-a-vis the Malaysian class structure as a whole (viz., there are Upper, Middle, and Lower classes and grades in-between among all Malaysians irrespective of ethnicity) is lost sight of. This is precisely the juncture where the disjunction between the reality and its perceptions, especially in a multi-cultural pluralistic society like Malaysia, sharpens and the hard reality of social class divisions gets obfuscated by stereotypes about ethnicity, minority persecution, and religious divisions. To sort out the stereotypes from the hard reality—without denying, of course, the interplay between the two in the real life-worlds of people—is the task of social scientists. In this task, to revert to our Malaysian Indian case, and in its relation to the all Malaysia B40 Category (those having incomes below M$4000 a month), we should be careful to assess

the distinctions between a numerical minority and a persecuted minority, between past history and present aspirations, between the older generation and the youth, and between gossip and researched information. One should also be guided by the canons of social scientific comparison and contextualization.

In the above perspective, the concept of class structure for Malaysian society that I have in mind will not be the Marxian one of more or less violent class conflict and an eventual "dictatorship of the proletariat". These insinuations are to my mind highly utopian rather than realistic. Also, I believe that in the contemporary world of global markets and international trade, as in the present Malaysian economy, it would seem ostrich-like to harp single-mindedly upon forces of production and relations of production moving in a dialectical fashion through an assumed linear historical process. If an intellectual paradigm is needed, even though provisionally, one would rather think of Max Weber's writing on Class, Status and Power where market forces (for life-chances or opportunities in the economy), status considerations (the choices of life-styles, in other words, consumption and culture), and the play of power (as in the negotiations of political processes) constitutes an explanatory trinity. And yet, should one make the mistake of thinking that this is a model of some ideal capitalistic economy and society, let me hasten to add that there is no such thing in the real world. The dangers of a runaway capitalism are ever so present. Peoples and nations will have to counter its ravages by whatever means possible including secular and ethico- religious ideologies and practice.

The solutions to the problems that face the contemporary Malaysian Indian community have been outlined in policy recommendations contained in the Jayasooria and Nathan volume (2016) referred to above. They have been framed in the back-drop of hard data that the various contributors have provided. Thus they speak of uniform citizenship procedures, inculcation of skills to the young men and women, quality education inclusive of that in the mother tongues, entrepreneurial avenues, empowerment of women, religious freedom, and so on. Let me finally say that they have not tried to brush under the carpet the various problems encountered in nation-building and statecraft of a multi-cultural society on the verge of economic development. All they have done is to state the aspirations for balanced and sustained developmental goals, where it will be possible for a large cohort of the B40 Category, inclusive of Malaysian Indians, to not

only aspire (as they already do) but to achieve the secure status of at least "middle class" citizens of the nation. The scenario they project is that of just and equitable growth for all Malaysians among whom the Malaysian Indians are a proud component.

Achievement

Not merely a wishful thinking or reiteration of excellent recommendations already made, here are a few pointers for transition from aspirations to the achievement of mobility and developmental goals as I see them. To do this let me now return to aspects of the politico-economic, geopolitical and, finally, sociological, dimensions of the inter-ethnic rather than exclusively intra-ethnic solutions to the crisis of B40 category of Malaysian Indians. I am emboldened to do so because of my past and continuing research on comparative diasporas with special reference to the contemporary Indian diaspora.

(1) In some of my recent writing (Jain, 2011) I have discussed the politico-economic merits and demerits of Prime Minister Mahathir's long rule by UMNO and the Alliance in recent Malaysian history. I agree with the observation made by Dr. Francis Loh (2010), that there was during that rule and policy dispensation, a spurt in the economic development of Malaysia (for example, despite world-wide recession in the economies during the last decade of the last century, note the Mahathir move of stabilizing Malaysian currency by fixing its value against the US dollar), encouragement to foreign investments, and a steady rise in the incomes of the Malay middle class. In my writing I have also said that during the same dispensation the Chinese in Malaysia were—as always—left to their devices and thus retained by and large a plateau of well-being. Only the bulk of the Malaysian Indians (proletarians and subalterns)—again as always—was left high and dry. If at all, the curve of their incomes and economic well-being showed a downward slope. On the positive side, however, (and here we traverse the sociological side of the Mahathir dispensation) the moderately affluent Malay middle class, often to the chagrin of Western expatriates, was advised by the powers that be to practise Islamic restraint in consumerist behaviour. Although to the best of my knowledge no academic study exists on Malay savings during the period, one should not be surprised if their savings showed an upward curve. Here one might add the impact of the

ideology of hudud (limits or moderation), of Rukun Negara (national principles) and of Malay adat (culture) in general. Needless to say, these ideas also resonate with Indian/Tamilian ethics spelled out in classics like the Thirukkural. This entire spectrum of values goes much beyond Mahathir's regime and has been re-formulated in Najib's "One Malaysia" call.

The point I wish to make, and this is premised on my reading that no structural change in the Malaysian capitalist economy has occurred between the Mahathir and post-Mahathir periods of governance, is that the upwardly mobile aspirations of youth of the Malaysian Indian ethnic group (participating in the improvement of national economy as a whole) may do well to take a leaf out of the middle class Malay thrift in the face of economic stability, if not actual buoyancy. In other words, rather than view their own persistent relative deprivation and hurdles to future aspirations, on the one hand, and Malay economic betterment, on the other, as a zero-sum game, it would be instructive for Malaysian Indians to focus on future secular gains through self-imposed thrift rather than harping on an imagined religious (Islamic vs. Non-Islamic) divide and deprivation.

(2) I would like to make a point where the dual ethnic identities of Malaysian Indians, as Malaysians and as people of Indian origin, can be harnessed as an advantage. There is no question here of where their political loyalties as citizens lie—unambiguously with Malaysia. And yet, in socio-economic relation to India, buttressed no doubt by a sentimental attachment, and in the perspective of India's contemporary burgeoning economy, Malaysian Indians supported by their own leadership can construe a win-win relationship between the two countries. An early sounding of such a possibility through partnership was made by the then Minister of Works, Government of Malaysia, Dato Seri S. Samy Vellu at the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas in New Delhi, as early as in 2003. He said: "There is a large pool of talent to share with the world. Fostering partnership between India and the Indian diaspora is a two-way process. The key dimension is how can there be a win-win situation from multiple players... Malaysians had been successful in investing and participating in infrastructure projects in India. We could further facilitate these through collaboration partnerships, which will be beneficial for both India and Malaysia." (cited in Jain 2010).

My argument here is that whatever the political controversy surrounding a particular Malaysian Indian leader within Malaysia then and now, the ad-

vantage of a dual identity as diasporic Indians in Malaysia beckons the B40 group, inclusive of other Malaysians, to tap the possibilities of economic buoyancy in India. These possibilities seem even brighter given the present Indian Prime Minister's thrust for global, including Malaysian, collaboration with the Indian diaspora.

(3) Let me now make a point that emerges not only from the Indian diaspora but from comparative diasporas globally. This is of special relevance to Malaysia, inclusive of Malaysian Indians, and indeed for the Malaysian government too. I refer to the lessons which even the non-Chinese Malaysians can learn from the official PRC attitude to the world-wide Chinese diaspora, the way China seduces its overseas benefactors to the mainland. There is in the PRC a largely decentralized, eco-geographically demarcated, and localized approach to tap into the investment potential of countrymen settled abroad (cf. Woon, 1997). The Chinese government, besides having good economic liaison with big businesses abroad, does not forget small towns, medium-sized businesses and even retailers having direct trading links with manufacturers and buyers abroad. And in this activity networking is crucial. There would be, in the case that we are discussing, vertical (inter-class) and horizontal (intra-class) networks traversing Malaysia and its various diasporas. These can be charted out and mobilized if regional businesses are informed and encouraged.

Conclusion

To sum up, in conjunction with their diasporic advantage, I have suggested a few pointers to an inter-ethnic paradigm for Malaysian Indian social mobility, and as you can see this is only a preliminary to a more complete strategy which resonates with the attainable ideal of One Malaysia. Further, I wish to underline that the wider economic framework within which such a strategy is set escapes the allure of a destructive runaway capitalist development like the one that led to the mid-decade slump in advanced European and U.S. economies during the 2010s. As I already pointed out, Malaysia had succeeded creditably in stalling such a crisis earlier, and if you needed a living exemplar of this model, we have Singapore in the neighbourhood.

An afterword

A word of caution apropos the allures of an ideology of runaway capitalism:

(1) Unlike the lawyer Waythamoorthy of HINDRAF, who filed a billion pound suit against the British government—nothing short of a millenarian dream—our bright Malaysian Indian minds, lawyers and other scholars, should try and procure all the documents of the formative period of the Constitution-making for independent Malaya, 1957. And, thence, if a scrupulous examination exposes complicity and collusion between the departing British authorities and a bigoted section of Malay interlocutors in a direction inimical to the formation of a basically pluralistic and liberal state, then the matter should be taken up at the highest international Court of Justice for redress.

(2) It seems that the populist ferment in Malaysia today to focus single-mindedly on alleged financial corruption in high places could again be a symptom of what I call the allure of a runaway and populist capitalist ideology. This has happened in India too before, and some radical scholars in India have alleged and even tried to document the role of experts from bodies like the World Bank and the IMF in exacerbating hype and gossip regarding corruption as the diabolical major cause of economic underdevelopment, hence diverting the attention away from persisting asymmetry of fiscal advantages between developed and developing economies. Here again reason, restraint, and patience with an impartial judiciary should be the watchword instead of a frenzy that smacks of a witch-hunt.

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The Emergence of Long Distance International Displacements and Restrictive Migratory Laws: A Review of Legal Expressions Based on Racist and National Discrimination

Luciana L. Contarino Sparta*

Defined as a large group of people with strong bonds based on a common culture, language and history, the concept of nation emerged during 19th century as the agglutinating background of western states. As governments were interested in ensuring the loyalty of population and in legitimating the monopoly of state power, they encouraged the idea of unity related to constructions of ethnic and cultural homogeneity and to traditions and a shared history[1] in order to create a profile that could distinguish themselves from other nationalities and peoples. By the end of 19th century, long distance migratory movements reached an unusual extension, with thousands and millions of people crossing oceans and political borders. These movements caused an unsettling effect on the discourse about blood and cultural purity inside state boundaries. It did not matter if the idea of national uniformity had been fictitious or invented (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1993); foreigners began to be perceived as a threat to national essence.

Governments exposed their concern about the entry of people that were considered culturally, and also, phenotypically different. And this concern was shared not only by European countries, but also by recently independent states of other continents. As Harald Kleinschmidt (2013) affirmed, migrations became a political issue and defining migrants as

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1. "Especially useful in that sense was public education […], as soon as historians, who could construct evocative "national histories". This topic is developed by Robert Marks (2007) in The Origins of Modern World (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers).

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opposed to national citizens appeared as a central matter inside modern nation-states. The world migrations emerged as "a term of social sciences functional to practical needs of administrators and derived from social theory and political philosophy of 19th and 20th centuries" (Kleinschmidt, 2013:12). Since then, the conditions that an individual or group of people must accomplish to be accepted as an immigrant or, on the contrary, be considered an undesirable person, turned into a main political task.

I. Swinging policies

Migratory movements were, on one side, a main source of labour force when internal offer was not enough to meet the demand –a recurrent situation in capitalism history, and, on the other, a process that jeopardised national values and reduced employment opportunities for citizens. That is why stop-and-go migratory policies were put into practice: they were not simply prohibitive, but regulatory of the entry of foreigners who wanted to settle down in the country. They, alternately, could become a convenient or a negative presence depending on circumstances and changing contexts and it was therefore imperative to count on legal instruments to justify expulsions and define preferred profiles of people.

Example of this was the United Kingdom that as a consequence of its early process of industrialization and labour opportunities that it offered, became a particularly attractive territory of destination. During the 19th century, the country received German, Italian and Irish immigrants, as well as thousands of Jewish that tried to flee from persecutions, who came from Romania, Russia, Lithuania and Poland. But there has been also a gradual arrival of immigrants from different parts of British Empire, including Africa, Asia and Caribbean territories; many of them began to work at London harbour. However, the uncertain future after Long Depression[2], when xenophobic

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2. The Long Depression or Long Recession of 1873-1896 combined financial problems with the fall of agriculture prices and the lack of basic food for survival and reproduction of population. As a consequence of demand inside industrial process, the profusion of subsistence crops have been diminishing in favour of raw material, but these circumstances got worse because successive poor harvests caused by climate issues. In the same time, debtors that could not fulfil credit commitments resulted in markets collapse and banks failure.

reactions spread, implied the end of an "open doors" period to give birth to an age of social control and regulations.

The most representative legal expression was the British Alien Act, enacted in Great Britain in 1905. Although it was a merely regulatory law, it also offered to local authorities a wide margin of discretion in migratory issues. The law qualified as "undesirable" the immigrant who could not prove that was in a position of finding the means to maintain himself and the persons who relied on him; who was "a lunatic or an idiot" or suffered any disease that could turn him in a burden on the public finances or a public danger; who had been sentenced in a foreign country or against whom an expulsion order had been issued.

Anyway, beyond appealing to diseases, criminal records or insolvency in order to qualify some immigrants as undesirable, restrictive legislations took into account positivist racial categories. They were the same that had been used in Europe to justify the extermination of American native population, slave trade and colonization, which classified human beings on the basis of somatic differences, putting whites at the top of a racist pyramid. Biological arguments appeared as the explanation of differences among human beings and they were incorporated as "cause and base of a strictly hierarchic organization of society" (Gilroy, 2001:58). By the end of 18th century, the English surgeon Charles White assessed that "white European" must be considered as "the most beautiful human race"."Nobody will doubt their intellectual power and superiority and I think – he asserted- that it will be proved that their ability is also naturally superior than the ability of any other man". Fifty years later, British anatomist Robert Knox maintained this discourse to oppose the superiority of European over "dark races", that included African and Asian, but likewise Jewish, Irish and Gypsies (Meyer, 1996).

This thought was reflected in the new migratory British laws of early 20th century, when the number of people that arrived from colonies multiplied. As Paul Rich (1990:12) said:"Race thinking in Great Britain in early 19th and early 20th centuries was strongly shaped by the twin experiences of imperial expansion overseas and industrial growth and class conflict at home". In this context, immigrants have been compelled to register themselves with the police while the Aliens Order (1920) and the Special Restriction Act (1925), known as Coloured Alien Seamen, restricted labour possibilities for Asian

and African sailors who could not prove their British nationality; they were considered unfair competition by their white colleagues, who accused them of accepting low salaries. This normative was enacted in the middle of race riots that emerged in harbours and targeted sailors that were considered coloured. It resulted in a process of expulsions including people of British citizenship like those that have arrived from the Caribbean Sea, whose identity documents had been confiscated in order they could not prove their nationality (Selvon, 1956). English and Black became incompatible identities in British mother country.

II. Early exclusion cases: race and national issues in the United States

Earlier examples of racial categorization could be found on the other side of the ocean, in the United States of America. The first rules that were established in this country had no straight connection with migration, but laid the foundation of future policies. Between 1790 and 1802, National Congress established basic conditions that must be fulfilled by people who had settled down in the territory and wanted to obtain citizenship: five years of residence, a good moral character and be free white persons (Smith M., 2002). There were not specific laws about migration during this period aside from the 1798 Foreigners and Sedition Act that empowered the president to deport those persons who were considered a threat to peace and security of the country. Specific regulations of immigration were not admitted in those times because, given the urgent need of population growth, it was considered a resource of national strength and wealth (Smith J.F., 1990). The Steerage Act of 1819 was related to this thinking as this law aimed at providing security and health conditions on passenger ships that transported immigrants.

Nevertheless, specific racial issues did not take long to appear. They became the base of exclusive laws initially related to internal migrations that came into force and regulated the settlement of free black people in different states of the country, and not only in the ancient slavery South, because "the new northern states that entered the Union after the end of slavery were as concerned about racial purity as the oldest ones" (Smith M., 2002). As an example, the state of Ohio enacted Black Codes in 1804 and

1807 that obliged blacks that entered the state to post a bond of 500 dollars in order to guarantee good behaviour and prove they were free men. This legislation was effectively applied years after, in 1929, when Afro-American population increased in the state and they were compelled to comply with the normative or leave (Sweet, 2005).

It is true that, as a whole, the United States introduced changes in their legislation in 1870, when the Naturalization Act came into force, allowing African-Americans access to citizenship that was reserved only to free Whites according to the previous law of 1790. However, almost simultaneously, in 1890, the Morril Act enshrined the principle of "separate but equal", that institutionalized two segregated systems of health, education and housing for Blacks and Whites, which were not only kept apart but also showed a completely different quality. This legislation enforced a fictitious inclusion or, more precisely, legal discrimination against the descendants of who Edouard Glissant (1995) called naked migrants, that is to say, enslaved Africans[3].

Also during the last decades of 19th century and following similar discriminatory justifications, the first law aimed at restricting the entry of immigrants in the United States was enacted. It had its target among the people from a specific non-western territory, China. Taking into account that Chinese have been the main labour force that allowed the development of gold mining in California, the new position of United States government vis-à-vis these immigrants can be related – as in Great Britain - with the need of shifting the responsibility for deterioration of labour demand during Long Depression of 1873-1996. And this time, in the same way, exclusion was justified by means of qualifying a sector of immigrant population as different and dangerous to national morality and homogeneity."The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first national effort to restrict immigration. The Congress responded to depression of those times blaming Chinese (as a scapegoat) as the reason of unemployment and other economic dislocations. Claims and complaints against Chinese included manifestations of xenophobia, as that they were incapable of adopting 'our habits' and assimilate to host society and that they 'had brought'

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3. In his book "Introduction à une poétique du divers", Edouard Glissant opposed the category of migrant nu, the enslaved Africans that has been transported from their land of origin without any provision, to the migrant armé, the colonizer, and the migrant familiale, who took part of spontaneous migratory waves.

prostitution. It was also feared that increasing Chinese immigration could reduce white colonization in the West." (Smith, J.F., 1990:671)

As the jurist James Frank Smith remarked, this law was only the first effort. In 1898, the Immigration Service created a List of Races or People to classify the immigrants who must go through an inspection process at the main door of entry, the Ellis island, where settlement areas and labour activities were to a large extent determined. By the end of 19ᵗʰ century, the reference to national origins often appeared in migratory laws. It became a main issue due to the growing nativist public opinion, promoted by intellectuals who demanded restrictive measures to "preserve American values and culture", and that resulted in recurrent episodes of hostility against foreigners.

Restrictions were extended in 1917 with the new Immigration Act that was enacted in order to prohibit the entry to sixteen years old foreigners that were physically able of reading but could not read English language or any other language or dialect, including Hebrew and Yiddish. Consuls were trained to discourage the immigration of people who could become a "public burden". Immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were qualified in 1920 as "racially inferior, inassimilable, radical and dangerous" and the reduction of their number was immediately ordered (Adam, 1990:175-176). Besides this law, an Asian Barred Zone was created in order to delineate a complete region of the world whose citizens were banned from entering the United States. And this restriction was not addressed only to Chinese people but to every person from Southern Asia from Arabia to Indochina and nearby islands, space that included India, Burma, Thailand, the Malaysian states, Eastern Indian islands, Asian Russia, the Polynesia and parts of Arabia and Afghanistan.

A quota system was put into practice in 1921. The future settlement of immigrants was reduced to three per cent of the population of the same origin that already lived in the United States. That proportion was cut down in 1924 to two per cent, as soon as Asian continued to be completely excluded and immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe was again reduced, giving and advantage of six to one in favour of peoplefrom Western and Northern Europe. The stated aim was"preserving race purity giving greater quotas to preferred countries and very small quotas to countries whose people were of 'inferior level`." (Streich and Kalaitzidis, 2008: 4-5).

Although racial approach was replaced by nationality in migratory

legislation, in fact, nationality and race became –not by chance- related terms that implied the same idea of superiority and inferiority. Legislation enacted in the United States was suspicious about foreigners and, more specifically, about those who did not share neither Western features nor the Western culture or, to be precise, Saxon features and culture. Restrictions about Chinese immigrants have been explained taking into account that their large presence as low-cost labour force in western coastal mines was perceived as labour competition and caused social unrest among native workers during the times of crisis. However, the arguments used to justify exclusion exceeded particular circumstances and practical issues and were based on a xenophobic thinking that was shared even by sectors considered as the most progressive in the country, whose members stressed superiority of natives of Saxon descent facing foreigners and nationals of other origins.[4]

In this sense, illustrative are the opinions expressed in the early 20th century by feminist militant Margaret Sanger in her book Women and the New Race, where she developed a clearly eugenic position. She considered that it was doubtful to think about the construction of a "better race" with the contribution of immigrants that arrived before 1910, who were for the most part illiterate. "That these foreigners who have come in hordes have brought with them their ignorance of hygiene and modern ways of living and that they are handicapped by religious superstitions is only too true – Sanger (1920) stated- [...]Under such circumstances we can hope that the 'melting pot' will refine. We shall see that it will save the precious metals of racial culture, fused into an amalgam of physical perfection, mental strength and spiritual progress. Such an American race, containing the best of all racial elements, could give to the world a vision and a leadership beyond our present imagination". In short: immigration brought a danger of "pollution" that jeopardised, in this case, the conservation of superior values that have been introduced in the country by Saxon people.

III. From north to south: shared restrictive principles

Similar ideological foundations had exclusive policies and laws of other

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4. This comparison is developed by Robert M. Yerkes (1921) in his book Psychological Examining in the United States Army.

states organized in America. That was the case of Canada, a confederation with a dominion status inside the imperial United Kingdom since 1867. With a rising economy, but a short number of inhabitants especially in the western side of the country, during 19th century its government promoted a migratory policy seemingly unrestricted. In 1869 the Immigration Act was put into force to ensure immigrants security, although it also established some restrictions that penalized the entry of "lunatics, idiots, deaf or full, blind or ill". References to geographical origins were not included.

Although immigrants came massively to Canada from Anglo-Saxon world during that century, after this law was enacted communities as diverse as those of Mennonites, Russian Jewish and Islanders were formed. Given that the construction of Canadian Pacific Railway was urgent, Chinese immigration was promoted and hundreds of workers of this origin arrived in the beginning of 1880s. Problems arose when the project came to an end and they were no longer welcomed and many citizens demanded the government to limit Chinese immigration and settlements as they were considered a danger to people security. Complaints became so extended that government created in 1884 a commission to verify what Canadians thought about this community. Workers, police agents, judges, lawyers, clerics and businessmen testified before the commission and all of them were unanimous in qualifying Chinese as dirty, prone to diseases, immoral, dishonest and unable to assimilate and their women were all called prostitutes. Besides, they were accused of stealing labour opportunities from the White people (Kelley, N. and M. Trebilcock, 2010). The government response was immediate: it was established that any Chinese who wanted to settle down in Canada had to pay a 10 dollars tax. The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 raised the amount first to 50 dollars and to 500 dollars after the amendment of 1903. Finally, as a consequence of new restrictions that were added during the first decades of 20th century, it was estimated that only fifteen Chinese were able to enter the country between 1923 and 1946.[5]

Besides this legislation based on stereotypical and prejudiced ideas similar to those that have been constructed in the United States in order to exclude Chinese migrants in 1882, 1906 and 1910, Canada government enacted new general and restrictive laws on migratory issues. The main characteristic

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5. These were the conclusions reached by the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21, Halifax, that can be accessed at www.pier21.ca.

of this legislation was that it gave the government discretionary powers to decide who could stay in the country, in other words, it allowed the authorities to execute deportation orders without any possibility of judicial review. In addition to this normative, a subsequent amendment authorized the administration to prohibit the entry of immigrants of any nationality, race, profession or social class on the basis of their particular habits, ways of life and methods of access to property. Simultaneously, the government organised campaigns to promote the entry of immigrants from the United States and Central Europe, considering the latter as expert farmers.

