Frontier Heritage Migrants: Finding Home in Globalizing India

Melissa Tandiwe Myambo*

I. Introduction

> "Thank God for Google Maps!...or I don't know what I would have done...[My move to India] wouldn't have been possible...It's a matter of circumstance that I am able to do any of this right now...and plus, like all these stores are here, Zara is here, Starbucks is here..."

One early morning in 2016, I was conducting an interview in Starbucks café in South Delhi's Hauz Khas Village with Nivedita, a young woman who had recently settled in India[1]. Her parents had left the subcontinent in the 1970s and she had been born and mostly raised on the East Coast of the USA but in her late twenties, she had made the decision to leave her life in the "global" city of New York and try her luck in the "globalizing" city of New Delhi. Although India's capital is a notoriously tough city for Westerners to live in - the pollution, immense income disparities, the everyday struggle to negotiate with vendors and autorickshaw-wallahs and so on – Nivedita described her migration as being made possible by the spatio-temporal changes wrought on India by this particular moment of globalization (see also Kapur, 2012).

The Internet (Google Maps, email, WhatsApp, Skype, Netflix), the Westernization and in particular the Americanization of the urbanscape (Starbucks, McDonalds, Krispy Kreme) and the changing global economy, especially in the service sector (finance, marketing, NGO work), have fundamentally transformed the migrant experience in India as elsewhere. This is the subject of this paper which focuses on frontier migrants for whom this is especially true. Their economic and cultural capital imbricated with

* Melissa Tandiwe Myambo, Research Associate at the Centre for Indian Studies in Africa at the University of the Witwatersrand and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Wits City Institute, South Africa. Email: melissa.myambo@wits.ac.za

these transformations results in considerable less "friction" (Yeoh and Huang, 2011) in their adaptation to India.

Nivedita is part of a burgeoning trend of what I call frontier migration. She is more particularly a frontier heritage migrant as a member of the Indian diaspora (see Myambo, 2017a). Frontier migration simply refers to the move of people, technology, ideas and capital from a more "developed" economy to a "developing" one and this form of migration is happening because "the geo-political order is changing...The north Atlantic no longer lies at the centre" (Gilroy, 2010: 4). There are increasing flows of highly-skilled professionals seeking out opportunities in India (Khadria, 2012; Radhakrishnan, 2008; Amrute, 2012) and many of these professionals come from more "developed" economies in North America, the UK, Western Europe, South Korea and Japan. These frontier migrants are headed to emerging market economies like China, South Africa and India (see Myambo forthcoming) and consist of three types:

> a) The multi-ethnic, multi-racial trend of people leaving a more "developed" economy for a "developing" economy
>
> b) Frontier return migrants who emigrated from their country as adults and are now returning home
>
> c) Frontier heritage migrants who are moving to countries their parents or grandparents or great-great grandparents etc. left.

I define "heritage migrant" as a migrant of 1.5 generation and beyond who "returns" to a country s/he designates as her or his ancestral ethnic/national homeland or country of heritage. I argue that heritage migrants should be differentiated from return migrants because the experience of returning to the country one has grown up in and "returning" to the country of one's forebears is qualitatively different (Myambo, 2017).

Both frontier return and frontier heritage migrants are an important segment of this overall frontier migration but the primary focus of this paper is frontier heritage migrants although there is considerable overlap with returnees, just as official governmental attempts to name these members of the diaspora – NRI (Non-Resident Indian), PIO (Person of Indian Origin), OCI (Overseas Citizen of India) – are porous categories which attempt to contain multiple realities regarding the diaspora's relations with the homeland. For the majority of frontier heritage migrants

whom I interviewed, however, the ability to "return" to the subcontinent is contingent on the spatio-temporal changes promulgated by globalization (see also King, 2002; Nijman, 2002; Amrute, 2008).

Drawing on qualitative research undertaken in 2016 which consisted of over sixty interviews with migrants to India conducted in Delhi, Mumbai, Goa and Bangalore, I will illustrate here that the subset of frontier heritage migrants can, at this precise historical moment, more easily adapt to new homes in the developing world, despite their growing up in "First World" countries, thanks to the cultural and economic changes effected by globalizing processes – a more Westernized urbanscape; new information and communications technologies; and a transforming economy with an expanding service sector geared towards India's burgeoning middle class (Das 2001, 287; Fernandes, 2006). Furthermore, frontier migrants literally find reminders of their former homes in emerging market economies in quite tangible, visceral form – the same brands, the same big box stores, the same food franchises and so on (see also Myambo, 2017b). They, therefore, find the home they left behind and can also create a new home more easily because of these tangible, visceral reminders. Frontier heritage migrants can find reminders of both the Indian diasporic experience in the West (similar foods, fashions, pop culture etc.) as well as their everyday lives in "First World" countries.