While immigration from Europe and the United States was encouraged, new legislation was applied as an instrument to restrict the entry of members of other communities that were considered undesirable. During the first decade of 20th century, the targets were people from Japan and India, no matter if the latter was part of British Empire. Ministry of Labour recommended the prohibition of entry to workers who had been contracted in Japan "in the interest of racial harmony and homogeneity"[6]. About people from India, the justification of the exclusion was that "immigrants of this kind, used to tropical weather, are completely inappropriate for this country and their inability to adapt themselves to a so different environment will led them inevitably to suffering and deprivation" (Kelley, N. y M. Trebilcock, 2010: 149).

In many areas of the British Empire outside America that were also territories with a high immigration demand, we can find more examples of regulatory laws. One of these was the Immigration Restriction Act enacted in the beginnings of 20th century in Australia, another white dominion of the United Kingdom. Principles that seemed to be a copy of first British laws were included in this legislation, that prohibited the immigration of any "insane or idiot" or person who suffered contagious diseases, was a prostitute or exploited other people for this kind of activities, was a convict or a person sentenced to more than one year of prison. Western preferences were also included: the normative empowered the authorities to expulse anyone unable to write in the presence of the designated officer a paragraph of fifty words in European language (Wilson, McMahon and Thompson, 1996). Similar normative had been earlier enacted in Natal, South Africa (1897), and in New Zealand (1899).

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6. Words pronounced by Mackenzie King, in charge of the Ministry, who later would be Primer Minister of Canada.

This kind of policies and laws has not been exclusive to Anglo-Saxon world. They were also applied in the main migratory destinations of Latin America between the second half of 19th and the first of half the 20th century, as it happened in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay where the aim of local government was to expand agriculture and livestock economy. From the south, but looking to the north, the principles held by the creole elite that participated in the organization of Argentine Republic were clear: "If the

population of more than six million of Anglo-American that started the United States Republic instead of growing with immigrants from the free and civilized Europe would have been populated with Chinese or Asian Indians, or with Africans, or with Ottomans, would it be the same country of free men that is today?[...] Why have I said that governing is populating and that this is an unquestionable truth? Because populating, I repeat, is to instruct, to educate, to moralize, to improve race. That is why [...] government must promote European immigration. Populate is not civilize, but brutalize, when it is done with Chinese and Indian from Asia and black from Africa."[7]

Although National Constitution of 1853 was subtler, it was also clear enough about migratory preferences and about the origins of migrants that were going to be favoured. As soon as its preamble opened arms "to every man of good will who wants to inhabit the Argentine soil", the same Constitution stated that it would be encouraged, specifically, the "European immigration". This preference was put into practice when Immigration and Colonization Act was enacted in 1876, although this law did not include precisions on preferred migrants' nationalities or characteristics. The law generally defined migrants as any foreigner under the age of 60, "labourers, craftsmen, industrialists, agricultures or teachers", who could prove "morality and abilities" and wanted to settle down in the country. Those who were identified as preferred immigrants by National Constitution were attracted through the action of agents who were sent to Europe in order to promote the advantages that Argentine government offered to people from that continent (Novick, 2008). The purpose of encouraging the entry of immigrants of European origins implied a complete opposition

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7. These expressions are part of the document "Bases y puntos de partida para la organización de la República Argentina" (1852), that was ritten by the local politician and intellectual Juan Bautista Alberdi and was used as the fundamental base of National Constitution, that would be enacted the following year.

to any kind of cultural diversification. On the contrary, the objective was cultural homogeneity, but conceived as European homogeneity, assuming that "racial diversity" could cause "serious social problems" (Garabedian, 2011:8).

Brazilian authorities fostered European immigration with the objective of "improving population quality" (Schramm Correa, 2005). Anyway, what they wanted was to replace the labour force that slavery had offered, because it was abolished in 1888. A decree enacted in 1980 was explicit from its first article that referred to exclusions in migratory aspects: "The entry to harbours of the Republic is completely free to valid and fit for work individuals not subject to any criminal action in their countries, with the exception of indigenes from Asia or Africa, who will be only admitted previous authorization of National Congress". As Ricardo Nóbrega said (2008: 118), the preference for European immigrants instead of people of Asian or African origins had to do with the adoption of the same stereotypical principles that "associated progress of developed nations to the characteristics of their people, which would be the result of racial belonging". In coincidence, Darcy Ribeiro (1992) stated that governments adopted "as a national project, the replacement of local people by European because they were considered to have an urgent desire for progress".

The Oriental Republic of Uruguay received large population waves from France, Spain and Italy that increased the population from 70,000 inhabitants in 1830 to one million in 1900. But this huge population contribution did not take place by chance. On the contrary, it was intentionally encouraged by local government that restricted explicitly the entry of migrants from other parts of the world and privileged Western Europeans, who became the owners of more than 50 per cent of rural lands and urban areas of the capital city.

With content that was similar to the preamble of Argentine Constitution, the Uruguayan Act 2096 that was put into force in 1890 established in its preface that "to the effects of this law, migrant is any honest and fit for work foreigner that would move to the Oriental Republic of Uruguay in a steam or sailing ship with a second or third class ticket and with the intention of fixing his residence in the country". But this preface offers a mistaken idea about the level of openness of migratory policy in this country. In fact, although this Uruguayan normative was inspired in Argentine 1876

Immigration and Colonization Act, it also differed from this because it gave precisions about which were the migratory patterns clearly rejected. In its 26º article, the law established restrictions on beggars, persons that suffered a contagious illness, individual not fit for work as a result of a physical problem and sixty years old people except that "they were accompanied with four people fit for work". Anyway, limitations exposed in 27º article were openly racist because it prohibited "Asian and African immigration, as well as the immigration of people known as Hungarians and Bohemians." (LópezSala, 2005)

IV. Conclusion

According to Aristide Zolberg (1989), the role played by government policies related to the development of international migrations is central. An archetypical example is the already analysed case of the United States, country that emerged as a "nation of immigrants, no doubt, but not of any immigrant" because "since de moment they began to manage their own affairs, just before political independence, the Americans have made the decision of determining who could join them" (Zolberg, 2008). Other host countries, to a greater or lesser extent, put into practice selective policies that led migrants to face obstacles, sometimes insurmountable, as soon as they transformed into undesirable elements.

Although it is true that regulations varied depending on economic conditions, for the most part these restrictions had its foundations in colonial ideology, centralized in the idea of racial hierarchy. As Paul Gilroy (2008: 29) said: "Race has been essential to the elaboration of a political anatomy of 19th century. As this concept came to be really scientific, it became an important aspect of European geopolitics inside a process of transition to its world leadership that was reinforced and legitimized thanks to an adapted application of Darwin ideas".In the end, the discourse of racial superiority emerged as the ideological base of imperial domination and defined the essence of White nations as a reservoir of societies that were phenotypically and culturally opposed to a non-Western world characterized as uncivilized.

During the historical age of overseas migratory expansion, these ideological principles were reproduced in host territories that had different political

conditions, economic needs and international positions. United Kingdom government, with its colonial leadership, founded immigration restrictions in the same position of superiority that have led the country to conquer a great part of the world. The United States and Canada targeted the non-European others as a dangerous presence. It was not difficult to justify restrictions to the entry of persons that belonged to non-Western category as soon as they were characterized as polluting stereotypes of a constructed cultural homogeneity. And, for the same reason, they became the recurrent scapegoat in times of unemployment and economic problems.

The creole elites of Latin-American countries that became independent states during 19th century tried to construct a European national essence, with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay as paradigmatic examples. Supporting this idea implied specific actions, like the extermination of indigenous people[8] and campaigns organised to promote European immigration. It was also an ideology that not only sought to marginalise indigenous communities and other non-Western peoples, like those of African descent; more radically, as in the Argentine case, the purpose was to invisibilise them, denying these communities as part of the social fabric and, consequently, trying to hide racism. This kind of concealment has been also put into practice in Brazil, a country that was defined as mestizo, adjective that was widespread by local sociologist Gilberto Freyre (1942). This word intended to define a society where origins were mixed-up and, consequently, discrimination was not a possibility. In comparison with Anglo-Saxon world, this local sociologist assessed that in his country there were no hostility between "the White and the Black, master and slave" because "we are two halves living in fraternity that enrich one another". For its part, the United States set up a fiction of equality of rights since 1868, when the doctrine separate but equal was put into practice.

During modern times, European countries that had sold enslaved Africans during centuries to America and colonised remote territories, homogeneity of Western civilization seemed to be protected by geographical distance. Nevertheless, migratory movements put an end to distance. While empires still existed, many individuals from colonies swelled labour force in European metropolis and others took up studies in that continent. After Second World War, this influx became more significant.

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8. During the 19th century, in Argentina took place the Desert Campaign and the Conquest of the Desert that led to the displacement and assassination of indigenous people followed by the occupation of their lands that were going to be distributed among the members of an elite close to state power.

Extended international migrations resulted in what Paul Gilroy calleda new world of "conviviality", term that he defines as the process of cohabitation and interaction that have turned multiculturalism in a common and daily feature of social life in urban areas of the world that transformed itself after colonial experience (Gilroy, 2008). However, far from being considered an enriching experience, this multiculturalism began to be observed as a threat to European and the White civilization. Others' communities have been characterized as potentially dangerous and rejected inside a xenophobic context, as soon as they were held liable to unemployment, crime and lack of security. With the rise of migrations waves, racialist and discriminatory perceptions strengthened and resulted in the denial of rights such as labour, education and decent housing.

Segregation or invisibilization became preferred policies inside modern nation-states that configured themselves in the ideology of European superiority and social homogeneity, qualifying people from non-Western countries as polluting to national identity. The entrenchment of this ideology implied that it has not been enough to abolish slavery or put an end to colonization; a highly racialized thought persisted over time (Calvès, 2008) and after the declaration of independence elites of former colonized countries applied to immigrants the same kind of discrimination that they have suffered before and continued to experience inside a neo-colonialist background.

Although the cases that have been approached are neither unique nor exhaustive, they show the common principles shared by countries that became main host territories during 19th and early 20th centuries. At the opposite ends of the world, in an imperialist metropolis or in recently independent territories that began to share the common characteristic of migrant receiving countries, the category of undesirable was consolidated on the same racialized stereotypes and, consequently, led to the definitive internalisation of human classifications that developed inside the colonial world.

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Digitalization of long distance nationalism, diaspora and their on-line political participation via internet

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I. Introduction

As stated by Oiarzabal and Reips (2012), "The study of how migrants utilize computer-based and mobile technologies to communicate, interact, exchange information, promote cultural and religious practices, and enhance political mobilization across borders is becoming a substantial body of theoretical consideration and empirical research." (p. 1334). It can be understood easily that the wide spread of Internet usage began from 1990's and the proliferation of its use due to the development of technology changed the way of lives of the transnational groups. Opposite to the conventional media tools such as radio, television or newspapers, the Internet has enabled the potential audience to be remote and not a location determinant in other words, by its nature, the Internet has given the migrants the opportunity to reach and create knowledge and content in a broadened manner. Accordingly, as stated by Kissau and Hunger (2008):

> "The internet offers immigrants possibilities -more than traditional print and audiovisual media can- to publish their opinions online and contribute to the formation of public opinion. Since migrants today lead a life between two poles which is speaking multiple languages, moving between two cultures and feel part of more than one society and pursue interest in regarding politics in two countries, internet as an alternative public sphere has potential to influence the public opinion and initiate social change." (p. 5).

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Thus, the increasing number of using the Internet as a communication tool by diaspora, has caused a big turn in migration research and the scope through which we look at mobilization around the globe. The diffusion of Internet, mobile communication, digital media, and a variety of tools of social software have prompted the development of horizontal networks of interactive communication that connect local and global in chosen time (Castells, 2007). As a matter of fact, -with reference to two case studies in view- this paper intends to highlight the possible effect of ICT's on certain diaspora groups' political participation to their homeland by focusing on the 'WHY's and 'HOW's. It is crucial to emphasize that the Internet is not only about information gathering or sharing, but also it is a creative space that includes emotions; diaspora online may create new forms of citizenships, community and political practices. (Bernal, 2006, p.161)

In light of this information, this paper aims to examine two certain diaspora groups, which are Kurdish and Turkish. However, since these two specific groups are quite broad, especially the Turkish diaspora who are secularist-nationalists, namely Kemalists, and the Kurdish diaspora which demands a national territory for Kurdistan will be focused upon. Furthermore, their engagement with on-line tools in terms of political participation will be exemplified and an attempt will be made to support it with the theory of long distance nationalism, which was introduced to the literature by Benedict Anderson in 1992; thus, with the innovations of technology, the concept is highly digitalized. Additionally, political participation, in general, can be understood in two dimensions: electoral and non-electoral. When diasporic participation in politics is considered, this paper focuses on non-electoral participation. By non-electoral participation, what is meant is demonstrations, digital activism through social media tools, online campaigns, e-mail initiatives, lobbying and so on.

II. The Transformation of Diaspora as A Dynamic Concept

To begin with, it is essential to touch upon the definition of the concept of 'diaspora', which was transformed by different scholars by using it in different scopes. The short section of diaspora definition will be followed by the introduction of the two groups of the diaspora who are the core of the paper. "Diaspora" can be interpreted as a concept of a core debate in transnational and migration related studies as it was mentioned above. Although lots

of scholars work on this concept, by its definition, it may sound blurry, simply because its earlier and current uses are different from each other. What is seen in a literature review is that, during its use, the term diaspora has transformed dramatically and there is no consensus in terms of its definition in the scholarship. Diaspora was originally an ancient Greek word used to describe the Greeks that were dispersed. Even though it is a common concept which is debated among contemporary scholars, the word has not been used in another language but the Greeks, before the 19th Century. Additionally, until mid-20th Century, the term was only used in relation to theology or religious studies; namely, the Jewish diaspora (Dufoix, 2003). When one looks up a dictionary, diaspora is defined as "to disperse" commonly. It means that the diasporic groups are scattering from their homeland to various destinations. Also, the Bible also refers to the Jewish diaspora who were exiled from Israel by the Babylonians. Moreover, starting from 1950's, there have (been) occurred a change in terms of not limiting the concept only with religion or the Jews; so, the concept started to be secularized. In other words, "diaspora" is now used more commonly to describe any migration pattern. Thus, following this secularization, various studies were conducted in the 1960's such as: Asian diaspora (by examining Chinatowns), the black diaspora and the Palestinian diaspora. Following the increase of transnationalization; Armenians, Turks and Indian diasporas were also studied in 80's and in 90's when diaspora studies made its peak, the Tibetan, Caribbean, Algerian, Iranian, Latin American, Russian and Afghan diasporas were also researched. Furthermore, "diaspora" as a concept has broadened itself with the rapid rise in the chances of mobility of various groups throughout the world and used for more than one group of migrants. As also claimed by Dufoix (2003):

> "In this way, "diaspora" has become a term that refers to any phenomenon of dispersion from a place; the organization of an ethnic, national, or religious community in one or more countries; a population spread over more than one territory, the places of dispersion; any non-territorial space where exchanges take place, and so on." (p.2)

Nevertheless, it is essential to mention that even though its use in literature and media tools is widened, not all scholars agree with the expanded use of diaspora such as Medam (1993), claiming that the concept loses its distinctive character when it includes more than it was intended originally (cited in Dufoix,

2008). However, this paper uses the broadened definition of diaspora while mentioning the Kurdish and Turkish diaspora, who are scattered with specific political views and ethnic belongings.

III. Theoretical Framework

Benedict Anderson, whose work "Imagined Communities" in 1983 argues the origins of nationalism, introduced the concept of "Long distance nationalism" in 1992 and this concept gave social scientists a base to study the political actions of diasporic groups. The concept is identical to the classical understanding of nationalism as seeing nation which people share a common history and the land. However, the only difference that long distance nationalism differs itself from the classical notion is the situation of being remote from the country of origin; thus, long distance nationalism can be interpreted as the action of diasporic groups in terms of the effect the politics of their country of origin without actually being in there. This certain group of diaspora is politically active regarding the country of origin and not only migration but the force of nation state establishments created these long distance nationalists (Thobani, 2018).

As explained by Schiller (2005):

> "Long distance nationalism is a set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various locations to a specific territory that they see as their ancestral home; moreover, forms of actions taken by those nationalists may range from 'voting, demonstrating, lobbying, contributing money, creating works of art' to 'fighting, killing and dying' (p.570).

According to Anderson (2001), politics no longer depends on territorial location in a home country (p.42). It can be said that the phenomenon of long distance nationalism becomes even more common and digitalized with the development of Internet based communication technologies, which enables the political participation easier without territorial considerations. In this way, it can be stated that within cyberspace, nationalism finds ways to arouse. Mainly the Internet, cheap communication, travels and money transfer technologies helped the diasporic groups to practice long

distance nationalism commonly. With the digitalization aspect of long distance nationalism, opportunities such as gaining political information, participate political discussions, creating political contents and running political campaigns online and even, organizing and gathering become possible.

As Anderson explained in 1998 (cited in Dieckhoff, 2017), long distance nationalism has two specific characteristics: unaccountability and instrumental function. As Dieckhoff (2017) further explains it, the unaccountability refers to the fact that the long distance nationalist are enjoying democratic states that they are living in and they can - but not necessarily- celebrate some excessive political ideas without being scared of any sanction. Thus, the instrumental function gives a self confidence to the diaspora since it helps to make the ethnic identity stronger and take up arms against the ones who are oppressed. In other words, the long distance nationalists have freedom of speech and are proud of their ethnicity.

Furthermore, by globalization and transnationalized world and the ways of lives, diasporic groups are carrying their languages, culture and ideologies with them along their mobility paths. Thus, combined with the opportunities of the Internet based technologies, the diasporic groups' possibility of engaging with their country of origins became a part of daily life. The rapid development of the communication tools eased the contrast of the inside and outside and differed the dimension of belonging. Therefore, the practical part of belonging is political participation offline and online, which made possible with the ICT`s that create digitalized long distance nationalism (Dieckhoff, 2017). By using online tools, diaspora creates a "virtual community" or "virtual neighborhoods", as Appardurai (1996) discusses, in cyberspace.

Moreover, due to human motion and the emergence of virtual communities, political struggles are no longer territorially bounded. Thus, most scholars agree upon the fact that migrant communities maintain a considerable impact on the politics of the homeland. (Bock-Luna 2007, p. 20 & Demmers 2002, p. 91). Although "whether the political participation of diaspora has an effect into the home countries or not" is a huge debate and carry importance, what this paper tries to see is "in what ways the internet may affect the specific diasporic groups' political participation". The main questions are that does the internet has an effect on political participation

of diaspora, if yes, in what ways and with which reasons the internet and online participation is preferred by certain groups. The concept of long distance nationalism combined with ICTs' are creating a recipe in order to answer this question.

IV. How to Become a Diaspora? Turks and Kurds

In this paper, two distinct groups of diaspora engagement with homeland politics via online communication tools are intended to be discussed. These two groups are the Turkish diaspora who are Kemalists that idealize nationalist and secularist political view, and the Kurdish diaspora who calls for a national territory. These two groups are particularly chosen since as Şenay (2013) argues, "Kemalist long distance nationalism is different than standard forms of diasporic activism" which is going to be explained further; in addition, since the Kurdish people are one of the major stateless nation in the world.

The Turkish diaspora, which dispersed throughout the world, is concentrated in Germany. The main reason of this density is the "guest worker" agreements between Germany and Turkey, which was signed in the 60's and applied until the 1973 oil crisis. The temporary agreement of guest workers due to the lack of labor force in Germany did not stop as it was planned, but just the contrary, mass migration to Germany and further policies such as family reunification was implemented. Furthermore, in 70's and 80's due to the political crisis in Turkey because of the military coup, political exiles also flee to mainly Europe and also to overseas countries. Another reason of the diaspora who are Turkish is the so-called "brain-drain" of certain elite population. There exists a significant number of researches in literature about the working class Turkish migrants, who are from rural areas and have low education levels, in terms of their behaviors about cultural preservation, integration and problems of identity construction. However, the scholars did not touch upon the political exiles or the brain-drain diaspora as much as it was done with guest workers.

This paper particularly centers upon the diasporic elites who are carrying the values of the founder of Turkish Republic, Atatürk, by emphasizing secularism, modernity and westernization. This specific group is identified as "Kemalists" which is the ideology of the Turkish republic since its foundation. This group of diaspora is known as having contrary views as

opposed to the current ruling political party (AKP) which was elected in 2002. AKP, a political party which identifies itself as a conservative and religious thing has been criticized and even protested by Kemalist diaspora about certain policy implementations, actions or even about any political speech of AKP members which sounds non-secular. Kemalist long-distance nationalists fear that the current state institutions are affected and corrupted by religious reactionaries. (Şenay, 2013, p. 377).

Moreover, according to Skrbiš (cited in Şenay, 2013), long-distance nationalism develops only if an emigrant population contains a critical mass of political exiles that has experienced a loss of status in their homeland. Kemalist diaspora and Kurdish diaspora are differentiated exactly at this point by Kemalists for not being an exiled community. Unlike the Kurdish diaspora, Kemalists diaspora is not an ethnic minority group that was repressed previously, but a group that is not satisfied with the current political agenda of Turkey and migrated due to different reasons such as education.

Further, the Kurdish people, who have no valid and official national territory, are mainly living in four different countries, which are Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Their own history consists of constant fights for their autonomy; however, due to the signed treaty of Lausanne after First World War by the new Turkish Republic, their hope for autonomy declined dramatically since the borders of Turkey were drawn certainly and no referendum was done about Kurdish autonomy. At the same time, it is essential to mention that the majority of Kurdish people is living in east Turkey are exposed to high rates of discrimination and repression by the government and the society for decades as a minority. Thus, due to the xenophobia they have experienced, economic reasons and the political climate in Turkey, since 1970's, mass migration to Europe has occurred. The migration of Kurdish people -who were living in Turkey- to Europe made to its peak when "Guest worker" agreements was signed, however, they were considered Turkish since they were holding a Turkish citizenship. In addition to the guest worker contracts, another wave of migration has happened after 1980's military coup since they were basically responding the political crisis of Turkey because of the increased repression.

Moreover, Başer (2013) mentions that there are no reliable statistics about the population of Kurdish people in Europe. The major consensus about

the estimations is around 850,000 Kurds who live in Europe, although other sources claim that the number is closer to one million with 85 % of them coming from Turkey and some states that number of Kurds living in Europe is even far more than two million. Therefore, until further empirical research is conducted to produce an accurate census of the Kurdish population living in Europe, the numbers will lack full credibility (p. 8). Even though the population of Kurdish people in Europe is uncertain, this does not change the fact that while they were not able to live their culture openly and speak their language freely in Turkey; thus, they gained freedom abroad by gaining the chance to express their existence without repression. This fact shows that this specific diasporic group earned the possibility to speak out without pressure, get organized without fear and be active politically about their "call for nation- Kurdistan". Furthermore, the situation of being active as creating associations, gatherings and protests has been expanded beyond the approximate audience of the Kurdish diaspora due to the rapid development of Internet and computer-based communication technologies. In other words, the Internet gave the Kurdish diaspora the opportunity to gather in virtual neighborhoods within the cyberspace which has a much broader audience throughout the world.

As a matter of fact, as Shiller categorized (2005) that while Kurdish diaspora belongs to the "separatist movement" which has the aim to have autonomy in a desired territory or a completely new state order; also, Kemalist diaspora belongs to the "regime change" which is not about territorial boundaries of a state but about a change of a certain political power or a party who is in power. Hence, diaspora communities can easily participate in conflicts in their homelands and live their politics long-distance thanks to the speed of communications as stated by Demmers (2002, p.88). In the next section, the effect of Internet on Kurdish and Turkish Kemalist diaspora and their political participation will be illustrated; also, how and why they utilize computer-based communication technologies will be exemplified.

V. On-Line is The New Politics: Two Case Studies

In 1996, Georges Prevelakis stated that the networks are inherent and fundamental elements of diaspora since they clarify their actual resurgence and their growing importance on the international arena (cited in Therwath, 2012). Thus, now in the 21st Century, it can be observed that on-line communication tools become widespread in the various spheres of life,

such as political activism and the long distance nationalism became even more possible and progressive to practice. The Internet as a cyberspace constitutes an area for diasporic communities where they can freely express them and speaks for the ones who are censored in their country of origin. It is a certain fact that access to the Internet can be banned or use of any social media can be prohibited by some nations. Also, the conventional media, which is dominated by certain power holders may also not reflect the ongoing situations of a country or do not picture the issues of minorities. By giving the opportunity of being anonymous, serving the alternative of freedom of expression and being relatively safe, the Internet is a great source for political participation online. Moreover, the usage of the Internet among diasporic communities increases with the possibilities of access; thus, throughout the internet, what one can see commonly are online platforms such as websites, on-line newspapers, Facebook groups or Twitter pages that are created by diasporic communities in order to actively participate into politics. In other words, the dispersed population of diaspora in a way creates their nation on-line once more by gathering in cyberspace and practices the digital long distance nationalism by participating in politics through the Internet.

(a) Call for a nation on-line –Kurdistan

Kurdish people due to the ongoing political crisis about their autonomy in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, has been repressed, lost their freedom of expression and remained nationless since ages. The conventional and also contemporary media tools are mostly banned in order them not to promote any views about Kurdish autonomy and their territory claims. While the TV channels are not giving any space to Kurdish voices, the same situation is valid in other media sources such as newspapers and radios. Hence, the usage of the Internet is sometimes undergoing controls and prohibitions by the governments. Such websites that carry the idea of autonomous Kurdistan and the cultural celebration of Kurdish people has the possibility to be restricted in terms of access. In the light of these circumstances, it can be understood easily that the Internet offers the Kurdish diaspora freedom of speech, a free platform to express themselves politically without fear. By also giving the users anonymity, digital communication tools became inviting to the ones who have access and literacy. Also, according to Georgiou (2002), the Internet expands the space of community communication, self-expression and self-representation, challenging boundaries and

restrictions, which is crucial for diasporic and excluded minority groups. (p. 1)

Long distance nationalism, which is discussed above, is not a new phenomenon as Kurdish nationalism. As Tas (2017) explains, the Kurds are diverse group and a great amount of them believes that the only way to terminate the situation of statelessness and put an end to the crisis is to have unity via nationalism from a long distance. Therefore, solidarity among Kurdish dispersed people can be seen first in the form of unions, NGO's and organizations such as the Kurdish Institute Paris, which was founded in 1983. Nevertheless, with the opportunities that internet gives to the users, non-electoral political participation has gained more contributors who are following or creating certain web-sides, on-line newspapers, joining to online platforms, chat rooms or bulletin boards, using social media tools, such as Twitter and Facebook, creating blogs or YouTube channels. Kurdish diaspora who "calls for a nation", who is a minority and has been prejudiced, has started to have the ability to reach others by being online, by being everywhere.

When the on-line platforms that are established by the diaspora are searched, one can find thousands of websites that share information about the Kurdish history, culture, population and politics. The main aim of these websites are to eliminate the bias about the Kurdish community and to inform the potential audience. Also, it is possible to find various social media accounts and on-line newspapers, which gives updates about current Kurdish politics. It is significant to emphasize that the news that are shared are mostly the ones that are not transmitted in the country of origin.

As Georgiou (2002) argues, in the cyberspace, Kurds are freely expressing their demand of a territory. Thus, in the Kurdish websites, the main ruling political agenda is the "call for a nation" in terms of a recognized land, human rights, and Kurdish language and culture preservation. For instance, the kurdishquestion.com, by saying it is not the "Kurdish problem" but the "Kurdish question", has news, opinions, interviews and article submission sections. The website is in English and also has Facebook and Twitter accounts linked to it. In the submission of article section, the website encourages activists, students, scholars or the Kurds to contribute by sending their ideas. Actually, in this way, the editors are encouraging the potential diaspora to participate the politics of origin

through online exchange of ideas. One can find different perspectives in the sections of the website about pro-Kurdish rights and pro-Kurdistan; thus, by publishing in English, it can be assumed that the aim is to reach a mass population. Also, in the news section, a transcription of an interview with Barzani, president of Kurdish Democratic Party, which was done in the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland is published. One of the main highlighted answers given by him is;

> "Question: There are rumors that your dream is to have an independent Kurdistan, an independent Kurdish state. Will you declare independence?
>
> Answer: It is neither a rumor nor a dream. It is a reality that will come true. We will do everything in order to accomplish this objective, but peacefully and without violence." (Washington Post, 2017)

The significance of this interview is not that the "call for a nation" is expressed in a worldwide organization, but the invisibility of this interview in any national media or broadcasting of any country that the Kurds live; Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Thus, the interview and the attendance of Barzani to the event can be found as news in the on-line newspapers, blogs or in various social media accounts, which are created, dominated and used by the diaspora. In short, the existence of Kurdish politics in this case, is only possible with the participation of the diaspora in cyberspace by sharing, debating and arguing this piece of the interview. It can also be said that, by long distance nationalism in a digitalized way, the Kurdish diaspora is an important tool to inform the ones who have no access to the news due to some restrictions and bans in the media. As put by Tas (2017), thanks to the Kurdish diaspora, the Kurdish issue was carried to the attention of international agenda.

Another example can be given from thekurdishproject.com, with their slogan "building compassion through news, education and people" in order to create a better understanding of Kurdistan and accomplish peace. The important thing is that the website has a blog section called "personal stories and insights" which gives the possibility to the Kurdish people to speak out online. The editors of the website state that the best ways to improve cross cultural understanding is by getting to know real people and

hearing their stories. Hence, while the stories, which also include political elements, are shared and commented by other diaspora, emotional support among themselves can also be observed.

Furthermore, apart from the website that brings the Kurdish people together, the individual social media accounts also carry importance in terms of creating a free area of expression. Activists throughout the world have the possibility to share news that is not broadcasted by the various media tools with their followers. Hence, even the names of the accounts are significant since they carry the main objective of the accounts. To illustrate, "longlivekurdistan" as a twitter account can be understood by its name that it is pro-Kurdistan. Also, its tweets and retweets show that there is an aim to reflect, "What is really happening?" via social media. The account is sharing some information about the protest of the illegal arrest of Kurdish officials in Turkey, in front of the Turkish consulate in NYC. This information as it can be imagined, cannot be found in Turkish newspapers or in any broadcasting tools.

Moreover, Rojname Kurdish news can also be given as an example of the restrictions of press and freedom of speech. Established fifteen years ago, the web-side is actually a search engine for information and Kurdish news. The permanent tweet of the account states that the Turkish Government had asked Twitter to remove the account permanently. However, the account, by tweeting the situation, informs the audience about it, since this does not take place in conventional media. The comments of the Kurdish diaspora throughout the world can be seen under the tweet of Rojname Kurdish news, about freedom of press, speech, being prohibited and being controlled. However, outside of the territorial context, this information is shared online. By "retweeting" this specific tweet, the individual accounts also inform their followers and by "mentioning" this tweet, it can be said they are participating their politics online.

Furthermore, it is not unusual to see online petitions, campaigns and real events that are organized through Facebook about the political agenda of the country of origins. Thus, this is only other way for a diaspora to participate in the politics on-line. In a highly transnationalized world, the Internet provides diaspora a borderless space where they can strengthen their community ties.
Finally, as also stated by Hunger and Candan (2008), the Internet offers a freedom of opinion and freedom of speech for the Kurds which is partially

illegal in their off-line world in country of origins. Also, the Internet connects Kurdish diaspora to their home regions by daily politics. In this case, it can be said that the restriction of their on-line existence in the country of origin matters and this results in gathering online around this topic; thus, the long distance nationalism and the solidarity among the community members are practiced, in a digital way. In short, the Internet has an effect on political participation of the Kurdish diaspora due to its facilities.

(b) On-line Nostalgia: Secular Nationalists – Kemalism

The Turkish diaspora, namely the Kemalists, is mainly the elite migrants with high education levels. It can be said that the reason of their diaspora status is because of the better education qualifications, also the point that they are hired in high paid jobs, westernized and far from the political tension of the past and today. In other words, the Kemalist diasporic group is not an exiled community and the reason why they are participating in politics online is not because of any historical repression as the Kurdish diaspora has gone through.

Moreover, as Şenay argues (2013), by the end of 90's, the political agenda in Turkey started to change by the victories of the current leading party, the AKP. While Kemalism being the official ideology of the Turkish Republic since its foundation, the Kemalists started to lose their positions in the society and the religious-driven policies of AKP started to take over the political sphere. This, of course, created an anxiety among the Kemalists and this situation continued to rise dramatically since today. Hence, the long distance nationalism of the Kemalists are not related to being repressed or ethnic minority, but related to the ideological affiliations; their ideological clash with AKP. In short, what motivates them to participate in Turkish politics while being abroad is simply because of an "activist nostalgia" (Şenay, 2013), a wish to transform the society as it was before. As it was imagined, their long distance nationalist acts and the digitalization process with the ICT's has also affected political participation.

Moreover, Gerbaudo (2012) argues that social media has a mobilizing role. It gives a shape to the way in which people come together and act together, or as he uses; social media "choreograph the collective action." (p. 20). In other words, what he mentioned is the expansion of social media usage, e.g. Facebook, into the physical sphere, which is the streets. Similarly,

Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have developed the concept of 'connective action' differing from the conventional concept of 'collective action'. The new concept is about the society's mobilization, linked with the modern communication tools. The main feature of the connective action is that the way activists use it. What is observed is the combination of social media usage with the real world activities such as protests and demonstrations.

Furthermore, in order to illustrate the theoretical background, which is given above, and link it to the digitalization of long distance nationalism, the Turkish case "Occupying Gezi" movement and to exemplify the diaspora involvement to Turkey`s elections, "oyveötesi.org" platform will be given as an example. To begin with, the movement has started in 2013 in May in Istanbul, in order to protect an urban space, Gezi Park from being demolished. In a short amount of time, due to the severe police attacks towards the protesters, the movement expanded through the whole country and to the world with the involvement of diasporic communities. As Gerbaudo exemplified it, stating that "Facebook event invitation" has started the Egyptian revolution in 2011 (2012, p.61), the same case occurred in Gezi Park movements too. Social media as a medium gave way to people to gather in the streets across the country via the Internet. However, since the #OccupyingGezi spread all over the country, social media usage, especially Twitter, was at its peak in order to communicate and gather information; internet access was cut by the Turkish government and some social media services were not able to be used. Thus, the mainstream media was also acting ignoring by broadcasting animal documentaries during the protests. As a reaction, stated by Imani Giglou et al. (2018) a twitter campaign #BugünTeleviyzonlariKapat (Turn off the Tv's Today) was initiated and the tendency to use social media increased accordingly. Moreover, that was the moment when the diasporic Kemalists started to participate in the events, which are the political and went "from the web to the streets" in their host countries to raise their voice for the ones who are censored in Turkey. Long distance nationalists gathered at the streets of many European cities and other capitals and twitter analysis show severe online participation from Europe (Imani Giglou et al., 2018)

The already existing ties between diasporic Turkish communities and their social capital in Turkey led to an information exchange about what was happening on the streets in. In this way, with the help of the Internet, they are actually involved into politics. As stated by Aknur (cited in Giglou,

d'Haenens, Ogan, 2016), by mid-June, international support was growing, particularly among areas of Europe with large Turkish communities. This support was expressed through social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, but also through public gatherings and protest marches (2014). Furthermore, activists in the diaspora had a major role about information sharing and raising awareness about what is happening in Gezi Park movements. With their social capital, they had the opportunity to gain information from the ones who are participating the uprising in Turkey; thus, the world's attention has been caught and reactions from all over the world, from NGO's, political leaders, supranational organizations' representatives took its place on media. It can be said that, not only, but also with the participation of migrants into their country of origins' politics; uprising movement was resulted eventually in not demolishing the Gezi Park in Istanbul.

Secondly, the platform "oyveötesi" which literally means "vote and beyond" is an initiative that was established in Turkey by some volunteers to ensure the fairness of elections and to promote voting in 2014. The volunteer initiative grown rapidly that it became an official and registered association, with approximately 50.000 volunteers throughout Turkey. The initiative according to Celebi (2015), co-founder of the platform, is the voter turnout, transparency around individual candidates, and independent election monitoring. What this initiative does during the election is that to first train the volunteers about the process, distribute the volunteers to the voting centers that these volunteers check during the election day if the voting procedure is carried out properly and at the end of the voting day to witness the vote counting and make a copy of the official document states the number of votes. Therefore, oyveötesi also created a crowd-sourced confirmation system called T3 (Türkiye Tutanak Teyit – Turkey Election Results Confirmation) that the volunteers enter the picture of that official document with vote numbers to the system and anyone who has internet connection can contribute to the verification of the vote counts. In 2018 elections of Turkey last July, the diaspora had to chance to contribute the politics online via this platform. By using that, one needs to simply calculate the total and enters it in the system, thus, when the same number is entered three times, the system validates the count and it becomes clear that there is no fraud at that vote center. In this way, long distance Kemalist nationalists participated in politics and online in order to make an influence on the elections, by being remote. With the help of the diaspora through T3

system, a difference of approximately 87.000 votes are realized and the necessary steps were taken to make corrections for the official count ("24 Haziran Seçimleri Ön Değerlendirme Raporu", 2018). The diaspora had the chance to be part of the politics and made an effect on Turkish politics.

All in all, the Kemalist diaspora who are eager to live their nostalgic past again by having the former Turkey back, tried to accomplish that via on-line tools. Their long distance nationalism has started to support the protestors in the field in Turkey by first spreading the information on-line; followed by real protest in different areas of the world. One more time, it can be said that the Internet has affected the participation into politics in a different way. A group of diaspora that is an opposition group of the current AKP government, has raised their voices through the possibilities of the Internet, created online events and gathered through social media as Gerbaudo, Bennett and Segerberg theorized it.

VI. Conclusion

All in all, diasporic communities' participation in their homeland politics is not a new phenomenon. However, how it is practiced by the means of digitalization has changed dramatically. Having a variety of tools and by being connected to the Internet gives vast opportunities to users. Internet communication and social media in particular are important towards facilitating such gatherings and creating space for expressions as it was illustrated. Thus, the way in which Internet gives diasporic communities the opportunity to participate in their country of origins' politics and the possibility of having affecting the amount of participation can be considered obvious.

Also mentioned by Candan and Hunger (2008), the "imagined community" of Anderson also adapts to the fact that how the Internet works. In a transnationalized world that we live in, the Internet gives opportunities to the users, the opportunities that were once given by print media in the previous centuries. Thus, with the usage of the Internet in order to participate in the politics on-line, the communities have the opportunity to strengthen the "we consciousness". An exiled community or not, the diaspora has gained their chance to be politically active while being distant to country of origins. Hence, while the 'WHY's can be identified as freedom of expression, speak for the censored ones, raise awareness and celebrate a

culture and ethnicity; the 'HOW's can be identified as social media usage, on-line newspaper publications, on-line petition creations and on-line event organizations that are carried to the streets. It is also beneficial to emphasize that, with the dynamic basis of politics and changing nature of technology, even more innovative ways to participate into politics via cyberspace have the possibility to come up.

However, despite the fact that the digitalization of long distance nationalism can be seen as optimistic, one should keep in mind that access to ICT's or Internet cannot be considered equal among the diasporic groups. Lack of access to means of technology or lack of education in terms of using the technology, which is the technological literacy, is likely to exist. Thus, when these differences are considered, inequalities among diasporic communities about participation in politics can be observed. The usage of cyberspace may vary in the spheres of gender, age, socio-economic status and the education level. Further research may focus on the same diasporic groups in order to identify these variations.

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Managing Migration in the Time of Economic Crisis: Example of Four EU Countries: (Germany, Spain, UK and Italy)

Yasin Kerem GÜMÜŞ*

Introduction

There is today the question of how (if at all) the recent financial crisis has impacted upon the policies associated with the management of labour migration and what forthcoming future research agenda might look like given the dramatic changes wrought by the recent EU financial crisis which started in 2008 and is still continuing. In this paper, I consider general EU migration policy (Koftman et al. 2008) as well as the framework of Migration Labour Supply (MLS) as argued by Pastore (2014) to investigate data from four EU countries: Germany, Spain, UK and Italy. To keep the research tractable, I focus narrowly on labour migration statistics from the UK's Labour Statistics Survey over the past one to two years, the source of which is the UK Migration Observatory's Report (Rienzo 2014), recognized as one of the UK's most authoritative sources of migration labour data.

It is largely accepted that the financial crisis has had a negative impact on the strength and agility of the labour markets, and as such there has been a large body of research in the area of labour migration and how it can be used to the benefit of the EU countries in navigating this period of recovery. It is noted throughout this analysis that there are likely to be certain effects of the economic crisis which will not be known for many years, if ever, and therefore the analysis here looks at the data available and the perceived issues that have arisen. This essay will look at the management of migration during economic crisis, using the example of four EU countries, Germany, Spain, UK and Italy. The EU migration policy before the crisis will be discussed, as well as how the crisis has influenced EU labour markets, and

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 EU policy reactions to the crisis.

EU Level Labour Migration Policy: Research Agenda before Crisis

Initially, it is important to understand the general principle of immigration and the ways in which it was being controlled and managed prior to the economic crisis. In order to appreciate why or how a specific course of action can impact on labour migration, it is first necessary to understand what was happening before the economic crisis took place. Research in this area has recognised that there are many different forms of migration and this in itself can go a long way towards explaining how EU migration policies will deal with labour migration (Kofman et al. 2008). It is noted that individuals will migrate for many different reasons, not only in pursuit of work, although this will ultimately still have an impact on the labour market, even if migrants are moving for other purposes such as asylum. On the whole, however, the focus here is on those who migrate for the purposes of gaining employment. Even where the individual moves from one country to another to seek work, there are going to be different impacts on the situation, depending on where the economic migrant has come from and for what reason. The migrant profile itself will also have a direct bearing on the willingness of an individual to move and to look towards opportunities in other regions (Tilly, 2013). There is also an additional difficulty in that an economic crisis may for a short period of time create unusual movement, particularly if there is a real shortage of work in one region that will encourage individuals to seek employment or choose to move from country to country, rather than to return home, due to the social protection that is being offered. The economy itself will become much more informal in nature, as well, with some people seeking employment in different industries or looking for ad-hoc work that may not be on the formal register and will not be part of the statistics (Galgoczi and Leschke, 2013).

The first aspect to look at when it comes to the issue of the economic crisis on migration is to consider what the impact has been during the immediate period of the crisis and the changes that have emerged. Prior to the economic crisis, the population across the EU had grown by a total 9.5

million, in the years between 2001 and 2008, with the majority of migrants within the EU coming from countries outside of the EU. This indicates that although there is certainly movement across the EU member states, the trend prior to the crisis was to encourage individuals from outside of the EU into the EU. This was however already in a declining position, with 66% of foreign migrants coming from outside of the EU in 2001, down to 63% in 2008. Prior to the economic crisis, the countries that saw the greatest influx of foreign individuals were Spain, Ireland and Cyprus, although this could be largely attributed to movement from other nations within the EU and cannot be attributed solely to the influx of foreign groups (Balan and Uzlau, 2010;85).

One particular difficulty is that there is likely to be some time lag between an economic slowdown and changes in migrant flows; therefore, the subsequent changes in policy are unlikely to take place immediately, thus making it hard to ascertain the exact impact of the economic crisis on migrant flows and the subsequent need for changes in EU level policy.

Despite this, the following relevant trends are important to note as it is likely to impact on the way the EU policy develops. Certain immediate impacts were felt; for example, Spain reported that the number of residence cards issued increased by only 7 per cent between 2008 and 2009, compared to 13 per cent in the previous year, showing that there was in fact an immediate reaction to the economic crisis in Spain, at least (Koehler, 2010; 13) . At this point, the overall policy had not changed, but there was still a shift in the desirability of the individuals to move from one region to another. Similarly, the net migration figure for the UK which is the surplus of people who were immigrating in excess of the people emigrating was 44 % lower in 2008 than it was in the previous year and the lowest since the accession to the EU in 2004 (Koehler, 2010; 14). This again is a clear indication that there has been a direct change of behaviours, without the change in policy. This needs to be borne in mind due to the need to ascertain whether the policy change will be required to adapt to the underlying economic changes, or whether it is necessary for the policy to shift to mitigate the effects of the changes that the market is making of its own accord. Certain sectors and regions remain in a position where they are recruiting, although it is clear that the general recruitment pattern is changing and in most cases slowing down. This will naturally have an impact on the ability and desirability of moving from region to region and the approach that the policy makers need

to take to mitigate the effects and lay down the foundations for economic recovery.

It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the economic crisis has created irregular migration, even if it is not necessarily a complete stop of migration or a complete change of factors that has an impact on migration. For example, by looking at the issue of illegal border crossing, this point relating to irregular migration can be considered fully.

When looking at the irregular migration flows, there is the additional challenge of having no real documentation; however, it is suggested that a similar slow down has been experienced, indicating that the economic crisis is having an impact on the legal and illegal movement of individuals seeking work between countries. A large amount of the changing influence could be seen by looking at the way in which temporary worker permits are being handled. There is some indication that, whilst there has been a reduction in the number of individuals choosing to remain in a country and simply waiting for matters to improve, these decisions are not necessarily related to policy changes, but to the needs of the individuals involved and the decisions that they make.

The area of temporary employment permits offers a real opportunity to understand the cause and effect of the economic crisis, indicating that the policy itself may not be the main driver of change, but rather the actual market forces themselves. Furthermore, temporary workers will have to readjust their position regularly and whilst the policy may impact on their decision making processes, it is not the sole driver and may even be a reaction to the position, rather than the cause of the change in the first place. One of the main indicators of illegal residences is in the number of forced removals, with figures indicating that this number has dropped substantially between 2008 and 2009, indicating that there was seemingly a reduction in the amount of migration, both legal and illegal, and a willingness of those on temporary contracts to leave the country in which they were resident on return home. Essentially, this suggests that as the economic crisis emerged, there was an immediate change in policy, yet the changes in behaviours were dramatic, even in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis (Dobson et al., 2009).

Bearing this in mind, the next part of the analysis shall consider the

theoretical changes that the economic crisis has had on labour migration and how this then needs to be tacked from the EU level policy makers in this area.

What has the Economic Crisis changed in the EU Labour Markets?

Economic crises also affect different sectors of the economy differently. It has been shown that both the high-end as well as non-profit sectors tend to suffer shortfalls in times of economic crisis. For instance, the care sector can be hard hit by cutbacks or new local or federal constraints (see Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). As I shall explain later, gender inequalities can also be exacerbated in times of economic crisis.

From the beginning of the economic crisis in mid 2008 and two years later in 2010, four million jobs were lost across the total of the EU (for all types of workers, both migrants and local workers) (ECB, 2012; 7). It is noted when looking at the number of jobs lost that this is somewhat smaller than the expected losses, based on the reduction of GDP, indicating a muted reaction from the labour markets (ECB, 2012;39). The other distinction that seemed to emerge in the post crisis trend was the speed of recovery, with some countries recovering quickly and others having a much longer recovery period.

The evidence also suggests that there were large divergences in terms of the worker groups themselves, with the level of unemployment being very much focussed on certain industries such as construction and manufacturing, with those who are in the younger age category being worst hit, during the economic crisis. This could largely be seen as recognition of how the institutions themselves have reformed and handled their key employment policies. This concept will be explored further as, if the companies themselves have changed their employment policies to focus on certain groups and to make others redundant. It would seem that this will then naturally lead to a different migration policy from the EU, as a whole. For example, if the economic crisis has hit those within the age category of 16 to 24 years old, then it would be expected that the EU level policies would support those within the age category, in order to reverse this trend.

Several trends have emerged and are relevant in this discussion; each will

be looked at in turn. Labour hoarding refers to the trend towards reducing hours of work, rather than reducing head count. This means that employers are recognising that they wish to retain staff members, particularly those with specific expertise and therefore do not want to release these individuals into the labour market, but instead want to reduce the wage bill. This trend of labour hoarding and placing staff onto part time contracts has both positive and negative consequences. Theoretically, therefore, those countries that encourage labour hoarding and part time contracts in this way will, on paper, seem to be managing the economic crisis in a better way, with a lesser number of jobs being lost.

Secondly, certain industries and sectors have suffered quite a bit more, but again, this could be seen to be a reaction to the previous boom within the housing sector and as the bubble burst on the housing industry, this had an immediate impact on the construction sector, with some countries in the EU then also having a more direct impact on the statistics, depending on their reliance on the construction industry.

When organisations are making decisions relating to employment, they will assess the nature of the shock that their industry or GDP changes are impacting on the long term demand. For example, where there is a sudden but dramatic shock such as a terrorist attack, the companies may choose to make little or no change to the employment pattern, recognising that this will be a temporary state. As such, there is a need for the companies to assess what they perceive to be the long term impact on the economic crisis and whether they believe it will last for a long or short period of time. The economic crisis on the whole however was perceived to be a long term factor and organisations typically recognised the need to readjust their employment decisions on a long term basis. Whilst this may not necessarily mean the need to remove employees urgently, it would naturally have an impact on the willingness to recruit new staff at a rate that would have been undertaken previously. This may also have an impact on the willingness of employees to leave their current employment, even if they are unhappy due to concerns about the availability of alternative employment. Essentially, the perceptions of the employers and employees are likely to be as important as the actual reality itself (Finotelli, 2014).

Divergences that already existed within the employment industry are such that they remained present during the economic crisis, but simply

became more obvious. As previously noted, education and attainment and skills are providing a real split in the reactions to the economic crisis, with those who are low skilled or have less in the way of experience suffering considerably more than those with specific skills who were largely retained within the organisations. This also had a geographic impact, with some countries which focus more on low skilled industries facing a much greater challenge than others. Similarly, the trend when looking at temporary workers was also seen to be distinct from those on permanent contracts. More specifically, it would seem reasonable that employers would look to end the contracts of temporary staff or simply not renew a contract during periods of economic difficulty, thus making temporary workers much less likely to remain in employment during this time. Temporary workers are therefore typically more vulnerable to any changes in the economic cycle and this again may have an impact on the migration situation, with migrant workers often being employed on short term or temporary contracts.

It is well known fact that the young persons within the working environment are more vulnerable to redundancy and will then find it harder to obtain long term employment and to gather the necessary skills to be attractive.

Another area of trends that is worth looking at, from the point of view of analysing the policy reactions, is to consider the trends in employment, from the point of view of how long those who are unemployed remain unemployed. During 2008 and 2009, there was an immediate increase in the number of unemployed people as an immediate reaction to the economic crisis; therefore, a real area of interest is how long this unemployed state continues for.

Long term unemployment (i.e. unemployment that lasts more than a year) slowly began to increase, indicating that those who were laid off during the economic crisis were then finding it difficult to gain fresh employment. Arguably, it is this factor that is particularly worrying to the labour migration trends, as those who are in certain jurisdictions are not necessarily able to find employment and will therefore look to move locations, whether this be returning to their home country or travelling from a home country to a more buoyant region. Where the situation is thought to be temporary, it is possible that people will not move and change their lives substantially, merely as a result of what is thought to be a short term situation. Migration and the desire to migrate are going to increase as the likelihood of

employment decreases. When it comes to migration, it could be argued that there are going to be pull and push factors, with the pull factors being the promise of greater opportunities elsewhere and the push factors relating to the lack of opportunities in the home country effectively pushing these individuals into migration outside of the home country.

The framework proposed by Pastore (2014) of 'Migrant Labour Supply' (MLS) policies is relevant here. Pastore argues that states and regions seek to exercise agency and control in times of economic crisis, by determining and constantly adjusting the composition of MLS through various policy mixes. Interestingly enough, MLS policies can act be, according to Pastore (2014, 385), a fundamental expression of states' 'country-specific attempts' to control the incentives, flow and overall effects of migrant labour supply; this is an important form of agency in the field of labour migration, especially in times of major economic fluctuations. I also contend that such national MLS policy mixes can be explained as country-specific attempts to find and constantly adapt 'paths of least resistance' meant to maximise fulfilment of labour immigration demands while minimising resistances to it (ibid, 385).

In other words, the European crisis can be clarified through a framework that allows, firstly, for periods of "actual regulation of transition periods" in recognition of the right to full freedom of movement between workers in acceding countries of the European Union and also giving recognition to 'indirect' labour migration policies that are "aimed at granting, facilitating or boosting access to domestic labour markets to immigrants originally admitted for reasons other than work (humanitarian, family, study, etc. (ibid, p. 387).

Barry (2014) discusses the gender dimension of the EU crisis, and notes that while at the EU level there was an increased emphasis on gender equality, especially in terms of employment policy this changed radically following the crisis. Barry (2014, p. 2) identifies four stages in the development of the European Employment Strategy (EES), pointing out that the first two stages (which were before the crisis) included guidelines on gender equality, and included the "mainstreaming of gender equality across all policy areas". However, phase 3 and phase 4, (which was developed during the crisis), did not include any guidelines on gender equality. Barry further points out that while the crisis led to dramatic changes in employment rates and a narrowing of the gender gap between employment rates of men

and women, this did not necessarily reflect a positive change in terms of gender equality, but rather reflected "the faster deteriorating employment situation of men across the EU particularly during the first stage of the crisis" (p. 3).

Although the economic crisis can be seen to have been impacting on all countries across the EU, there have been some notable areas that are worse hit, such as the countries of Ireland, Spain and Estonia, all of which had different labour dynamics, prior to the economic crisis, but which are now seemingly suffering a more dramatic and more sustained period of decline. With this in mind, the discussion here now moves on to look at the policy measures that have been adopted to tackle the issue, both EU wide and from a more regional basis.

What are the EU Level Policy Reactions to the Crisis?

Before discussing the reaction to the crisis, it is helpful to look at the institutions and structural issue that had been put in place, prior to the crisis. For example, tax wedges and the reduction of benefits for the unemployed individuals by ensuring that the benefits offered to those who are unemployed are not as financially viable as gaining employment would be. This means that individuals would be less inclined to remain on benefits and would actively seek employment. Whilst this may have been effective for those who are actively avoiding employment, it does not offer a solution where individuals are actually seeking employment, but the jobs do not exist.

Both the countries that have typically received the immigrants and those that the immigrants move away from are going to be impacted on by these changes. Each of the policy responses will be looked at in turn (Düll, 2012).

Migration policies themselves will clearly have a direct and real impact on the migrant flows. National governments will naturally look towards applying policies in such a way that their own recovery is as quick and efficient as it can be. The immediate reaction in most cases across the EU is that of the need to restrict the number of third party nationals who enter into their country, by tightening the border controls, particularly in terms of the unskilled labour that is susceptible to the downturn, at a greater rate than the highly skilled individuals. For example, in the UK, a migrant approach that involves points is used to ensure that only those with a skill that is in

short demand are able to enter the country, on a labour or working basis. Direct migrant policies are however somewhat reactive in nature and will not necessarily look towards the long term demographic changes. Instead, the migration policies will consider the security of the country and will look to protect the position of the country, rather than seeking long term growth and development.

Despite this, there are some EU level strategies that have been adopted and are extremely relevant to the discussion here.

Stockholm Programme

This was a strategic approach adopted during the crisis itself as a means of updating the existing Hague Programme, in light of the underlying economic conditions. The programme was adopted at the 2009 European Council and focused on promoting citizenship and fundamental rights, justice, security, enhancing border management, and the development of "a comprehensive and flexible migration policy" for the period from 2010 to 2014 (Europa, 2010, n. p.). Given the timing of this programme, it is unsurprising that its approach to migration is somewhat different from other policies. Crucially, this programme did not focus fully on increasing the level of migration and movement, but rather looked more towards creating harmonisation and consistency, in terms of asylum and immigration policy. In particular, the EC Action Plan Communications state that the growth of the economic crisis should not prevent countries from looking towards integrating and developing a common migration policy, whatever that may be. This has been taken forward with the Europe 2020 Strategy. Nevertheless, the European Migration Report (2014) states that a significant development of this programme regarding circular migration was the adoption of Directive 2014/36/EU that stipulated the conditions for entry and stay of third-country nationals for employment purposes as seasonal workers. Four EU countries (Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Poland) introduced new legislations aimed at encouraging labour migrants to carry out temporary work in member states in order to improve their professional experience or set up business following their return to their country of origin. A project was also launched in 2013 called the Post-Stockholm programme, aimed at setting out further steps to be taken in terms of freedom, security and justice and to, among other things, improve the attractiveness of the European Union through adopting sound admission policies and enhancing mobility

rights within the EU. This programme also aims to take into consideration the impact the economic crisis will have on both migrant workers and EU citizens, and the structural limits brought about by the severe strain national budgets have been under due to the economic crisis (European Policy Centre, 2013).

Europe 2020

Interestingly, Europe 2020 actually looked at the fact that there were labour shortages in certain regions and in specific industries. This was not therefore focussed on reducing movement or encouraging people to remain within their home territory, but rather on ensuring consistency of treatment, so that Europe as a whole becomes more competitive as an overall unit. The EU policy therefore seems to be focused on the idea that the EU should be operating as one overall whole, with a view to being competitive globally, rather than focussing on dealing with competition across the EU itself and between member states (Card and DiNardo, 2002).

Several priorities have been identified as part of the ongoing strategy for Europe, in relation to migration in the wake of the economic crisis. The main strategy is to try to ensure that the knowledge and information side of the economy is developed to ensure that there is ongoing growth, rather than looking at the lower skilled roles that have been hit hard by the economic crisis. Whilst individual countries such as the UK have looked at reducing access to their country, particularly for those likely to be utilising the benefit system, the EU policy is much more about achieving long term growth and developing skills to make the EU competitive overall (Beets and Willekens, 2009).

Of particular note is the fact that the EU policy agenda titled 'New Skills, New Jobs' recognises that the focus is on up-skilling every element of the workforce, rather than simply excluding or segregating those who are seen as being low skilled. Bearing in mind this general EU agenda, it is clear to see that there are likely to be distinctions between the EU and the individual countries which may be taking a more protectionist stance and preventing migration and the EU wishing to simply create one overall coherent strategy for the benefit of the EU overall.

Recognising that there may be differences between the demands of the EU and the individual countries wishing to do something distinctive to protect

their own position, the EU has now produced guidelines for national governments as to how they can individually assist with the establishment of a coherent EU policy (Chappell et al., 2009).

Admission restrictions have emerged at a national level across the EU, as a result of this shift in EU policy. For example, in Italy, they have established specific quotas for migrant workers, with this being all but eliminated in 2009 to anyone except tourist workers or agricultural workers on a short term contract. Other countries such as Portugal and Croatia have also reduced their quotas. Similarly, Spain and the UK reduced their quotas, but did so, on the basis of skills and the skills' shortages that are in existence at that time. This would seem to be a much more logical approach, due to the fact that the economic crisis has had a direct impact on certain industries and, as such, by restricting migration of some skills, it is sensible that this will then create a better employment set of opportunities for the nationals in the country.

Despite the economic crisis and the attempted restrictions on migration, there has been little change in the willingness of countries to open up new lines of migration and to consider offering greater opportunities across the EU. Although the changes are such that the countries themselves are looking at ways of restricting and managing the flows of migrants in such a way that supports long term economic recovery, on the whole, the policy for migration, regardless of precisely how it is undertaken across the EU, is that of restricting the inflow of low skilled individuals. Some countries, however, have gone a little further and have actually openly tried to improve the number of highly skilled individuals that are in their region. This is a particular approach taken by Germany, with this migration policy being looked at in the final section of the analysis, before drawing conclusions and ultimate points of analysis.

Comparisons of Changes in Policies: with Germany, Italy, the UK and Spain

1.Northern Europe – Germany and the UK

Germany performed very differently during the economic crisis and this can potentially be attributed to the way in which it has dealt with the labour market and labour reform, since the early 2000s. The way in which the labour market had been structured in the case of Germany in the run up

to the economic crisis was substantially different from that established in the UK and this can go a long way towards explaining why the country has not seemingly suffered as badly during the economic downturn and has not been subject to dramatic changes in labour migration patterns.

Some of the approaches taken by Germany include the reduction of unemployment benefit and subsidising of jobs that are low skilled or part time, so as to stimulate this end of the market, the one area that has suffered the most during the financial crisis. Eligibility for benefits was made stricter in Germany and this seemingly reduced the desirability of travelling to the country seeking employment. This has created a situation whereby those travelling to Germany have been largely restricted to those who have secured jobs or have the skills to be gainfully employed in the region. During the economic crisis, there was a much lesser shift in the migration patterns across Germany and this could be largely attributed to the long standing policies which have discouraged migrants who were simply taking a chance; also the general labour policies within the region encouraged flexible patterns of employment that were much more adaptable to the underlying economic changes.

Following the recent examples and the EU policies, it can be seen that Germany is maintaining a continuous growth approach and actively encouraging migration of highly skilled individuals. During May 2009, the German government stated that it was aiming to ensure that the best individuals are attracted into the German labour force. The German government has established the Labour Migration Control Act which works alongside the existing immigration laws. This aims to look at the policy of allowing highly qualified individuals the ability to seek permanent residency and to bring in family members and settle in the country. Essentially, this takes the approach of encouraging desirable behaviour, rather than discouraging poor behaviours.

According to Rienzi (2014, p.3), "the number of foreign-born people of working age in the UK increased from 2.9 million in 1993 to more than 6 million in 2013". The number of working-age foreigners in the UK also increased from about 3 million million in 1993 to more than 6 million in 2013. The recession saw only a slight decrease in numbers of migrants coming to the UK to seek work (e.g. 2007, 2009 and 2010). As expected, there was a significant jump in the number of foreign-born workers in the

UK during 2006, which coincides with the opening of UK labour markets to workers from the A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) in mid-2004 (ibid.).

As the table 4.1 shows, the greatest concentration of foreign-born workers employed in the UK is in the manufacturing industry (industry cleaning, canning, filling, etc.) or manual trades (agriculture). Clearly, then, labour supply correlates closely to demand. Migrants take jobs that local citizens are either unwilling or unable to fill.

Table 4.1 Concentration of foreign-born workers employed in the UK

Top 10 by workforce share, all migrants	%	Occupation share	Top 10 by workforce share, recent migrants	%	Occupation share
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1 Elementary process plant occupations	43.3	0.85	Elementary process plant occupations	20.6	0.85
2 Cleaning and housekeeping managers and supervisors	38.6	0.19	Elementary cleaning occupations	10.1	2.32
3 Food preparation and hospitality trades	31.6	1.58	Process operatives	10.1	0.95
4 Elementary cleaning occupations	30.5	2.32	Cleaning and housekeeping managers and supervisors	8.8	0.19
5 Process operatives	29.3	0.95	Natural and social science professionals	8.7	0.64
6 Health professionals	25.2	1.68	Food preparation and hospitality trades	6.7	1.58
7 Natural and social science professionals	25	0.64	Elementary storage occupations	6.6	1.43
8 Managers and proprietors in hospitality and leisure services	25	0.84	Other elementary process occupations	6.4	3.23
9 Chief executives and senior officials	24.4	0.21	Elementary agricultural occupations	6.4	0.28
10 Textiles and garments trades	24.8	0.23	IT and telecommunications	5.7	2.91

Source: Labour Force Survey 2013, Q1-4

Since 2004, the key increase in labour migration from new EU member states has come from Eastern Europe and especially Poland, with migrant concentrations in agricultural areas which have traditionally been areas of

emigration unused to inflows except on a seasonal basis. Evidence of the impact of the economic crisis of 2008-9 in the UK lies in the policies of the 2010 Conservative-Liberal coalition who have attempted to cut immigration and welfare programmes. As a result, labour inflows have declined and many immigrants returned home due to rising unemployment in Britain and increased opportunities in their countries of origin.

Maerdi et al point to the construction industry in the UK as demonstrating a clear link between economic downturn and migration. They point to increases in immigration in preceding years especially from Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic States accounting for an estimated ten percent of employment in the sector. In 2009, immediately following the financial crisis, employment in construction fell 4 percent as against 2.1 percent for the whole economy (Maerdi et al., 2012).

2. Southern Europe – Italy and Spain

Prior to the economic crisis the number of foreigners with resident permits in Italy doubled in the period 1981-1991 rising to 1.4 million in 2000. Increases were thought to be due to the regularization of irregular immigration between 1986 and 2009. The entry of non-EU citizens for employment in Italy was made subject to quotas but these are very low and do not reflect demand for labour, resulting in substantial levels of overstay and irregular entry (Castles et al., 2014, s. 114).

Thus there is a trend of increasing net migration to Italy despite the economic crisis. Throughout 2009 and 2010 inflows only decreased slightly compared with 2008 which suggests Italy was not strongly affected by the crisis. This trend results from the fundamental rigidity of legal migration policies which need time to adapt to evolving constraints but is also connected to the persistent but uneven need for foreign manpower in some sectors. Nevertheless some sign of the deterioration in the capacity of the Italian economy to absorb large inflows can be detected in the uneven geographical distribution of the slowdown in net migration (Villioso and Pastore, 2011, s. 3).

Spain and Italy demonstrate substantially different responses to the economic crisis. During the economic boom of the 1960s a hundred thousand Spaniards a year emigrated until this trend was halted by the

economic crisis of 1973. Up until this date Spain was regarded as a land of emigration. Spain does share characteristics with northern EU states such as Germany and the UK but is distinguished by the key role played by inflows shaped by an underground economy, irregular migration and weak government regulation (Castles et al., 2014, s. 113).

The situation changed after post-Franco democratization in 1975 and membership of the EU in 1986. Between 1986 and 1999 there was a rapid increase in immigration especially from North Africa boosted by economic growth, the large-scale incorporation of Spanish women into the labour market and regulation of entry. After 2000, Latin American migration was encouraged and family reunion. The registered foreign population grew from 279,000 in 1990 to 1.3 million in 2000, 4.1 million by 2005 and 5.7 million in 2010 representing 12.4 percent of the total population. Only a minority of irregular migrants entered Spain because between 1985 and 2005 Spain authorized 12 legalization campaigns (Castles et al., 2014, s.114).

What has emerged from comparisons between Italy and Spain is that there is no homogenous 'Mediterranean model'. Maerdi et al., (2012:2) suggest that Spain represents a Southern European/segmented model. In line with segmented labour theory foreign workers are specialized according to their origins, thus Moroccans and other Africans are employed in agriculture, Latin American women in the domestic and care sectors, Latin American men in construction and services while their European counterparts tend to work in industry. Spain has also hosted 200,000 retirees mainly from the northern EU member states since 1981 (Borkert et al., 2007, s. 28).

Of all European states Spain has been the most affected by the economic recession of 2008-9. Economic growth in the preceding decade was highly dependent on the availability of cheap labour especially in the service sector and the construction industry. A combination of the global financial crisis and the bursting of the construction bubble transformed Spain from a major labour importer to one with the highest unemployment rates for natives (17 percent) and foreigners (30 percent) in the EU. Spain is therefore cited as a prime example of the effects of economic downturn on a strong employer-oriented labour migration model (Finotelli, 2012, s. 13).

The Spanish government has been forced to reduce entry flows for labour

purposes by 90 per cent. Annual estimates for stable workers dropped from 27,034 in 2007 to just 14 in 2011 (Fintotelli, 2012, s. 14).

Assessment of migration policies in the times of Economic Crisis: Crisis is an opportunity?

The broader European Economic Recovery Plan is central to the overall approach taken by the EC to the economic recovery of the region. This does not specifically look at migration or even employment, but can arguably be seen to underlie the overall agenda pursued in this specific area of policy generation. For example, the EC states that it expects any policies implemented by the national states to be mindful of the long term agenda for recovery. In particular, the EU agenda aims to look at the building of long term skills, something which has been central to the approach in Germany, for a relatively long period of time (and in any event, long before the financial crisis came forward). The EU policy recognises that there is an ongoing concern about the skills' mismatch and that there is a need for mobility amongst the workforce of the EU to facilitate these gaps. The need for more highly skilled individuals remains constant and countries are amending their migrant policies to allow for this flow of skilled individuals to take place, while at the same time restricting the migration of low skilled individuals. There are exceptions to this, for example, certain countries have a high seasonal demand for certain workers, such as those involved in tourism.

With this in mind, the main policy change is towards the up-skilling and training of people who seem to be central to the long term policy approach which has been adopted across the EU (Hijzen and Venn, 2011). Certain countries have embraced this with a greater sense of urgency than others; however, the main factor which is relevant to the discussion here is that migration is only being restricted in so far as it is necessary to ensure long term buoyancy within a country, thus ensuring that individuals who are low skilled or unemployed are not encouraged to enter an area or country in order to make use of social benefits. This indicates a need to review social policies, rather than necessarily looking at migrant policies to change the parameters (as is already the case in Germany), so that people simply do not go welfare shopping and will only migrate to a country when it is for a specific job or in order to fill a specific skill gap.

For the purposes of comparison, the Migrant Integration Policy Index is an assessment tool provided by the EU using 148 policy indicators to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards regularly monitoring 40 countries and expanding its influence well beyond Europe.

Germany, currently occupying 13th position in the index, has some of the best targeted measures for labour market integration except in recognising qualifications but MIPEX notes still has the most restrictive conditions for long-term residence in Europe and North America and is backward in granting foreigners voting rights. It appears that despite improvements the German government is still inclined to see migration as a temporary source of cheap labour and although accepting that it is now a country of immigration is still resistant to the idea of permanent settlement of non-Germans.

The UK government, 14th in the index, was unprepared for the number of EU Citizens from 2004 accession countries. The migration debate in the UK is seen in terms of real costs versus benefits, community cohesion versus British jobs for British workers. Since the economic crisis MIPEX has found conditions slightly less favourable to integration with UK policies for non-EU workers and their families only half-way favourable compared to other countries in the index.

Italy's new security law has made conditions slightly less favourable to integration with immigrants being presented ads responsible for general social problems. New family reunion laws and long-term residence conditions are out of touch with social realities and equality laws remain the weakest in Europe. Nevertheless Italy scores well overall, lying 10th in the table.

Spain is lying 8th, having undergone a swift transformation to become Europe's largest country of immigration despite having the highest unemployment rates in the EU. MIPEX finds that fewer migrants are coming to Spain but those who are settled there are likely to remain. Spain benefits from slightly favourable integration policies and is now the best of Europe's major immigration countries maintaining and even enhancing long-term commitments to economic, family and societal integration despite cuts. However MIPEX does note that Spain has only gone halfway to addressing the disproportionate impact of the economic crisis on foreign residents and

that it has brought new limits on family reunification (MIPEX, 2013).

In some areas then, an economic crisis can be seen to have a positive impact on migration policies particularly where the crisis is seen as an opportunity. The European Union has seen it as an opportunity to strengthen integration, anti-discrimination law and standardize regulations for residence and family reunion as well as attempting to obtain relocation and citizenship rights for asylum seekers and refugees.

Globalization has encouraged competitiveness and market flexibility, emphasizing liberalization, democratization and deregulation. One outcome has been to stem the flow of migration through outsourcing in countries of origin with a reverse flow of capital, both human and financial, technology and skills. Flexibility is key to the positive perception of migration in the UK, Italy and Spain as is the diverging role of the state and the expectations of the Welfare State (Düll, 2003, s. 4). In the UK, in a strategic ad hoc response to the unpredictability of demand and staff shortages in sectors with highly competitive product markets and fluctuating labour costs, greater flexibility has been achieved through temporary contracts and as a method of overcoming the crisis.

In the first place, it is flexible and gives companies the ability to react quickly to changing labour conditions. Secondly, higher unemployment vulnerability of migrants has political advantages for the host government electorally and financially in terms of less expenditure, than high unemployment among voters.

Conclusion

In Italy the effects of the economic crisis have generally been weaker than in Spain because of the Italian production system. Italy did not experience a phase of economic growth based on increasing the supply of cheap labour and so avoided a 'national' crisis alongside the international crisis. The most affected sector is manufacturing which employs native rather than immigrant workers. In Italy most immigrants are employed in the agricultural sector which has always been subject to seasonal fluctuations or in the domestic and care sectors which are less affected by the economic downturn. A gender rebalancing of the immigrant population is also a feature in Italy due to family reunions and autonomous female migration to support the home/health care sector which, due to Italy's ageing population,

has suffered less retraction during the economic crisis with consequently less impact on female workers. Whereas inflows to Spain decreased, largely due to a slump in the construction industry, inflows to Italy continue to increase (Finotelli, 2012: s. 13).

Spain has demonstrated greater capacity than Italy for organizing its labour regime, achieving a consensus between social partners and employers. A socialist government and the co-ordination of state bureaucracies has favoured recruitment and enhancement of labour market controls in the short term whereas Italy's right-wing government and fragmented administration has been less effective.

The Spanish experience of the economic crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of immigrants and the link between migration and economic uncertainty (Maerdi et al., 2012, s.8).

International market mobility can exacerbate economic uncertainty. Spanish immigration in the early 2000s increased demand for housing expanding the construction sector which has proved the most volatile in the downturn. Immigrants work in the sectors with most insecurity and seasonal variation including the underground economy which adds to overall economic uncertainty (Meardi et al., 2012, s. 20).

Pulling all of this together and with particular reference to the approach taken by Germany, it can be seen that the EU policy shift since the economic crisis has been to encourage migration, but in a directed manner, so as to ensure that the skills' gaps are filled appropriately and that migration is supported only when it is being used to encourage long term growth for the EU as a whole. Individual countries have applied these policy agendas as a means of restricting the level of migration, based either on a quota or on the basis of skills' requirements.

The aim of the EU policy is to encourage growth and recovery from the economic crisis and this involves not only looking at the financial markets, but also in ensuring that the labour mobility is maintained in a constructive way, so as to allow skilled labour to be developed through training and for skilled workers to be mobile to travel around the EU as and when required, in order to meet economic demands.

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Frontier Heritage Migrants: Finding Home in Globalizing India

Melissa Tandiwe Myambo*

I. Introduction

> "Thank God for Google Maps!...or I don't know what I would have done...[My move to India] wouldn't have been possible...It's a matter of circumstance that I am able to do any of this right now...and plus, like all these stores are here, Zara is here, Starbucks is here..."

One early morning in 2016, I was conducting an interview in Starbucks café in South Delhi's Hauz Khas Village with Nivedita, a young woman who had recently settled in India. Her parents had left the subcontinent in the 1970s and she had been born and mostly raised on the East Coast of the USA but in her late twenties, she had made the decision to leave her life in the "global" city of New York and try her luck in the "globalizing" city of New Delhi. Although India's capital is a notoriously tough city for Westerners to live in - the pollution, immense income disparities, the everyday struggle to negotiate with vendors and autorickshaw-wallahs and so on – Nivedita described her migration as being made possible by the spatio-temporal changes wrought on India by this particular moment of globalization (see also Kapur, 2012).

The Internet (Google Maps, email, WhatsApp, Skype, Netflix), the Westernization and in particular the Americanization of the urbanscape (Starbucks, McDonalds, Krispy Kreme) and the changing global economy, especially in the service sector (finance, marketing, NGO work), have fundamentally transformed the migrant experience in India as elsewhere. This is the subject of this paper which focuses on frontier migrants for whom this is especially true. Their economic and cultural capital imbricated with

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these transformations results in considerable less "friction" (Yeoh and Huang, 2011) in their adaptation to India.

Nivedita is part of a burgeoning trend of what I call frontier migration. She is more particularly a frontier heritage migrant as a member of the Indian diaspora (see Myambo, 2017a). Frontier migration simply refers to the move of people, technology, ideas and capital from a more "developed" economy to a "developing" one and this form of migration is happening because "the geo-political order is changing...The north Atlantic no longer lies at the centre" (Gilroy, 2010: 4). There are increasing flows of highly-skilled professionals seeking out opportunities in India (Khadria, 2012; Radhakrishnan, 2008; Amrute, 2012) and many of these professionals come from more "developed" economies in North America, the UK, Western Europe, South Korea and Japan. These frontier migrants are headed to emerging market economies like China, South Africa and India (see Myambo forthcoming) and consist of three types:

> a) The multi-ethnic, multi-racial trend of people leaving a more "developed" economy for a "developing" economy

> b) Frontier return migrants who emigrated from their country as adults and are now returning home

> c) Frontier heritage migrants who are moving to countries their parents or grandparents or great-great grandparents etc. left.

I define "heritage migrant" as a migrant of 1.5 generation and beyond who "returns" to a country s/he designates as her or his ancestral ethnic/national homeland or country of heritage. I argue that heritage migrants should be differentiated from return migrants because the experience of returning to the country one has grown up in and "returning" to the country of one's forebears is qualitatively different (Myambo, 2017).

Both frontier return and frontier heritage migrants are an important segment of this overall frontier migration but the primary focus of this paper is frontier heritage migrants although there is considerable overlap with returnees, just as official governmental attempts to name these members of the diaspora – NRI (Non-Resident Indian), PIO (Person of Indian Origin), OCI (Overseas Citizen of India) – are porous categories which attempt to contain multiple realities regarding the diaspora's relations with the homeland. For the majority of frontier heritage migrants

whom I interviewed, however, the ability to "return" to the subcontinent is contingent on the spatio-temporal changes promulgated by globalization (see also King, 2002; Nijman, 2002; Amrute, 2008).

Drawing on qualitative research undertaken in 2016 which consisted of over sixty interviews with migrants to India conducted in Delhi, Mumbai, Goa and Bangalore, I will illustrate here that the subset of frontier heritage migrants can, at this precise historical moment, more easily adapt to new homes in the developing world, despite their growing up in "First World" countries, thanks to the cultural and economic changes effected by globalizing processes – a more Westernized urbanscape; new information and communications technologies; and a transforming economy with an expanding service sector geared towards India's burgeoning middle class (Das 2001, 287; Fernandes, 2006). Furthermore, frontier migrants literally find reminders of their former homes in emerging market economies in quite tangible, visceral form – the same brands, the same big box stores, the same food franchises and so on (see also Myambo, 2017b). They, therefore, find the home they left behind and can also create a new home more easily because of these tangible, visceral reminders. Frontier heritage migrants can find reminders of both the Indian diasporic experience in the West (similar foods, fashions, pop culture etc.) as well as their everyday lives in "First World" countries.

To analyze the lived experience of people of Indian descent who grew up in Euro-America and who are migrating to post-1990 India, we have to grapple with the fact that the world has transformed in the last few decades. Not only has the entire global economy changed dramatically since the 1980s but so has India but instead of asking why do these frontier heritage migrants "return" to the country their forebears left, sometimes generations ago, we should ask to which part of India are they moving? In other words, to understand today's migration experience we require a more refined, more nuanced understanding of the spatial in its trans/sub/inter/intra-national forms. By this, I simply mean that India is a country that displays immense levels of uneven development exemplified by the stereotypical shack dwelling next to the five-star hotel. Analyzing migrant experience at the level of the nation – e.g. Swedish migrant moves to India – tells us nothing about the migrant's experience which takes place instead in distinct microspaces.

Migrants, like most people, live their lives in their homes, in their work spaces

and where they shop, or study, or socialize. Post-Cold War globalization is a phase of intensifying capitalism which has caused increasing uneven development worldwide (Smith, 2008: Harvey, 2006: Bond, 1999). These levels of increased uneven development - capitalism's dialectical propensity to create both wealth and poverty simultaneously – mean that within India there are "zones" that exhibit high levels of "development" or Western-style capitalist-modernity and these "zones" co-exist simultaneously with less "developed" areas. Therefore, the Indian urban/landscape that frontier heritage migrants encounter is the jumbled-up, odd-even world that is the result of intensifying cultural globalization which has splintered nation-states into diverse, developmentally-different, infrastructurally-divergent microspaces I call Cultural Time Zones (CTZs). The gated residential community, the international school, the mall, the microbrewery and so on, exemplify transnational CTZs. They are one part of post-liberalized India and they are just as much the "Real India" as a subnational CTZ like the rural village.

One frontier migrant explained it to me this way. Although she lives in one of the most elite gated compounds in Gurugram akin to a "four-star resort" as her husband describes it, she no longer describes her life as a "bubble and not being part of the Real India." She came to the realization that many upper-class Indians live the same way she does in elite CTZs enjoying chauffeur-driven cars, air-conditioned offices, homes with a small army of domestic staff, and "First World amenities" such as access to Wi-Fi, thus she determined that her luxurious lifestyle was as much a part of the Real India "as the people living under the bridge."

Although I will lay out here, using the metrics of technology, the urbanscape and the economy, some of the ways in which frontier heritage migrants are finding it easier to adapt to the globalizing India, somewhat perversely, India's uneven development and plethora of "local," "subnational" and less moneyed CTZs is still a defining part of frontier migrants' lived experience and one with which many of them are intimately involved. Uneven development is actually a "pull" factor which attracts frontier migrants to the county (see Myambo forthcoming). Whether they are working in NGOs or leveraging their "First World cultural capital" (Myambo, 2017 a) to analyze niche consumer demand for "global" products like craft beer or single-origin coffee, they depend on the economy's unevenness for their livelihood. Just as this paper aims to bring more nuance to the discussion of national space by employing the concept of the CTZ, or microspace, which

takes virtual and physical form, so I hope to posit some observations about India's myriad micro-economies. Technology enables transnational virtual CTZs (Facebook friends, WhatsApp groups, Skype contacts etc.) and the globalization of certain urban built forms creates transnational physical CTZs (shops, restaurants, multinational companies) and these operate in dialectical tension with the global economy which is constituted by myriad (trans/sub/inter/intra-national) micro-economies. All of these imbricated ingredients – the economic, the cultural (time zones), and the technological – were propelled into being by India's temporal transformation which began in the 1980s. This spatio-temporal conceptual framework which was laid out by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was based upon the particular experience of the Indian diaspora in the West and would eventually enable more frontier, frontier return and frontier heritage migration and also of course, India's embrace of neoliberal globalization. That is where we must begin.

II.   Forging the Global Future, Re-Constituting the Spatio-Temporal

Scholar Aditya Nigam (2004) makes a convincing case that India's entry onto the global stage and into the present tense of hyper-capitalism was a) a state-led policy that was the result of frontier return migration and b) relies on recruiting frontier return and heritage migrants in the diaspora because they have already seen the future in the Western countries where they reside(d):

> It was in the mid-1980s that Rajiv Gandhi announced his determination to 'take India into the 21st century'…. Arriving in the 21st century meant arriving into a utopian future. Yet, that 'future' was something that Rajiv and his [computer] boys had already seen. They had spent a large part of their lives in lands where the future was actually the present. And they realized that that was our present-to-be, or at least, that they were determined to make it ours. (Nigam, 2004: 72, emphasis in original)

In other words, Rajiv Gandhi and his "computer boys" had been migrants in industrialized nations and upon returning to India, they determined that India should become like the West. However, "'going into the 21st century'

was not simply a matter of moving through the tunnel of time from one year into another…'Going there' entailed reconstituting ourselves, transforming our mode/s of being…" (Nigam, 2004: 72, emphasis in original) which required a complete transformation of the developmental state into a free market neoliberal one as if India itself was to enter into a new time owing to the ICTS revolution, outsourcing and call centers which were an early reconfiguration of the new globalizing urbanscape.

Crucially, it was the NRI who would take India into the 21st century. Whereas India, like many nations, used to be ashamed of having a large diaspora which had negative connotations of brain drain resulting from a stagnating economy (see also Castles and Wise, 2008), Nigam argues that:

> The new breed of 'Rajivian' leaders…inaugurated a new idea of 'nationhood' – one that was territorially unbounded and global…those who went away were no longer to be seen as traitors. They were the [nation's] resources…They had state-of-the-art skills, knowledge and capital to invest in the new areas that needed to be rapidly developed. Enter, therefore, the ubiquitous figure of the NRI – the privileged citizen of this global nation…It was the NRI who had seen the future where it was present; it was s/he therefore, who could become the engine that would power 'our' journey into that world. (Nigam, 2004: 72-3, my emphasis)

Whereas diasporas were viewed as possible "traitors" in the era of the bounded nation state, in a deterritorialized and ubiquitous notion of a global India, they are now "angels of development" (Castles and Wise, 2008: 271) and come to embody and symbolize the "new" India (Upadhya, 2012; Amrute, 2008). Thus, state policy enables and encourages literal (actual return/heritage tourism and migration) and metaphorical frontier returns (e.g. in the form of FDI and remittances) to power India's move into the 21st century (Khadria, 2012, 128-131; Amrute, 2008). However, Nigam's implication here is that the Indian state would particularly welcome frontier return and heritage migrants who had been in "First World" countries whose present was to be India's future because they have several forms of capital – economic, social, cultural – which further "globalize" India and help it "emerge" (Radhakrishnan, 2008; King, 2002; Upadhya, 2012; Myambo, 2017a).

India, like China and Vietnam and other nation-states is now actively

attempting to woo back its diasporas (Xiang, Yeoh, Toyota, 2013) and the Indian government's policies attempting to shape migration flows and take advantage of diasporic populations have borne fruit e.g. Bangalore's IT industry is partially the result of frontier return and heritage migration and many of the ongoing transnational linkages between Bangalore and Silicon Valley as two nodes in the global economy are actualized by diasporic Indian populations who regularly travel between the two (Vijayabaskar and Krishnaswamy, 2004; Radhakrishnan, 2008; Saxenian, 2006). Many of these policies and subsequent migration flows appear to be the result of how the future of India was imagined (see Appadurai, 1996) by Gandhi and his "computer boys" as Nigam asserts above. More profoundly, there has been a total shift in the notion of the nation's temporal narration of itself.

India's postcolonial nation time has been reconfigured by the country's embrace of what scholar Jyostna Kapur calls "capitalistic time" (2013). Two examples of this would be how the country's government and business sectors have fully assimilated the temporal dimensions of the instantaneous simultaneity of the internet as engine of growth and globalization's time-space compression which allows for outsourcing (see also Myambo, 2018). The 1991 decision by then Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, to liberalize the economy under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to accept a structural adjustment program has been narrated by various powerful sectors from politicians to the media to the business world as a temporal "break" between the socialist India of yore to the neoliberal capitalist present of the infinite "new" India in which the country becomes an economic superstar. While debates about how "new," post-1991 India is or is not are very important (see Kapur, 2013 and D'Costa, 2010), the majority of frontier migrants I interviewed did partake in the general sentiment that, "India will rule the future" (Mungee, 2011). Their decisions to migrate to India were very much contingent on the temporal understanding of a "new," and indeed neoliberal, India (see also Giridharadas, 2011: 254; Jain, 2012: 901-2) which in turn had various spatial effects including a new, more amenable urbanscape for them. This urbanscape is also very neoliberal, full of privatized public spaces like the upscale mall and securitized enclaves like the gated community (see also King, 2002; Amrute, 2010; Kapur, 2012; Kapur, 2013).

Figure 1. Select Citywalk Mall, Saket, South Delhi.

In Figure 1 above, we see an example of a transnational CTZ, the American-style mall, which is changing New Delhi's urbanscape. In the background of the photo is a Starbucks café and in the foreground, we see the franshise Burger King's Christmas display which allows visitors to the mall, most of whom presumably are not Christians since India is a Hindu-majority country, to take pictures with Santa Claus, the Burger King logo and the Select Citywalk, Go Shopping logo. The young lady in the photo is dutifully carrying a shopping bag from the Swedish fast fashion store, H&M.

Outside this privatized public space – several security guards man each entranceway and the mall's customers must pass through a metal detector and file their bags through an X-ray machine like those at the airport – is a very different India. Across from this particular mall is Khirkee Village, a completely different CTZ (see Myambo, 2017c). There is not just one, homogeneous India in which frontier heritage migrants arrive but there are instead myriad Indias.

One of the "jumbling" effects of globalization is that, like many other "developing" nations, India combines elements of "First World" core and "Third World" periphery, "centers" and "margins" within it (Andrucki and

Dickinson, 2014). This extreme intra-national uneven development means that frontier migrants can decide to live a Western lifestyle if they have the requisite economic capital and so desire because this lifestyle is made possible by the emergence of increasing numbers of transnational CTZs. Even if they are physically located in India, frontier heritage migrants can stick to zones which are culturally quite Westernized (e.g. in terms of gender relations, the way women dress, the music playing on the loudspeakers, signage written in English etc.).

The spatial proximity of "First" and "Third World" in the same place e.g. the air-conditioned office park next to the shanty town results in vast disjunctures within nations but perversely, another of the radical effects of cultural globalization is that spatial distance between different countries no longer equals a deep chasm between similar lifestyles (Tomlinson 1999). Those living a California-like lifestyle in a gated community next to a slum or a village may appear to be culturally very "far away" from these places even when they are spatially proximate (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Forti, 2007; Ruggeri, 2007) because the gated community connotes temporal descriptors like "modernity" in contrast to the village which, of course is contemporaneous and co-eval with the gated community, but still represents "earlier times," "the past" and that most complex of terms, "tradition."

These spatial and temporal "jumblings" are typical of the globalizing urbanscape in which "modern" and "traditional," "global" and "local," trans- and subnational CTZs exist together cheek by jowl and directly impact the experience of frontier migrants to India. However, it is the emergence of more "modern," "global" and/or transnational CTZs which undergird the changing world in which "the lifestyle gaps between India and the West have narrowed rapidly" (Rai, 2005; cf. Kapur, 2012). This narrowing lifestyle gap is of course restricted to a certain class of people whom we might loosely call the "global middle classes" (Heiman, Freeman and Liechty 2012), a group that encompasses frontier heritage migrants who may live in India but live a "First World" lifestyle, sipping coffee at a transnational CTZ like Starbucks and shopping at Zara and H&M and working out at a fancy international gym like Fitness First or Gold's. In some senses and for some socio-economic classes, the world is more unified and homogenized than ever before.

The emergence of transnational CTZs in the form of American franchises

and Western chain stores is of course a direct result of 1991 liberalization. Prior to the 1990s, these CTZs did not exist in their current form. A frontier migrant coming to India in the 1970s would not have as many Western-style amenities as one arriving in the 21st century does. Of course, India's history as a colony of Great Britain and imperial era frontier migrations had already resulted in the creation of several Western(ized) CTZs like Delhi's famous Gymkhana Club and hill stations. The 1990s inaugurated massive cultural and economic changes that saw the influx of Western brands and built forms. That is why Nivedita, the frontier heritage migrant from the US, explained her migration to me in spatio-temporal terms:

> "I would never have been able to do this *even ten years ago*...it was *so different*...the fact that there's internet... Thank God for Google Maps!...or I don't know what I would have done...[My move to India] *wouldn't have been possible...It's a matter of circumstance* that I am able to do any of this right now...and plus all these stores are here, Zara is here, Starbucks is here...It's the only way that I can like fundamentally live *for a long time* [having spaces/ commodities] that are part of how I usually operate [in the US]...I need these kinds of luxuries."

In the passage above, I have italicized the many ways she stresses how contingent her migration is on a spatially-transforming, modernizing India. When I asked Nivedita what she missed from the US, she said, "My sister, Mexican food, Trader Joe's" but went on to explain that she could get "everything else" from the States in India, even if she had to "pay a little more," she felt that nearly everything from her life in the States was available during the era of globalization.

J.D., a frontier heritage migrant from the UK, expressed similar sentiments about the contingency of his migration being related to India's globalization but unlike Nivedita, he was much more negative about the changes in India even though he recognized that it enabled his migration. While the majority of frontier heritage migrants whom I interviewed were born in the 1980s or even the 1990s, J.D. was in his sixties and had first come to India in 1980 as a tourist. Before moving to the country in the 21st century, he had visited many times on holiday and described the spatio-temporal changes to globalizing India in civilizational terms (even though ironically he was critical of these changes!). He explained that as a child he was

always curious about India but only managed to come as a man of almost thirty years of age:

> "Then I came to India in 1980 actually to see what it was like...It was *a very different place then* of course. I landed in Delhi airport, newly built at that time. It was *in the middle of nowhere*. Driving through far lands on the way to Delhi itself...I was curious about what it was really like in India. Is it like people say? You get ill, it's horrible? In 1980, *it was a lot less civilized than it is now*. My girlfriend at the time [with whom I] was travelling, she got terribly ill. I didn't, she did...She was forever running to the bathroom. We were going to see the Taj Mahal...and then *in those days* the public bathrooms were also not very desirable either."

I have italicized above all the ways in which J.D. emphasizes the difference between 1980 India and the 21st century period in which this interview took place. When I pressed him with the question, "When you say it was not as 'civilized,' what do you mean by that?", he responded with spatio-temporal references, "There wasn't much organization in those days. There certainly wasn't much globalization in those days. You would not find a place like this for sure [a pub in an upscale mall in Gurugram]."

Despite criticizing Gurugram's hyper-modern urbanscape as one of the worst exemplars of globalization, J.D. nevertheless still equated it with capitalist-modernity and globalization and recognized that the "new" India was what had facilitated his own migration to the country. Another facilitator and indeed a transformative facilitator of migration is technology which has reconstituted the migrant experience.

IV. Technology and Virtual CTZs

Many of the younger frontier heritage migrants faced parental and/or familial resentment to their decision to heritage migrate to India. The parents left behind in the US or the UK, at times, felt that their children's choice to move to India was a rejection of their own decision to leave India. But as explored in the section above, the India that their parents' generation had left was spatio-temporally, politically and economically vastly different. Frontier heritage migrants in general expressed sympathy for their grand parents' decision to leave India but felt frustrated when one or

more relative, either in India or abroad, expressed a lack of comprehension about why they would move to India. For frontier heritage migrants, the answer to this question was clear: they believed that their relatives had an "old-fashioned" view of the "old" India which equated everything from "abroad" (meaning the West) as automatically superior to anything from "home" (meaning India). This view of the "old" India did not comport with their reality in which the urban globalscape of India's large cities offered them similar or even the same lifestyle choices as their home countries. Additionally, the economic opportunities were often more plentiful than in the sending country and finally, technology had eased their migration experience.

In fact, technology has fundamentally transformed the migrant experience. For frontier heritage migrants who are economically privileged, technological change has made their migrant experience considerably more palatable because:

> a) It allows them to navigate the new city with considerable more ease (Google Maps, ride-sharing apps like Uber and Ola);
>
> b) Knowledge about living in the new city such as where to eat, where to find a roommate or place to stay, where to find certain commodities and so on, is easily found through Facebook groups or review sites like Zomato.
>
> c) It is easy to stay in touch with their family and friends wherever they may be through cheap or free communications technologies like calling/messaging on WhatsApp, Skype, Facetime etc. It is easy for friends and family to stay up-to-date with each other's lives despite geographical separation through the posting of photos and videos in real time on Instagram, Snapchat, Facebook etc. Some migrants also reported that they used "older" forms of communication like emails for staying in touch.
>
> d) Many frontier heritage migrants also reported being able to create their own "worlds" in which they could watch movies and TV on Netflix or news clips from their home countries on YouTube.

These digitally-enabled virtual lives create virtual CTZs, online microspaces

which allow the migrant to feel connected to far-flung loved ones and also culturally closer to the everyday happenings in their old lives, whether that be politics or cultural events or their social circle's doings. For frontier heritage migrants who may have experienced familial disapproval of their migration choice, they feel that the emotional connectivity facilitated by technology can somewhat mitigate that type of negativity.

However, Anoushka, a young frontier heritage migrant from New Jersey, told me that technology could not adequately replace face-to-face interactions: "I really miss spending time with my friends, like sitting in the presence of them. You can catch up on Skype, but it's somehow not ...Those conversations are great, and I would go crazy without them, but what I really miss is just like, 'I'm bored. Can I come over?' and just going over and not even talking, just sitting on your laptops, or just chilling, watching TV with someone, not doing anything, just being with them." Although the majority of frontier heritage migrants did acknowledge the power of technology in mitigating loneliness, the virtual CTZ was not always as emotionally satisfying as IRL (In Real Life) interactions. However, in sum, India's fairly constant and cheap internet access, especially in comparison to other developing countries, was a positive factor in their migration experience.

V. Micro-Economies and the Changing Global Economy

> "Okay. So I was born and raised in the US...Studied economics in undergrad. After finishing that, which was end of 2008, [it] was pretty much the worst time to be a fresh grad with no relevant experience...So I couldn't really find any jobs. I graduated in December, and I think by June, May/June, I had actually moved to India."

Siddanth, a young frontier heritage migrant, had been living in Mumbai for some months at the time I interviewed him in a trendy café in Bandra. After originally coming to India for a year in 2009-10, he had returned to the States to pursue postgraduate training and then moved back to India a second time in 2015. One of the "push" factors that compelled him to move to India in the first place was indeed the Great Recession of 2008 which tanked the US and subsequently the global economy. At that particular moment, India's economic growth was far out-pacing the US and the global

North in general. Thus, economic strength was also a "pull" factor attracting frontier heritage migrants. But this was not just a momentary change in relative economic strength. In the 21st century, long-term economic trends favor developing countries (see Myambo forthcoming) and many frontier migrants describe the economies they left behind in the West as "saturated" and "stagnant." India, by contrast, represented "energy," "volatility" and "opportunity." This is how another Bombay-based heritage migrant, Aroop, put it to me, as he tried to explain why India was more attractive to him than the West as an entrepreneur: "Tomorrow, if I come up with a drink, I have a much better opportunity of making that into a business in India than I do in the UK or in the US. I guess I'm looking from an entrepreneurship point of view. I think that there are gaps in the market in India...which are completely saturated in the West." Gaps in the market are the result of India's uneven development, which in turn presents opportunity for migrants whether they work in an NGO like Siddanth or are looking to find a niche market to exploit like Aroop.

India's growing middle class is a boon to frontier migrants who are able to exploit the increasing number of micro-economies produced by the introduction of new "global" commodities and "global" lifestyle options. They leverage their "First World" cultural capital (Myambo, 2017a) to (re) produce or sell goods and services that are often associated with the West or Western "standards" or indeed, the "global," often a euphemism for Western.

However, frontier heritage migrants (as opposed to the wider category of multi-ethnic frontier migrants) narrate their reasons for migrating to India in terms that supersede mere economic opportunity or market potential (see also Amin and Thrift, 2007; Myambo, 2017). The economic is always-already entangled with the cultural, the social, the psychic, the spiritual and issues of knowing one's self, one's history and one's roots. One frontier heritage migrant explained that he had come to India to help the country even though his parents had emigrated from Bangalore before he was born and settled in the US. Rahul, however, was excited about the cultural and economic opportunities of globalizing India, as well as the chance to spend more time with his grandparents and most of all was motivated to help India's economy flourish. When I asked him why, he said, "[India]'s where my heritage is, it's where my family is."

Conclusion

Frontier heritage migrants are finding home in globalizing India as a result of India's embrace of neoliberal globalization which has resulted in dramatic changes to the urbanscape. Their migrations are contingent on the spatio-temporal moment of India's insertion into global capitalism and technology and economic opportunity further work to ease their migration to the country their forebears had left behind "in the past." Now, that India represents the "future" of capitalist-modernity, frontier heritage migrants are leaving the West to try their luck in the subcontinent.

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Diasporas Lobbying the Host Government: Mexican Diaspora as a Third Actor of the Bilateral Relationship Between Mexico and the U.S.

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Introduction

Lobbying is a cultural practice of the United States (U.S.) political and civil society. It is a common tool for bringing pressure by domestic or foreign interest groups to influence government decisions by hiring professional firms or through grassroots mobilization, rooted in the first amendment right of petition. In this context, Mexican-origin organizations have had to develop it over the years on the structure of the government of the host country; in this case, the U.S. Most of the academic work in the field of International Relations, argues that a Diaspora is a set of individuals that are living out of the borders of their nation of origin because of their dispersion. In spite of the fact that they are located in more than two different geographical points, they keep a close link with the motherland (country of origin, real or not) acting as a third actor in the relationship between both countries: the one that is hosting the Diaspora and its motherland.

Diasporas' cores are made up of well-organized elites of a group who mobilize the community. According to this logic, only a minority of the whole group is permanently active and not always visible. The majority are passive members who second the core group in the mobilizations. Although not permanently organized, they are receptive to the coordination by Diaspora elites. Most people in a Diaspora are silent members of the group.

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Ordinary people are not up to date on political, social, or cultural issues, but their number and weight in the economy make them the natural target of the Diaspora elites. The Mexican case has these characteristics (Shain, Yossi and Aharon Barth, 2003).

I define Mexican Diaspora in the U.S. as the group of people made up of Mexican immigrants and their descendants born there, known as Mexican-Americans. The latter, together with a segment of immigrants, children, or young people who have become naturalized U.S. citizens, they consider themselves as Latinos or Hispanics, and play that role to achieve greater acceptance in political life. The organizations that consider themselves representatives of the interests of the U.S. Latino population, like the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), or the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), are part of this group. I also identify the coalition of networks of Mexican migrants and the councils, federations, and clubs of Mexican born U.S. residents as part of the Diaspora.

Because the Diaspora concept means dispersion, and does not distinguish legal status, I also consider undocumented immigrants from Mexico living in the U.S. as an important part of the Diaspora. It is relevant to clarify that Mexican diaspora is not a unique category of people, but a heterogeneous community that includes groups with different levels of skills, social class, legal status, wages, and purposes, as most of the diasporas in the world. However, for the academic purposes of this analysis, I use the term diaspora because it is a concept that includes the divergences of those groups, and explain their collective action in specific contexts. By 2018, there are more than 36 million citizens of Mexican origin in the U.S. of first, second and third generation, who maintain ties with Mexico. This means that 12 % of the U.S. population have a Mexican origin. The Latino population represents 16 %. More than 12 million Mexicans living in the U.S. were born in Mexico (Gzesh and Schiavon, 2018, p. 6). Bearing this in mind, the main question that guides the current research is as follows, what are the main strategies used by the Mexican Diaspora to influence the U.S. political system? I argue that, under historical and difficult conditions, Mexican Diaspora living in the U.S. became an important player in the relationship between Mexico and the U.S. because it has developed strategies such as grassroots mobilization to get close to politicians on a national level, it sends economic contributions to Mexico, and make lobbying at a local U.S.

Legislatures to influence some decisions that affect Mexican issues on both sides of the border. Those different strategies are the main issue of concern of this study.

Concept of Diaspora

The study of Diasporas is theoretically located in constructivism because it seeks to explain the identities of the actors, their motivations and preferences, and also in liberalism, because they are groups of interests that try to influence the preferences of States (Shain and Barth, 2003; p. 451). From a constructivist perspective, identity is seen as the factor that allows an individual or group to visualize and differentiate itself from others. For Kubálková (2001), identity is established in relation to a series of differences vis-à-vis another, not only external but also internal (p. 230). In this respect, Wendt (1992) says that social interactions form structures in such a way that "practices are those that create a structure of identities or interests since it has no existence or powers outside the process ... Because of this, Anarchy-as a structure-is what states make of it." (Wendt, 1992; p. 128). An example of this is the construction of a group narrative in which it is given a central role in collective memory as a mechanism of identity creation.

According to Frederick Mayer (2010), shared narratives are the fundamental human devices that enable communities to act collectively (p. 1). In that sense, the author notes that the narratives serve as constituent structures, common interests in collective assets, align individual identities with group purposes and give meaning to collective acts (Mayer, 2006, p. 1). Langenbacher (2010) also observes that the intensity of the collective memory does not last forever, so it is necessary to make it more mythical so that it does not lose its grade of impact, hence the importance of the use of infrastructures, such as Memorials museums and academic documentation, to strengthen the existence and influence of memories (pp. 28-29). In that sense, Wendt (1992) is also right when he argues that "regular practices produce mutually constitutive identities, as well as their associated institutional norms". I argue that Diasporas use narratives to strengthen their collective action based on functional identities.

Concerning the treatment of liberal theory by interest groups as relevant

social actors in the domestic politics of a state, Andrew Moravcsik (1997) points out that the fundamental actors of international politics are the individuals and private groups that organize an exchange, and collective action to promote their differentiated interests under constraints. This happens due to material scarcity, social conflict, and variations in social influence (p. 517). In this line are the diasporas as, non-state actors, which, when participating in the construction of the agenda, have blurred the line between the internal and international dimensions. This analytical framework serves to study, under the logic of consequentialism, the ways in which Diasporas, as domestic interest groups, influence the preferences of the States.

William Safran (1991) defines diaspora as a community that goes from one center to two or more foreign regions or peripheral areas, retaining the collective memory of a vision or a myth, the consideration of the ancestral homeland as the true home and the ideal place for an eventual return, and a commitment to the maintenance or the re-establishment of the homeland as the guarantor of its cohesion under an ethnic-communal consciousness. Following the above, Cohen (1999) conceives Diasporas as groups of individuals residing outside the borders of their country of origin in, at least, two or three different regions as a result of traumatic events that bordered them. In them there is a reproduction and a frequent development of the idea of the country of origin, which has among its members a collective approval even though a good part of the group does not think it seriously (Cohen, 1999; pp. 45-57).

Dominique Schnapper (2011) also suggests that it is necessary to reserve the concept for populations that still maintain institutionalized (objective or symbolic) links, beyond the frontiers of the Nation-State (p. 173). It is useless to distinguish whether the dispersion has been provoked by political persecution, economic misery, and a project of colonization, commerce or culture because the diaspora comprises multiple meanings (Schnapper, 2011; p 172). Jose Moya (2011) agrees with Schnapper in arguing that, because although the term has changed from 1968 to date, one of the most important criteria to identify a diaspora is the degree of dispersion and interconnection among its organizations. Since the definition, in our contemporary world, describes groups that have dispersed throughout the world, regardless of whether their displacements are forced or not, from the relative prominence of the idea of return in their ethnic-cultural discourses,

or from the conflict of their relationship with the receiving society, this concept is multifunctional (p. 209).

Shain and Aaron Barth (2003) argue that there are four possible (and not mutually exclusive) motivations for Diasporas to exert influence:

> 1. Their central interest in projecting a certain image of their national identity through their foreign policy of the country's receiver. (Shain and Barth, 2003; p. 450).
>
> 2. They seek to keep a unique role in the political or foreign policy of the country of origin. (Shain and Barth, 2003; p. 454.)
>
> 3. They can perceive that the foreign policy of their own country could affect a particular community in the receiver country. (Shain and Barth, 2003; p. 455.)
>
> 4. Diasporas could see that the foreign policy of its countries affect the bureaucratic interests of their organizations. (Shain and Barth, 2003, p. 456).

As can be seen here, the term Diaspora, historically centered in the paradigmatic case of the Jewish experience, has changed from 1968 to date. This happened due to the fact that the current definition includes national groups that have dispersed throughout the world, regardless of whether their displacements are forced or not, from the relative prominence of the idea of return in their ethnic-cultural discourses, of their relationship with the receiving society (Moya, 2011, p. 209). Hence, the Mexican communities abroad may qualify as diaspora although this has not necessarily originated according to the pattern of the Jewish Diaspora model.

Diasporic lobbying in the U.S.

Discussion on U.S. policy is important because being the world superpower, what happens within it has concrete impacts on international politics due to the widespread scope of its decisions. Defined as a democracy with a presidential system, the U.S. has three branches of the Union: one

executive headed by the president, who is elected every four years and can be re-elected for an immediate period, and has the power to appoint his cabinet in the different portfolios; One legislative that is formed of a bicameral Congress; The House of Representatives that is composed of 435 members that represent the population by means of electoral districts, and the Senate, which counts on two senators by each one of the 50 States that conform the nation. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United States heads the judiciary, which is the highest court in that country. In this context, lobbying from interest groups is done primarily before the first two powers of the Union.

As Allan Cigler and Burdett Loomis (2005) point out, it is possible to see three well-marked paths in American political dynamics. First, a growing number of interest groups are engaged and involved in with to decisively influencing the American policy. Lobbying is the most effective strategy of all of them. Second, both argue that there is an increasingly less marked distinction between internal lobbying (for national issues) and external lobbying (for international policy issues). The most effective lobbying is a combination of both. Third, the distinction between the U.S. electoral system and its decision-making structure is increasingly blurred. The links between the public and private sectors are stronger, and both officials and interest groups seem to make decisions based on their electoral aspirations in the short and medium term.

In this context, observing lobbying here as a variable that explains the influence of non-state actors on the U.S. government is necessary, as this line is a vein that is often ignored among the Mexican academicians while studying the U.S. policy. According to Jefrey H. Birnbaum (2005), the term lobbying was first used in the U.S. in the year 1829 during the administration of President Andrew Jackson to refer to the activity of lobbies seeking privileges in favor of important New York bankers. For authors such as Thomas Clive (1998), the first regulation of this activity occurred in the year 1876, when the lower house demanded a resolution to make the lobbyists register their activities before its secretariat.

In that sense, Walter Astier-Burgos (2011) suggests that the most illustrative examples of what institutionalized the practice, were the meetings held in the lobby of the Willard Hotel in Washington, DC-located a couple of blocks from the White House- between the president of that time Ulises S. Grant

and certain businessmen, to whom it was more difficult to access in his presidential precinct than in the lobby of this hotel. This practice was then stipulated as lobbying and was identified as an effective tool with which lobbyists streamlined their lobbying and petitioning mechanisms to enable them to make things happen as they hoped, by contacting government officials without having to follow the ordinary communication protocols of that time.

In 1938 lobbying was approved in the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), as a legal framework for lobbyists who represent the interests of foreign groups. These agents were required to register with the Department of Justice. By 1946, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was enacted to regulate lobbying in domestic affairs at the parliamentary level and in 1995 the Lobbying Disclosure Act was passed to regulate the practices of pressure groups on the Executive. Other laws such as Lobbying Disclosure Act, Technical Amendments 1998, Leaership Honest and Open Government Act of 2007, and the Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance 2010 were passed to regulate the lobbying practices of the stakeholders, which had become recurring practices. Due to this legal framework, both foreign governments and Diasporas as domestic interest groups can influence the U.S. government decisions from inside. In other words, on the one hand, the U.S. - friendly policy toward Israel or Armenia, meaning permanent annual economic and military assistance, would not be understood without the help of the Jewish and Armenian Diasporas in front of the Congress and the White House in favor of those countries. They are emblematically considered ancestral homelands, or symbols of the unity of Jews and Armenians, respectively. On the other hand, the aggressive U.S. foreign policy against Cuba would not be understood without the pressure exerted by the Cuban Diaspora in Florida and Washington again the Cuban regime.

Among the most important achievements of the pro-Israel lobby -led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) mainly carried by the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League (Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, 2016) - are the institutionalization of unconditional annual economic aid of 3 billion dollars, as well as U.S. military support to Israel for any defensive emergency since 1949 (Stauffer, 2003). For every dollar the U.S. government invests in foreign aid to Africa, it allocates $ 250 to Israel, and for every dollar given to Latin America and the Caribbean, $ 214 goes to Israel (Curtiss, 1998).

For fiscal year 2016, the U.S. Congress approved annual aid of $ 38 billion, just to mention another example. At the diplomatic level, only from 1982 to 2006, the United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, vetoed more than thirty resolutions against Israel (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006, pp. 3-12). According to Hossein Alikhani (2000), economic embargoes against Libya and Iran (well-known enemies of Israel) were also promoted by AIPAC and executed by former presidents Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton, even against lobbying of domestic oil lobbies (p. 45).

As far as pro-Armenian Diaspora lobbying is concerned, among its most important achievements are the annual 90 million dollars, which were provided to sustain Armenia in the 1990s, the maintenance of the 907 legislation that was blocked until 2002, any American aid to Azerbaijan with the warning that hostilities against Armenia should be stopped, the stagnation of a larger arms agreement with Turkey and the increasing support of different political sectors of the U.S. government to officially acknowledge the genocide (Gregg, 2002, p. 1). To that end, both the Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) and the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) have promoted the creation of an Armenian Caucus in Congress, which reached, by 2014, the 113 members with permanent membership, of which 30 come from California, 11 from New York, 9 from Michigan, 8 from Illinois and 7 from New Jersey; States where up to 85% of the population of Armenian origin is estimated at 1.5 million (Armenian Assembly of America, 2014).

On the other hand, Cubans represent the paradigmatic case of lobbying a diaspora against the government of the country of origin. It is composed of organizations such as the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), the U.S.- Cuba Democracy Pac, the Free Cuba Pac (disappeared in 2004), and the Cuba Liberty Council. Its main objective and its core mission it is to influence US policies to provoke the fall of the Castro regime, which has turned this diaspora into the most influential lobbyist organization from Latino origin in this country, especially in the context of the Cold War (Santamaría Gómez, 1998; p. 260). Such controversial laws against the island of Cuba, such as the Torricelli Act of 1992, as well as Helms Burton of 1996, whose ultimate purpose was to consolidate the embargo against Cuba, were the result of Cuban-American lobbying on the basis of the U.S. political system of State (1992). Its speech is in total harmony with the

leading approach of U.S. national and foreign policy.

For Lara Quint, "although foreign policy decisions are not as affected at the same level as at the domestic policy level, pro-Israel groups such as AIPAC, or anti-Cuba as the CANF, of the Cuban diaspora in the exile, are the most influential Diasporas because they understand the game. Depending on the member of Congress to which they are addressed, they can enhance their reach: 'Again, it depends on who the target is and where they are from" (Quint, 2014). Both the Jewish and the Armenian diaspora, as well as the Cuban diaspora, allow us to observe that these groups reproduce the dominant discourse of the country, as pointed out by Constructivism, and assume it as their own to justify the cause they promote (common world of life). In this context, the Mexican diaspora would be placed in that category of groups that lobbyist; first, to consolidate themselves as autonomous actors with their own political needs and interests; Second, as a potential ally of the government of their country of origin (Mexico) in the U.S. to counterbalance hostilities from it.

The Mexican diaspora as a factor of the bilateral relation

The Mexican diaspora holds relevance in the U.S. as a third actor of the bilateral relationship, although not new from a migration-focused approach, it is from an approach oriented towards the politicization and transformation of this community as an actor that influences the American politics with direct benefits for itself and indirect benefit for Mexico. Ruddy O. de la Garza (1997) had pointed out for decades that the use of the Mexican diaspora to try to influence the American political system was a clear objective of the Mexican government. When the first Program for the Mexican Communities Abroad (PCME) was launched, it was aimed at encouraging Hispanics of Mexican origin to be on the side of the Mexican government in their intention to promote the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whose effects had been limited to that of "Mexican-American" until that moment (Escamilla-Hamm, 2001).

For David Ayón (2006), the sustainable development of diverse networks of leaders of migrant activists and organizations of Mexicans was decisive in organizing hundreds of orderly and disciplined marches involving millions of protesters over a period of approximately 10 weeks; the greatest

mobilizations to be remembered in the history of that country (p. 115). One point to emphasize in Ayón's analysis is that the context of Mexican politics regarding migration and its diaspora underwent a profound transformation from 1986 to 1991. (p. 127). The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was aproved and signed in November 1986 after nearly a decade of political maneuvering by Mexican-American leaders and Latino organizations, but in which the Mexican government played no role. It legalized about 2.7 million undocumented immigrants and once legalized, they expanded their political perspectives to empower themselves as an autonomous community with their own interests.

Gustavo Cano (2004) developed a study that analyzes the work of organizing migrant communities in American cities. Cano argues that a complete understanding of immigrant political mobilization must simultaneously focus on the relations of Mexican immigrants with relevant political institutions and processes in their 'home' (in this case, Mexico) and 'host' societies (the United States). In that direction, the work of Myriam Hazan (2006), analyzes the political incorporation of Mexican immigrants into both their home and host countries through the examination of the origins, dynamics and patterns of action of first-generation Mexican-American organizations in four American cities: Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Dallas. According to Hazan, Mexicans in the U.S. can potentially affect local and national electoral processes, particularly taking into account the fact that their naturalization rates have been on the rise (p. 1). This fact makes the Diasporas a key player for the Mexican government to work together in order to influence some U.S. decisions related to both, the Mexican community in the U.S. and the Mexican Government in the bilateral relationship.

On one hand, Brenda Lara (2010) analyzes the role of the Consultative Council of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, the potential of state cooperation with the Mexican diaspora organized in North America, and the scope and limitations of this body. For Lara, the consultative council has been functional to the demands of the diaspora because it has offered a channel of expression and structured participation in two ways; 1) its organization has management capabilities since it is divided into thematic commissions which mostly articulate concrete proposals to improve the conditions of their communities; 2) the dialogue between the State and its diaspora is representative according to the circumstances of its origin, but limited in its

future possibilities, since it requires constant negotiations between activists and/or community leaders with the government authorities in charge. (p. 132). On the other hand, Alexandra Délano (2011) talks about the positive effects of the approval of double nationality law of 1996 which had on the Mexican diaspora, which allowed the Mexicans to opt for a nationality without losing their Mexican nationality, so they could nationalize and defend themselves as Americans by obtaining a legal status against the racist policies of that country. Délano also points out that the president of Mexico at that moment, Ernesto Zedillo, went further than the traditional speech that characterized other presidential administrations, arguing that following the passage of the law of dual nationality, he hoped that Mexicans would opt for US citizenship, not only to defend their community rights, but also to form a pro-Mexico lobby in the terms in which Jewish groups did it for Israel (p. 47).

Carlos González Gutiérrez (2003) has argued that it was clear that without diminishing the loyalty that the descendants of the Mexican diaspora felt for the U.S., their growing access to the political and economic circles in that country opened the door to Mexico´s issues. González underlined that democratic change in Mexico, the consolidation of a Mexican-American middle class, and the growing maturity of diaspora organizations had generated the conditions conducive to an institutional relationship between the Mexican government and them (p. 166). In this vein, Carlos Heredia (2012) developed an important analysis on the diplomacy of non-governmental actors, specifically, of Mexicans in the U.S. as transnational political actors who seek to influence public policies both in their country of origin as in the one of destination. According to Heredia, the central components of citizen diplomacy are, interalia, lobbying activities or influence among foreign governments and multilateral organizations, the building of transnational community power through community organization and civic participation, and the impact on research agendas. This is what many Mexican Diaspora organizations started doing since, at least, two decades ago in the U.S. (p.168)

Finally, López Almejo (2015) proposed that, in terms of foreign policy, the U.S. government is more sensitive to the influence of diaspora lobbying than to traditional lobbying hired by foreign governments, due to their role as domestic interest groups with the capacity to legitimize their demands when they adjust their practices and speeches to the American political

system. Taking the Mexican diasporic lobbying as a case of study, the author points out that both diaspora organizations created by Mexicans of first-generation and those led by Mexican Americans have political activism, even over other Diasporas in the U.S. Their leaders are able to agree on the major issues related to all of them, such as the defense of the use of Consular Matriculation, driving licenses for undocumented migrants, the impetus for immigration reform and the high total to deportations.

The Role of Remittances to the Mexican Economy

As previously seen, the study mentioned the importance of the Diaspora as a relevant non-state actor, to the bilateral relationship. To a large degree, Mexicans in the U.S. have been more important to their country of origin in economic than political terms. It is precisely this that has motivated the Mexican government to have a strategic institutional approach with the Diaspora, since remittances represented, at the beginning of the nineties, the third important source of income for Mexico. According to Bancomer (2015) in 2014, remittances to Mexico from the U.S. reached 23.6 billion dollars, 7.8% greater than that of 013. According to data from The Central Bank of Mexico (Banco de México-Banxico) (2016), from 2005 to 2015, the accumulated remittance inflows exceeded the 21.3 billion dollars at their minimum level and reached the annual amount of 26 billion. If in 1995 remittances were 3.7 billion, according to the Banxico database, by 2016 they exceeded 20 billion from January to September itself, with a projection of at least 26 billion dollars by December (Banxico, 2016). This means that remittances may constitute the first source of income for Mexico, above oil or foreign direct investment.

Table 6.1:U. S. - Mexican Remittances to Mexico

Years	Annual amount
2016	26 billion dollars
2015	24 billion dollars
2014	23.6 billion dollars
2013	23 billion dollars
1995	3.7 billion dollars

Source: Bancomer (2015), Banxico (2016)

It is important to mention that remittances have represented an escape valve for the Mexican economy due to the fluidity that is maintained in the purchasing power of the sectors that receive them and by the liquidity that it injects to the industries that provide services to the receiving communities. In other words, money sent by the Mexican diaspora from the U.S. to Mexico encourages the Mexican government to maintain strong ties with its Diasporas permanently. Despite the fact that in 2010 there was a zero migration in the number of Mexicans going to the U.S., because of the impacts of the 2008 financial crisis and the increase in border security measures, the economic power of the Diaspora did not stop growing and unlikely reached historical levels of economic growth. The demographic consolidation in USA gave Mexico the incentive to have the large consular network of a country that provides credentialing services, passports, consular protection, mobile health services, and political training (Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 2016).

Mexican Diaspora lobbying the host government

When we talk about Mexican diasporic lobbying delivered at the local level, we shall bring to the table what happened in California in 2005, when the Californian legislature approved the law SB670 -the Apology Act for the 1930s Mexican Repatriation Program-, thanks to mobilizations and demands carried by the Diaspora. This law emphasized the unconstitutionality of the deportations of U.S. citizens and legal residents of Mexican origin to Mexico between 1929 and 1944, in the framework of the Mexican Repatriation Program. Due to this act, California offered a public apology to those individuals illegally deported and forced to emigrate to Mexico and requested a special place with a commemorative plaque in a public place in Los Angeles. This bill, introduced in the California legislature by Senator Joseph Dunn on February 22, 2005, was signed into law by Governor Schwarzenegger on October 5, 2005. The legislators who sponsored it in California's Congress were U.S. politicians of Mexican origin whose electoral campaigns were supported by Mexican-American organizations. During the discussions about the bill, MALDEF presented speeches and reparations petitions of surviving deportees before different legislative committees in 2003 with the support of Cruz Reynoso, a former official of the California Supreme Court, and Esteban Torres, a

former federal congressman for District 38. When the issue was reported in the press and pressure on California's Congress stepped up, the legislature gave in. (Almejo, 2015)

A similar case took place in Illinois 4 years later: the SB1557 was signed into law by Governor Pat Quinn on August 25, 2009, condemningthe deportation of 1.5- 2 million Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in 1933 as unconstitutional. This state law mandates all state-funded educational institutions, from primary schools to high schools, to include a specific module in their history study plans to teach about those racist and illegal deportations. In Illinois, journalist Vicente Serrano led the Diaspora lobbying efforts to get this bill passed; he later produced a documentary called "Unforgotten Injustice" to tell the story (Serrano, 2014). The senator for Illinois District 2, William Delgado, took up the fight in the state legislature. In Illinois, Mexican immigrants were the ones taking the lead to get those laws approved, but in California, Mexican-Americans did it. In both cases, groups of Mexican Diaspora supported each other's efforts. What happened in California in 2005 was key for inspiring what was done in Chicago in 2009. These two cases of successful Diaspora lobbying on the issue of deportations united the community, given the perception of a collective threat. They recovered the historic memory in the same way that the Jews and Armenians have done by remembering their traumatic events: the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. (Almejo, 2015)

In terms of lobbying at a national level, experiences at the local level, as mentioned before was being transferred to the national arena. Another relevant issue for the Mexican Diaspora is the formation of non-profit diasporic organizations to jointly fight along with local organisations for Immigration Reform. A particular example of this is the way the Illinois Coalition For Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) -created by MALDEF in Illinois- works with the Federation of Michoacan Clubs in Illinois -defined itself as a nonprofit organization formed by organizations of migrants from Michoacan (a Mexican province). These two organizations, work together to help migrants, benefited by IRCA in 1986, to get the U.S. citizenship by means such as consulting, teaching about the U.S. political system, civic participation and the importance of the grassroots mobilization (FEDECMI, 2013).

MALDEF at the national level, ICIRR at the state level, and Casa Michoacan

at the local level, particularly in the Chicago metropolitan area, created a national-level lobbying network for an immigration reform that allows observing how organizations of Mexican immigrants and Mexican-American communities work together to foster it as a theme of common interest. From the offices of the ICIRR, in the particular case of Illinois, they performed a constant monitoring through mapping to identify the voting record of the state congressional representatives. Once they located which Congressmen are totally against immigration reform, which ones favor it and which are the undecided ones; MALDEF, ICIRR and Casa Michoacan, design campaigns of telephone calls, letters and public mobilizations to press them and influence the campaign in the sense of their vows. These steps were followed in the same way as it was done when the local Legislature was lobbied for the passage of Illinois driver's license issued in 2012 (Arreola, 2013). Now, 13 states such as California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii and Illinois, among others, allow undocumented immigrants to use a driver's license (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2016).

When in spite of the approaches and negotiations to influence the meaning of their vote, congressional representatives still maintain a position of skepticism regarding what the organizations demand of them, diasporic organizations hold events to raise funds and offer them to finance some of their political campaigns. As Casa Michoacan is legally prevented from carrying out political activities and financing campaigns, some of its members created the Michoacan Binational Front as a Political Action Committee, specifically for these kind of activities. At the national level, some members of Mexican Diaspora support the candidacy of Representative Luis Gutierrez from District 4; who is still in his charge. At the local level, they have also supported winning candidates, such as Senator William Delgado (District 2), Representative Edward J. Acevedo (District 2) as well as the first state attorney for Cook County, who in 2008 became the first Hispanic woman to win the job - to ensure continued support for her demands at the national, state, and county levels. (Arreola, 2013).

The same experience is being replicated for the achievement of immigration reform around the whole country. Not only Michoacans allied with ICIRR in other states , but also Pueblans and the New York Immigration Coaliton (NYIC) in New York, Guanajuatans and the Zacatecans in Houston and Dallas; and, especially, the Zacatecans in Californi (Moctezuma, 2004; pp.

245-259). Moctezuma argues that within the communities of Mexicans residing in the US, there is a close relationship between their political participation in the destination country and a Mexican membership of the nation-state. (Moctezuma, 2004; p. 245). The author points out that the Zacatecans were an important link between the governors of Zacatecas and California between 1998 and 2004. To illustrate it, he underlines the cases of Rudy R. Rios, member of Section 652 of the Laborers' International Union of North America (LIUNA), and Guadalupe Gómez de Lara (president until 2004 of the United Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, co-founder of the Zacatecan Civic Front and adviser to the CCIME). (Moctezuma, 2004; p. 247).

From economic contributions to electoral campaigns done by Mexican Diaspora, it is possible to observe the work of the Zacatecan Civic Front (FCZ) to promote the candidacies of Lou Correa, originally born in Calera, Zacatecas, on his way to the California State Legislature, District 69 and later, to the California Senate for District 34. Members of this Political Action Committee also sponsored Linda Sanchez to become a congressional representative for District 39, and later they did the same when she ran for District 38 in 2013. Miguel Pulido, also received support from FCZ when he ran for the mayoralty of Santa Anna. Former Sheriff Lee Baca, was helped for his re-election like sheriff of Los Angeles (1998-2014). According to Moctezuma, FCZ also lended support to the winning formula-winners of California, Governor Gray Davis and Cruz Bustamante. Finally, the nominations of Loreta Sánchez (District 46) and Grace Napolitano (District 32) to the United States Congress also received support of Mexican diasporic organizations (Moctezuma, 2004; p. 247).

Moctezuma also points out that the United Zacatecan Federation of Illinois, which has made important contributions to the campaign of Luis V. Gutierrez (District 4) and Edward Burke (District 14 Councilor), replicated the experience of California in Illinois. This organization has also been an intermediary for official meetings of the Mexican governors of Zacatecas and the mayor of Chicago. (Moctezuma, 2004; p. 247) When Antonio Villaraigosa competed for the mayoralty of Los Angeles in 2005, Maricela Talamantes and Guadalupe Rodríguez, who were active members of the FCZ, which did not participate directly as an organization because most its members belonged to other counties, also supported him. This shows that although FCZ did not intervene because of legal impediments, its wing

settled in the city, did it. (Moctezuma, 2005; p. 79).

Conclusion

Mexican-Americans and Mexican migrants have learned to work together to influence the U.S. political system in order to help themselves to become a stronger community. They also send remittances regularly to Mexico, which is very important for the Mexican economy and the Mexican trade toward the United States. They also learnt the strategies to deal with the U.S. political system, dynamics and at times, they are natural targets to become key allies for the Mexican government to influence some U.S. decisions in specific cases that could affect Mexican oriented issues. This makes the Mexican diaspora, embedded in the world of the Hispanic community, a third player in the relationship between Mexico and the U.S., specifically in times of President, Donald Trump, who represents a big threat to the Mexican people in both sides of the border.

The U.S. political system has created structures where politicians pay more attention to demands made by the local constituencies, than to those made by foreign actors. Due to this, Diasporas become key allies for the governments of their countries of origin to push combined interests. Therefore, grassroots mobilization is important because, as mentioned earlier, Mexican-Americans made calls to their congressional representatives, sent them demand letters, organized rallies, donated to electoral campaigns and showed public political support to push their interests. Mexican Diaspora is not as influential as Jewish or Cuban Diasporas are, but its organizations are learning to consolidate themselves as political players that contribute politically and economically to both economies: Mexican and American.

Mexican organizations have been progressively taking control of their own narrative as a community that are part of the U.S. political society, and, at the same time, keeping their Mexican identity. Issues such as deportations, Immigration Reform and racists attacks are not only Mexican issues, but also Americans. That's why, the lobbying strategies of Mexican Diaspora to push the Apology Acts for the 1930s, Mexican Repatriation Programs at the local level, showed how important they are becoming, to be considered a third actor of the bilateral relationship. It is also true that Mexican-American advocacy also requires being more "professional" and keep permanent structures of pressure by tapping media-savvy spokespersons

and, maybe, Public Relations experts rather than just relying on unpaid helpers or community leaders. However, they are in their way to advance their interests in more evoluative ways.

The Mexican scholar Rafael Fernández De Castro (2016) also adds that the Mexico's 50 consulates in the United States are lobbying political, economic and social figures in each local district. The goal here is to promote the contributions of Mexicans, and to educate the American public and politicians in how jobs are being generated through the U. S. exports to Mexico as well as the direct investments Mexican companies make in American cities. This could not be possible without the help and combined work of the Mexican Diaspora and Mexican government; a variable that must remain present in the studies of the bilateral relations to come.

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Book Reviews

I

Ninna Nyberg Sorensen (2007), Living Across Worlds: Diaspora, Development and Transnational Engagement, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, Pp. III + 207, ISBN 978-92-9068-404-6.

The book is a compendium of research papers written by scholars from different disciplines such as Sociology, Development studies, International studies, Anthropology and so on. The eight research papers are based on ethnography, case studies and narratives of the immigrants, who are drawn from different geographical terrains of the world, but mainly focusing on immigrants from Latin American countries to Europe and U.S.A. The editor of the book states that the broad geographical outlook allows for a broader analysis of Diaspora formation, production of transnational social space, and the determinants of trans-national engagements. He further adds that the possible positive and negative influences of such engagements on developing the countries or local communities within them are documented in the following eight chapters.

The first chapter discusses the contemporary definitions and conceptualizations of Diaspora. It has been argued that Diaspora does not emerge solely as a consequence of dispersion, common national ancestry, or simply through any kind of connection. There is a process by which groups are motivated or influenced to become Diasporas. The author argues that the following criteria are essential such as- the level of community consciousness about the needs for a link with the homeland; whether the home-land government is encouraging diasporic identifications or links; the perception of emigrants by the society in the homeland and finally the relationship between homeland and host governments. Such processes are demonstrated by using case studies of the different Central American migrant groups. Finally, it can be inferred that in addition to 'common origin' and 'history', the 'context' is crucial for a migrant group to emerge as a diaspora.

The second chapter approaches the production of trans-national social space through Henri Lefebre's (1991) distinction between space as practiced, conceived and perceived. The author uses Mexican migration of 1910s to 1940s to the United States as a case study to theorize the production of transnational social space. The third chapter sets out to analyze the contradictory processes of the making and unmaking of transnational communities and diasporic identities. The author challenges the conventional concepts of diaspora and transnational community by using Burundian diaspora in Belgium as a case study. The author shows that the objective position of a diaspora in the host country is not only born out of ethnicity and time of arrival, but also depends on individual political manoeuvring in the transnational political field that shapes diasporic networks and determines the contents of trans-national practices. The fourth chapter maps and examines the determinants of transnational engagements among Nicaraguan migrants in Costa Rica. It is demonstrated that Diaspora form a platform for politics as well as are a location of change. The chapter further shows the evidence of a new transnational political field of action that has to be taken into account in the current political landscape.

The fifth chapter discusses about the transnational engagement of 'return Diaspora' in the homeland with the help of a case study of Somali Diaspora and shows the process of recognition, power relations, opportunities, nation building and gender in the homeland. The sixth chapter challenges the notion of 'return' as a migratory practice and develops the concept of 'revolving returnees' to capture the dynamics between an ideology of return and final homecomings on the one side, and mobile migratory practice on the other. The chapter also explains why 'revolving returnees' maintain continued forms of mobility between Somaliland and the West, and concludes that people need networks, knowledge, money and documents to be able to circulate between Somaliland and the West. The chapter also conveys that the Somalis are prime example of what Roger Rouse called a 'transnational migrant circuit' that is maintained through the circulation of people, money, goods and information (Rouse, 1991:15).

The seventh chapter analyzes transnational family life among Latin American migrants in Europe. The chapter criticizes that the previous studies tend to look at trans-national migration as larger processes of cross-border family relations, but have largely failed to address more closely micro-social processes such as family formation and family transformation-

beyond the simple description of continuous connections across borders. The article argues that one has to go beyond 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2003) which should be substituted with 'methodological regionalism' (p.169). The final eighth chapter explains the migration experiences of Peruvians. It argues that the decisions to emigrate as well as the choice of destination countries are determined by migrant's previous migratory experience and economic and social status in Peruvian society. It has been argued that migrants construct different notions of home in response to the context of reception in their new settings as well as their previous migration experience. The chapter cautions that the policy makers should take into account the dynamics of migratory experiences while framing the policy. In the conclusion, it has an overview of all the research papers and gives food for thoughts for policy makers and practitioners to engage with Diaspora effectively.

The primary critique of the book is that every research paper is intercepted with abstracts of the research papers which are not necessary, because there are abstracts of each chapter in the introduction section itself. Further, while discussing trans-national engagements with the homeland, the authors should have made a comparison or reference to Indian or Chinese diaspora who are engaged with the homeland. The other major criticism could be that though the authors of each chapter are from different discipline, they have not used much of their respective discipline's concepts. All of them focus on the concepts namely development and transnationalism, of course, the concepts like social capital and cultural capital have been used in the fifth chapter for analysis. None of the research papers discuss macro level impact on a nation state. Instead, all of them focus on micro level impact on community, region or family. Further, none of the research papers provide any kind of statistical data or details about the remittance to homeland. Certainly, it is a qualitative analysis, but, it could have been better if there had been quantitative analysis while discussing remittance flow at least in the first chapter. Over all, it can be stated that this book is a value addition in the growing body of Diaspora literature and scholarship.

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II

Andre Solimano (2010). International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization: Historical and Recent Experiences, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0-521-19425-9.

In the globalized era, the international migration has become a prominent area of discussion in academic field. The global forces intend to pace up the flow of money, resources, workers and society from one geographical boundaries to another. The international migration of people has been a main feature of the global economy of today and past. For last few decades, the international migration of workers, professionals and ethnic minorities have been increasing due to socio-economic and political pressures. Under such conditions, the migrants' rights and safety remain ambiguous in the destination countries. Therefore, the international migration, both as a process and condition has become challenging and precarious for both country-of-origin and country-of-destination.

The book titled "International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization" is written by Andre`s Solimano, who is the Founder and President of the International Center for Globalization and Development in Santiago, Chile. He discussed the international migration with the historical cases and recent evidences, which comprising of various country-examples from the mid-19th century and early 21st century. He has also conceptualized the push and pull factors of current migration waves and their impacts on the development of source and receiving countries. Furthermore, the migration experiences under the certain time-frame, political structure, cost involved in migration, socio-economic pressures have been analalysed. These issues are relevant at the times of economic crises as well as economic growth and prosperity.

The book consists of seven interconnected chapters dealing with theoretical underpinnings and empirical experiences of people and societies. The author has given a detailed introduction of the global migration history and discussed the major characteristics of international migration. The first chapter examined the trends, themes and stratification of international migration, highlighting the major drives and incentives for mobility. It

also discussed the role of visas, walls and deportation to allow easy and smooth immigration of people vis-a-vis to discourage the immigration from sending countries. The chapter also discussed the shift in political power and ideological differences, which plays critical roles in the flow of immigration.

The book examines the eight critical themes of international migration which resulted in the conceptualization of international migration. Such eight critical dimensions underline the international migration in the following areas: contentious or consensus issue, economic prosperity or economic crisis, consequence or mitigation of income disparities, goods and capital or people are important, talented elites or workers are more mobile, economic success in north or economic failure in south, irregular migration or fragmentation of global labour markets, multicultural framework for regulating international migration.

The second chapter examines the reasons for people's movement such as international differences in income, wages, payments, economic cycles, policies, social networks, financial crisis, political instability, civil war, dissolution of empires and so on. The impact of economic development on the standard of living, social services, community safety, health, environment and overall social securities for both individual as well as society as well as the role of development organizations, philanthropy and investment in the communities back home are discussed. It also analysed 'why not' people migrate which includes financial, family, social costs and factors that influence the decision to migrate, other than income.

The third chapter discuss the dilemma of legal ambiguities, denial of rights and restrictions on immigration that result in illegal migration. Immigration creates a sense of insecurity for employment opportunities, natural resources and capital among the natives. Furthermore, the dilemma of migration compatibility and income convergence in view of size of migration, the challenges of brain drain and brain gain in tandem with migration outflow and inflow in the sending and receiving countries respectively were discussed. The impact of economic growth in sending countries in view of talent circulation, remittances, new development effects have been also discussed in this chapter.

The fourth chapter deals with the policy regimes and economic imperatives

that influence the mobility of capital and people. The author discussed the economic liberalization in the first wave of globalization for labour and capital markets during 1870-1914. He talked about the major traits, nature and role of global capital market in the labour-flow from developing countries. He also discussed the de-globalization phase during 1913-1945 wherein economic instability (western and developing countries) and political turmoil (in developed nations bloc) led to restricted immigration flows. Furthermore, the book emphasized the rising debate over nationalism vs. internationalism during 1945-1973, corresponding with the Bretton Woods era. The chapter also talked about the second phase of globalization with mass labour migration towards Western Asian region from South Asia. The chapter analysed how international capital markets have interacted, shifted and reshaped under certain political events and policy regimes. The chapter explained that how the nature of international trade, capital markets and free labour mobility took place from first wave of globalization to second phase of globalization.

The fifth chapter deals with Latin America, which was discussed as a case of economic development, political crisis, poverty and remittance gain. In this chapter, the author discussed the development gaps between Latin America and Europe, which reinforces the formation of New world in the 19th century. Under this broad theme, the author eaxamined the country-cases of Argentina and overtaking immigration in Latin America in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The author also discussed the macro-economic and financial crisis, inconsistent growth and recurrent political crises which led to the emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean towards the one country i.e.; United States. However, since 1990s, the flow of people from Latin America shifted towards Spain and some other European countries. The chapter further discoursed over the socio-economic demographic characteristics of Latin American migration which promulgated the emigration of women and educated persons. It also studied how internal diversity in developmental levels which helped to explain intra-regional migration and the effects of remittances gain for the domestic economies in Latin America.

The sixth chapter focused on the highly talented, highly educated, professionals and entrepreneurially oriented people. The chapter conceptualized the concept of elite, knowledge and talents in the current economic scenario. It raised the debate on the significance of international

political relations, capital markets and value of talents in the sending and receiving countries. The chapter also discussed where the talent moves, where the health and cultural talent moves, why there is mobility of talent in international public organizations, multinational corporations and international banks. The chapter has brought the debate on and what they offer- employment opportunities, earning, rewards, promotion and better career options to talented workers. It critically addressed the debate over the segmentation of labour market based on their skills, knowledge and experiences. This has furthermore raised the discussion over the best vs. worst, talented vs. looser, winner vs. failure under the conditions of economic gains, reward system and profit terms. The chapter has put forth the important topics of return flow of talented persons, talent circulation and outsourcing jobs, unnoticed, unseen and unrecognized (in terms of rewards, earning and employment) contribution of youths in culture and arts in the world.

The seventh chapter dealt with the conclusion inclusive of summary of the salient arguments and critical issues of the book. This chapter advocated a fair and orderly international migration process. The author suggested for global social contracts, legal framework, conventions and recommendations particularly for management of international migration and disseminate the responsibilities to the various agencies of sending and receiving countries. The chapter forecasted the migration scope in the world and proposed to fill up the institutional vacuum through various contracts, policies and programmes. The chapter recommended the state, civil societies and non-govt organisations to bring new policy measures and programmes for more inclusive and accommodative migration approach. It also proposed the international organizations for more proactive, dynamic and effective approach to address the issues and challenges of international migration today.

The book has relevance with the current debate over international migration worldwide. The book provides a detailed historical background of the international migration trends of people with support of the changing political and economic regimes. The book is well organized and executed with detailed reference lists for comprehensive readings related to migration studies.

It also analysed some critical issues such as illegal migration, economic

crisis, brain drain, political turbulence. The book, however, does not discuss the issues of exile, forced migration, women's irregular migration and human trafficking per se. The book does not discuss the critical role of state and international bodies in terms of unskilled workers' migration, human trafficking, absence of human rights and challenges of migrants. . The book did not address the migration history of Africans to the European countries. Nevertheless, the book contributes tothe knowledge capital of migration studies and provokes readers to think on capitalism, internationalism and globalization.

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III

Rajinder Dudrah (2012). Bollywood Travels: Culture, diaspora and border crossings in popular Hindi cinema, London/New York: Routledge, P– 144, ISBN: 0415447402 .

This book is based on a research journey about a cinematic medium, i.e. Bollywood and its products; its audience and the context of reception. It is a product of years of research and writing by the author and some of its chapters have been published and presented in different scholarly domain in the past few years. The reason for saying this is Rajinder Dudrah is a familiar name for those interested in "cultural studies" and to be more specific "reception studies". From the reception studies perspective, the present monograph can be placed within "the third generation audience studies" (Alasuutari 1999) as it pays equal attention to the texts, audiences and the context of consumption. To say it differently, this is a very timely contribution to the growing body of literature on the analysis of popular culture and its reception.

As the title suggests, Bollywood Travels indicates a globalized media phenomenon that crosses multiple geographical territories through distribution of the films to their intended markets and simultaneously through film form and language. The idea of Bollywood as a "culture

industry" (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1993) producing and reproducing popular culture has been claimed and preserved thoughout.

Through this scholarly endeavour, the author seeks answers for three key objectives. First "What happens to issues of culture and diaspora in Bollywood cinema, especially as it develops as a cinema and popular culture in the era of globalization?" Second "How far, and to what extent, do some if its films and related products (i.e. starts and related film industry) travel across borders of various kinds (cultural, social, economic and actual nation-state boundaries)?" Last but not the least, "How do audiences take up some of these mediations and incorporate them into their lives beyond mere cinematic spectatorship?"

The book attempts to answer some of these questions by drawing on participant observation, textual analysis, and performance and cultural studies. The author attempts to make sense of the phenomena of Bollywood shows, especially from the viewpoint of the diaspora.The author has developed on the existing body of works done by distinguished scholars on Bollywood, like Madhava Prasad (2003), Ashish Rajadhyakshya (2003, 2009), Vijay Mishra (2008) among others.. These scholars mostly concentrated on the nomenclature of Bollywood, and how it has become the preferred term, replacing earlier descriptors such as Bombay Cinema, Indian Popular Cinema, and Hindi Cinema; its relationship with the hegemonic centre of Hollywood film production and distribution around the world. Moving ahead of these works, Dudrah focuses on the changing representation of diaspora itself as Bollywood films, popular culture, and its cultural industries travel and interact with global cultures and ideas outside India. As Bollywood cinema partly relies on the Indian and wider South Asian diaspora for its monetary growth, it regularly seeks to depict this diaspora in its own special ways.

Through his journey in 'Bollywood Travels', the author examines some of Bollywood cinema's recent travels where part of its pleasure and tensions are about crossing borders of various imaginative and actual kinds. He does so through the textual analysis of some of the recent popular and successful Hindi films, their possible readings and uses by audiences in the diaspora as wider popular culture, and its 'cultural industry manoeuvres' in the cotemporary moment of globalization. He states that "in crossing such socio-cultural borders in the production and uses of the films and popular

culture by filmmakers and audiences, this allows the creation of border places and spaces" (p. 99).

Citing the scope for Bollywood travels in future, the author says that we should pay attention to the various industrial, textual and socio-economic dynamics of the movements across Bollywood and its neighboring cinemas. This may include the travel of popular films from the south to the north of India and beyond, where one can focus on the translation of films into different languages, and also the recent phenomenon where some of India's industry personnel (like Mani Ratnam) who often work on regional and Bollywood films simultaneously.

The Book is divided into seven chapters. In the first chapter the author introduces his work and places it within the larger body of literature on Bollywood and diaspora. The second chapter takes up the issue of border and border crossing in the recent popular films like Main Hoon Na and Veer Zaara with a special focus on the troubled relationship between India and Pakistan. The third chapter analyzes and discusses the filmic text of Jhoom Barabar Jhoom as an interesting take on issues of the diaspora and homeland. The fourth chapter deals with the issues of queer gender and sexuality in the mainstream gay Bollywood film Dostana. These four chapters deal with the film form, content, plots and narratives and focus on how pleasure in the texts can be critically read and assessed. Moving ahead the fifth chapter in this book develops the theoretical framework of the 'haptic urban ethnoscape' which deals with the multi-sensory ways of interaction between the film text and the audience, in metropolitan locales. Differing from all others, the sixth chapter explores how the star-studded Bollywood shows and the culture industries perform an idea of Bollywood. The last and the concluding chapter (chapter 7) explores the future pathways for the continuation of this spirit of Bollywood through social networking sites like twitter.

One noticeable aspect of this book is, though its chapters vary in their scope, the common thread that binds them together is the concept/idea of Bollywood. The book is neatly written and the concepts/ideas are well developed for a better understanding of the reader. Through his writing, the author takes the reader on a smooth journey of 'Bollywood in the foreign lands'.

More recent studies like Bollywood and Globalization (2011) edited by Mehta and Pandharipande, Tracing an Indian Diaspora (2008) edited by Raghuram et.al. mostly focus on the content of the filmic text and how they deal with the idea of diaspora whereas the present study by Dudrah looks beyond the text to understand the interaction between the text and the audience and the presence of Bollywood's culture industry in the life of the diasporic audience outside theatre.

This book is an excellent piece of work and a scholarly contribution to the emerging field of Sociology of Media and Communication. Anyone who is interested in the areas of sociology, diaspora, media and film studies will find it interesting and useful.

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IV

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff (2009) Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement, UK: Cambridge University Press, ISBN-13 978-0511-71938-7

Migratory birds like the Siberian cranes cover large distances to escape harsh winters and shortage of food during the winter months. Even though they stay for a few months in their host country of migration like India, they are a source of joy as well as a source of income through tourism for locals. In much the same way, humans migrate from their countries of birth for livelihood, better life or to escape conflict or persecution in their homelands. Unlike the birds, however, most of them don't return to their homelands, having settled in their new lives in their adopted homelands. So what is the difference between migrants and Diasporas?

Diasporas are defined as migrants in host countries, who still maintain emotional and material linkages with their homelands. This book by Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff is a scholarly work about digital Diasporas, Diaspora groups that use the Internet. The term 'Digital Diaspora' is a recent coinage and describes the phenomenon of Diasporas using the Internet to connect and maintain bonds with their countries of origin. The Internet

pretty much performs the same function as a physical group i.e., that is, it provides a connection to the country of origin, eases security concerns, improves a member's quality of life, creates communities that represent hybrid identities and encourages solidarity among members.

So how does the digital aspect add value? Migration is not easy. The identity of the migrant is not a zero sum game. It is typically a dynamic hybridization between home, host and lived experiences. There is a felt need of a migrant to actively express an identity. This may be derived from various forms of marginalization, confusion or not wanting to lose a sense of homeland identity.

Information technology is interactive and is an easily access tool for Diaspora storytelling, sharing and narration, thus enabling members to make sense of their experiences and feelings in their new culture and identity. The anonymity of the Internet eases the Diaspora participation especially when sharing painful memories or discussing potentially conflictive topics.

Brinkerhoff examines how immigrants who still feel a connection to their country of origin use the Internet, and this, she does through the case study of nine digital organizations. She argues that digital Diasporas can ease security concerns in both the homeland and the host society, thus improving Diaspora members' quality of life in the host society, and contributing to socioeconomic development in the homeland.

She begins her arguments by theoretically defining the term 'Diaspora' and emphasis on the Diasporan identity and its importance. She elucidates the major components that influence Diaspora identity. These are origin, language, historical memory, religion, and the habitual status of a minority in larger societies.

Diasporas may proactively promote and recreate homeland identities, these identities being more acute in the absence of a physical homeland, for instance, for people from Tibet. She cites the case of Dorjee Nud, a Tibetan born in India, after his parents fled Tibet. Nudup founded TibetBoard in the year 2000, two years after his arrival in New York. TibetBoard, explains Brinkerhoff, is an interactive and comparatively informal destination for those who may want to learn about or negotiate the Tibetan identity among Diaspora.

Brinkerhoff talks about how digital networks increase in social capital, bonding of which provides the collective identity, and how instrumental networks that can ward off personal disorder and psychic crisis. They direct their mobilized identity toward improved quality of life for compatriots in the homeland, for Diaspora communities in the host-land, or for both. For example, the IIT Roorkee Alumni Association of North America (host land) is working with IIT Roorkee (homeland) to help students explore and fine-tune their entrepreneurial instincts by pitching business ideas for start-ups to a panel of senior venture capitalists and entrepreneurs for mentorship and incubation using the digital medium.

Besides a homeland identity, IT helps Diasporas link to the homeland. Brinkerhoff cites the case of Bal Joshi who after pursuing his undergraduate in business studies in Portland, Oregon, returned to Nepal. In Nepal, he started Thamel.com to attract tourists after trying his hand at other entrepreneur ventures. Bal Joshi used Thamel in a throwback to the name of a Kathmandu street that hosts the business core. Thamel.com became an important vehicle for Diasporas to communicate inexpensively with their family members in Nepal. Joshi stumbled on to a new idea related to the Dashain Festival, the most important cultural and spiritual celebration in Nepal, the major component of which was the sacrifice of a ceremonial goat to bring prosperity in the year ahead. After a few iterations, Thamel. com zeroed in on delivering gift certificates from Diasporas that could be redeemed by the family in Nepal at a particular goat market. These become a big hit with the Nepal Diaspora who would transfer the money online for gift certificate to be physically delivered in Nepal.

The chapter, "Digital Diasporas and Conflict Prevention" analyzes how digital Diasporas by the creation of cyber communities counter the marginalization conducive to violence using examples of Somalinet and AfghanistanOnline. These cybercommunities potentially prevent conflict through opportunities to express feelings and bond with others online, as the difficulty of communication in the physical world is simplified in the cyberworld where a certain degree of anonymity is permitted to an individual. Through these cybercommunities, members potentially deflect their frustration and animosity through verbal modes, as opposed to potentially violent forms like physical agitation and confrontation.

The author discusses how Diasporas also support agendas consistent

with liberal values, such as democracy and human rights which are advantageous to selected homeland constituents and the international community alike. Furthermore, the author feels Diasporas may not threaten state sovereignty to the extent feared, and may even support it giving the example of the U.S. Copts Association and its physical world political agenda to improve the quality of life of Copts residing in Egypt. She narrates the story of Nermien Riad, a US State Department employee on a duty in Egypt, after visiting a Coptic orphanage in Cairo went on to start the Coptic Orphans that implements four programs in Egypt that not only help the Coptic community, but also extend their reach to non-Coptic girls and their problems.

The author brings out how today the most advanced digital diasporas are seeking to improve policy and institutional frameworks in support of both targeted homeland communities/populations and Diaspora contribution efforts. For example, the Zacatecan Federation of Hometown Associations in the United States orchestrated matching programs with the Mexican Government and spun off a political arm to lobby on both sides of the border, for an improved migrant investment environment while the India, Diaspora members have contributed significantly to the IT sector, through direct investment brokering investment relationships and proposing and promoting necessary changes to the legal framework in order to improve the investment climate.

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff is leaning heavily on how these digital Diasporas help negotiate hybrid identity and contribute to homeland societies. How digital Diasporas are contributing to the host-land in terms of host societies understanding of migrant culture, migrant skills and addition to host-land economy is not elucidated. She has also not touched upon digital Diasporas support for secession by ethnic groups in homeland.

The research for this 2009 published book has been done in the early 21st century and hence concepts like "social media Diaspora groups" don't figure in the narrative. How social media channels "Youtube" "Twitter and "Facebook" have reworked connecting and sharing rules on the internet or usage of Skype for communication is not touched upon. Five years is a long time in the new media converged world of today and hence maybe a second edition of the book is due.

Irrespective of a little repetitiveness the book is a must read for students working in the field of Diaspora studies. Students of new media will also get a great baseline insight on digital Diasporas. This combined with the current tidings of digital Diasporas experiments with social media will be worth investigating.

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V

Savitri Sawhney (2008) I shall Never Ask for Pardon: A Memoir of Pandurang Khankhoje, New Delhi: Penguin, 341 p, ISBN-13: 978-0143063766.

The National Movement in India comprised individuals of various hues. The attempt by the imperialist historiography to portray them as self seekers in the institutional openings created by British indeed needs to be critiqued. The biography under review depicts a man who exemplified commitment to the nation and its downtrodden. However this was no sectarian, narrow or chauvinist commitment. Khankhoje made a link between the downtrodden in India and the downtrodden across national boundaries. It was thus a transition from an armed revolutionary to an agricultural scientist of repute in far away Mexico was made.

Khankhoje was what E.H. Carr has called a 'romantic exile'. He left the country to explore avenues for training in arms and possibilities of a revolutionary overthrow of the British rule in India. This was at a very young age of 19 and after travelling through Japan, China and several other countries he reached the United States. Working as a labourer and restaurant waiter he studied at the Oregon University to earn a degree in agriculture. It is here that the foundations of the revolutionary Ghadr movement were laid. He depicted himself as a man of action and thus headed the 'praharak' (action) wing of the Ghadr movement. The casual way in which Khushwant Singh dismisses his association with Ghadr

is not borne out by facts. Harish K. Puri in an article in Social Scientist in 1980 described Khankhoje as the head of the armed militant wing in the revolutionary organization of Ghadr. Similarly, his name comes up in the various accounts of the time. That he had to be low profile was a price he had to pay for organizing armed training and mobilization. Savitri Sawhney in her account tells us that he often disguised himself as a muslim and assumed names such as Pir Khan. She has done a signal service to the scholars of the national movement by bringing out an account based on Khankhoje's personal papers. We get to know of Khankhoje's trials and travails as he makes contact with democratic movements in China (where he meets Sun-Yat-Sen), Japan, Persia and Russia. The attempts at armed mobilization were not without danger as Savitri Sawhney tells us of the time when he was shot and wounded and was taken care of by a nomadic Persian tribe.

Khankhoje turned towards the left revolutionary politics in the 1920s. Along with Virendernath Chattopadhyay, he met Lenin in Moscow in 1921 and submitted a thesis on the Indian question.

A revolutionary cannot be permanently plotting and carrying out armed revolution. Khankhoje in US had acquired degrees in agriculture at a US university. As Sawhney points out the inspiration to work on agriculture had initially come from his meeting with Sun-Yat-Sen. In his meeting with Lenin she tells us that Lenin had asked in detail about caloric and nutritional requirement of the Indian worker. It is these inspirations which fuelled Khankhoje's research in agriculture when he took asylum in Mexico. His contribution in developing a new variety of corn is well documented in various histories of agriculture.

Savitri Sawhney's account is indeed a tribute of a daughter to her father. There is nothing to be apologetic about that. Indeed her sparkling narrative tells us of the happy memories of her childhood and her father. In spite of the stresses and strains of the revolutionary commitment he managed to give that to his family is indeed an achievement.

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VI

Stephane Dufoix (2008), Diasporas, Berkeley: University of California Press, Paperback, 160 pages ISBN: 9780520253605

As we all very much aware that the word 'diaspora' referred only to religious group and Jewish migration experience at early stage. Later, it has assumed different connotations due to its application in diverse fields. In 1990s, the word was applied to world people who had migrated to different parts of the world due to various reasons and the word was further being applied to professional groups. At present, Diaspora means that it is nothing but the idea of displacement and the maintenance of a connection with a real or imagined homeland. The critics argued that owing to wider application, the usage of the term has become ambiguous. At this juncture, the scholars like Robin Cohen and Steven Vertovec tried to concretize the theoretical meaning of the term. In this light, the contribution of Stephane Dufoix is note worthy.

The book was originally written in French and it was translated to English by William Rodarmor. It is an indispensable guide for those who want to understand Diaspora as intellectual phenomenon and a social process. The book starts with a brief introduction by citing the popular usage of term in different fields and the divided views on Diaspora as a concept. Dufoix suggests a broader analytical framework for depicting the homeland relations of dispersed populations which is a unique theoretical contribution by Dufoix. Further, he has coined a new term 'referent origin' instead of calling it homeland as envisaged by others. The first chapter entitled as what is a Diaspora? exemplifies the etymological origin of the term in the beginning and then, he provides two classic examples of different diasporic experiences such as the 'Jewish Diaspora' and the 'Black Diaspora' as it is linked and opposed to each other. Followed by, he describes the recent historiography of the term. Having discussed that, he surveys and distinguishes three kinds of existing definitions on the term such as open, categorical and oxymoronic. For instance, oxymoronic definitions are based on the postmodern thought which is radically different from open and categorical definitions. Postmodern definitions focus upon paradoxical identity, the noncenter, and hybridity. The works of Stuart Hall, James Clifford and Paul Gilroy can be put under this category. A phenomenon called Diaspora to happen, first of all, dispersion should

take place. He analyses the dispersion of the people around the globe in the second chapter called as 'the spaces of dispersion,' which throws light on the nature, patterns, and phases of migration of people.

Dufoix discusses about four kinds of migratory groups namely the Greeks, Indians, Chinese, Armenians and their global spread. Having spread over space and time by diasporas, the establishment of connection with the referent origin is another important feature of dispersed population. He addresses this aspect in the third chapter entitled as 'maintaining connections' in which he develops a broader framework for homeland relations and collective experience abroad. He uses the Max Weber's methodology 'Ideal type' to identify as well as to structurise the different dimensions of homeland relationships. He proposes four ideal types such as 'centro-peripheral,' 'enclaved,' 'atopic,' and 'antagonistic' which are fluid in nature. Drawing on wealth of examples, he shows how populations can move from one mode to another. He shows that the Jewish Diaspora had transformed from atopic mode to centro-peripheral mode after the creation of the state of Israel. By doing so, he brings out the dynamic aspect of Diaspora relations rather than static thinking on the term. Besides, he shows with illustrations and tables the shifting nature of collective experience of the dispersed populations. In Chapter four 'Managing Distance' where he exemplifies the management and leverage of one's diasporic population and also explains the construction and imagination of Diaspora draws one's attention. For instance, he discusses about long distance nationalism by diasporas and the arrival of internet has reduced the distance which has paved the way for creation of 'imaginary community.' He concludes by saying that Diaspora has become a global word and is a common noun at present. It is no longer refers to misery, persecution and punishment of immigrant groups, he delineates that the term is perfectly suited to the modern process of Diasporic phenomenon.

Dufoix must be appreciated for analyzing the travel of the term from past to present with innumerable examples drawn from around the globe. He tries to make the term very inclusive given its position in the modern context. Over all, the book is a comprehensive and thorough account on the phenomenon called Diaspora. Though it is a small volume but it has all the ingredients. It is very much coherent, well structured and lucid written one. The illustrations and tables are self explanatory. The contents of the book aptly stands up to the title of the book 'diasporas.' Certainly, Dufoix differs

from other scholars for his dynamic approach in terms of conceptualizing and interpreting the term. The book will be a rewarding one for the scholars, students and those who are perplexed over understanding the term.

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VII

Gabriel Sheffer (2003) Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad, UK: Cambridge University Press, pages, 290, ISBN: 9780521009874.

What forms the basis of Diaspora politics? What are the main formational tools that leads to Diaspora formation within the ambit of a trans-national network? How do we associate Diaspora politics within this increasingly globalised world? These some the questions Gabriel Sheffer tries to tackle in the book "Diaspora Politics Home and Abroad. With this book, Sheffer tries to analyse the extent to which Diaspora networks play within the context of both homeland and the host country. This is a question that has particularly come within the fore front of the global stage. The book itself is structured in a form which looks to first discuss, then debate the question of the driving forces towards the formation of Diaspora politics within the homeland and looks to provide an analytical framework which could be used for further research.

The central focus of Sheffer's Diaspora analysis is set on the factor of "ethno-nationalism", a term he underlines while putting forward the Primary Questions and Hypotheses of the book. It is with this focus that Sheffer then builds on his various conclusions within the book itself. By ethno-national Sheffer tries to understand the politics of diasporas founded solely on the basis of a feeling on nationhood led by similar "ethnic and national traits, tendencies and familiarities" (p. 11). This acts as the foundation which the author uses to analyse the extant theories regarding the formation of diasporas so as to distinguish them from other sets of immigrants. With this important note, the first few chapters deal with the clarification of certain terms as well as the setting out of certain caveats while analyzing

the role diaspora politics in the global scenario. Having set out the types of diaspora to focus on in the opening chapters, Sheffer then attempts to show how the concept of a diaspora lobby group influencing politics in both the homeland and the host is not a new concept. Tracing the histories of ancients diasporas such as the Jewish, the Greek and the Armenian diasporas and subsequently the Chinese and the Indian diasporas, Sheffer shows how these groups had already formed a precursor to the sort of diaspora politics found today.

There are two basic points of reference where Sheffer tries to draw our attention towards while discussing the political and cultural group formation within diaspora groups. One important point of distinction is the difference between a "state-linked" diaspora- those diaspora groups who have a concrete and politically recognized notion of a homeland- and a "stateless" diaspora- those groups who lack the former. This point of difference is an important one according to Sheffer and the author keeps bringing the reader back to this point regularly throughout the remainder of the book. The other point of reference is the historicity of diasporas. Hence, as the author leads from the fact that diaspora formation is quite an old concept, he also shows that various new diaspora groups keep springing up everywhere in the world. This plays an important part in their participation within the politics of both homeland and host countries and the strategies that the various diasporas use when dealing with these two nations and vice versa. It is this difference between the historical and established diaspora and the incipient diasporas as well as the stateless and the state-linked diasporas that the book tries to analyse throughout the remainder of the book.

Given these two points of contention, it is then that the author proposes the questions of strategies used by the diasporas to exist and bargain both with the host country as well as the homeland. This process, as Sheffer notes, is not merely a one-way relationship, as homeland and host countries are always on the lookout to woo the diaspora groups to their advantage. Within this complex web of transnational politics, what Sheffer then tries to anlayse is the way in which diaspora political groups are formed and even unmade (put forward in the chapter "The Making, Development and Unmaking of Diasporas"). One of the most interesting aspects of the book comes when Sheffer tries to place state-linked and stateless diasporas within the ambit of six broad strategies of integration – assimilationist, integrationist, communalist/

corporatist, autonomist, irredentist and separatist- within the host country. Each diaspora group owing to its identity as a state-linked/ stateless diaspora as well as its history of establishment, will pick and choose one strategy from the former so as to increase their spheres of influence regarding their socio-economic and political mandates.

It is from this angle also that Sheffer views the issues of trans-national networks, their relationship with traditional nation- states in an increasingly transnational world and finally and importantly, the question of a diaspora pledging its loyalty towards either the host country or a homeland. Again through the lens of ethno-nationalism and the previous criss-crossing identities, Sheffer points out that a diaspora groups loyalty depends on a whole host of prevalent political conditions in both the homeland and the host country.

It is in the final chapter that Sheffer tries to look beyond the conventional categorization of diaspora groups (making a direct reference to particularly the features of a diaspora group given by Safran and the types of diaspora as given by Cohen). In order to understand the true nature of diaspora functioning within a global context requires a departure from these narrow view towards a more holistic view, which consists of a primordialist view as well as a mytho-symbolic view as well as the instrumental approach already mentioned in the book. It is only when one sees the making and development of diaspora groups within the country, according to Sheffer, can one truly contextualize the role of diaspora politics within a globalized world. Thus, as the title refers, it is important to understand how the diaspora makes itself home abroad that will define its role with respect to the world.

Sheffer does a good job of identifying and then analyzing the various issues and strategies used to overcome those issues by various sets of diaspora groups. His justification for using the ethno-nationalistic perspective for doing so is also put forward adequately. The book also provides adequate insight into the historicity of the formation and development of diaspora groups for those not aware of it. All in all, the book does provide a clear perspective on how to go about analyzing the role of diaspora groups within a globalized economic and political system.

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Complete paper with all reference details should be submitted to the editor(s) at: editor@grfdt.com. The papers should be about 5000-6000 words. Illustrations, figures, maps and graphs should be prepared in black and white and be kept to the minimum.

Structure of the Paper
Headings and Subheadings
The papers should be structured through numbered main headings (in all caps bold), subheadings (in upper/lower bold), and sub-sub-headings (in normal italics). Spellings of frequently used words should be consistent all through the paper.

Notes/ Foot/End Notes
Notes should be numbered in Arabic numerals as superscripts inside the text, and their details should appear as end notes. Tables should appear along with their data sources (if not generated from author's own research) in the appropriate places inside the text.
Notes for tables should be marked with (*) and should appear at the bottom of the table.

References Style
Reference cited in the text should follow the author-date system (e.g., Cohen, 1997) and should be properly referred to at the end of the text in the following style.

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