To analyze the lived experience of people of Indian descent who grew up in Euro-America and who are migrating to post-1990 India, we have to grapple with the fact that the world has transformed in the last few decades. Not only has the entire global economy changed dramatically since the 1980s but so has India but instead of asking why do these frontier heritage migrants "return" to the country their forebears left, sometimes generations ago, we should ask to which part of India are they moving? In other words, to understand today's migration experience we require a more refined, more nuanced understanding of the spatial in its trans/sub/inter/intra-national forms. By this, I simply mean that India is a country that displays immense levels of uneven development exemplified by the stereotypical shack dwelling next to the five-star hotel. Analyzing migrant experience at the level of the nation – e.g. Swedish migrant moves to India – tells us nothing about the migrant's experience which takes place instead in distinct microspaces.

Migrants, like most people, live their lives in their homes, in their work spaces

and where they shop, or study, or socialize. Post-Cold War globalization is a phase of intensifying capitalism which has caused increasing uneven development worldwide (Smith, 2008: Harvey, 2006: Bond, 1999). These levels of increased uneven development - capitalism's dialectical propensity to create both wealth and poverty simultaneously – mean that within India there are "zones" that exhibit high levels of "development" or Western-style capitalist-modernity and these "zones" co-exist simultaneously with less "developed" areas. Therefore, the Indian urban/landscape that frontier heritage migrants encounter is the jumbled-up, odd-even world that is the result of intensifying cultural globalization which has splintered nation-states into diverse, developmentally-different, infrastructurally-divergent microspaces I call Cultural Time Zones (CTZs). The gated residential community, the international school, the mall, the microbrewery and so on, exemplify transnational CTZs. They are one part of post-liberalized India and they are just as much the "Real India" as a subnational CTZ like the rural village.

One frontier migrant explained it to me this way. Although she lives in one of the most elite gated compounds in Gurugram akin to a "four-star resort" as her husband describes it, she no longer describes her life as a "bubble and not being part of the Real India." She came to the realization that many upper-class Indians live the same way she does in elite CTZs enjoying chauffeur-driven cars, air-conditioned offices, homes with a small army of domestic staff, and "First World amenities" such as access to Wi-Fi, thus she determined that her luxurious lifestyle was as much a part of the Real India "as the people living under the bridge."

Although I will lay out here, using the metrics of technology, the urbanscape and the economy, some of the ways in which frontier heritage migrants are finding it easier to adapt to the globalizing India, somewhat perversely, India's uneven development and plethora of "local," "subnational" and less moneyed CTZs is still a defining part of frontier migrants' lived experience and one with which many of them are intimately involved. Uneven development is actually a "pull" factor which attracts frontier migrants to the county (see Myambo forthcoming). Whether they are working in NGOs or leveraging their "First World cultural capital" (Myambo, 2017 a) to analyze niche consumer demand for "global" products like craft beer or single-origin coffee, they depend on the economy's unevenness for their livelihood. Just as this paper aims to bring more nuance to the discussion of national space by employing the concept of the CTZ, or microspace, which

takes virtual and physical form, so I hope to posit some observations about India's myriad micro-economies. Technology enables transnational virtual CTZs (Facebook friends, WhatsApp groups, Skype contacts etc.) and the globalization of certain urban built forms creates transnational physical CTZs (shops, restaurants, multinational companies) and these operate in dialectical tension with the global economy which is constituted by myriad (trans/sub/inter/intra-national) micro-economies. All of these imbricated ingredients – the economic, the cultural (time zones), and the technological – were propelled into being by India's temporal transformation which began in the 1980s. This spatio-temporal conceptual framework which was laid out by then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was based upon the particular experience of the Indian diaspora in the West and would eventually enable more frontier, frontier return and frontier heritage migration and also of course, India's embrace of neoliberal globalization. That is where we must begin.

II.   Forging the Global Future, Re-Constituting the Spatio-Temporal

Scholar Aditya Nigam (2004) makes a convincing case that India's entry onto the global stage and into the present tense of hyper-capitalism was a) a state-led policy that was the result of frontier return migration and b) relies on recruiting frontier return and heritage migrants in the diaspora because they have already seen the future in the Western countries where they reside(d):

> It was in the mid-1980s that Rajiv Gandhi announced his determination to 'take India into the 21st century'…. Arriving in the 21st century meant arriving into a utopian future. Yet, that 'future' was something that Rajiv and his [computer] boys had already seen. They had spent a large part of their lives in lands where the future was actually the present. And they realized that that was our present-to-be, or at least, that they were determined to make it ours. (Nigam, 2004: 72, emphasis in original)

In other words, Rajiv Gandhi and his "computer boys" had been migrants in industrialized nations and upon returning to India, they determined that India should become like the West. However, "'going into the 21st century'

was not simply a matter of moving through the tunnel of time from one year into another…'Going there' entailed reconstituting ourselves, transforming our mode/s of being…" (Nigam, 2004: 72, emphasis in original) which required a complete transformation of the developmental state into a free market neoliberal one as if India itself was to enter into a new time owing to the ICTS revolution, outsourcing and call centers which were an early reconfiguration of the new globalizing urbanscape.

Crucially, it was the NRI who would take India into the 21st century. Whereas India, like many nations, used to be ashamed of having a large diaspora which had negative connotations of brain drain resulting from a stagnating economy (see also Castles and Wise, 2008), Nigam argues that:

> The new breed of 'Rajivian' leaders…inaugurated a new idea of 'nationhood' – one that was territorially unbounded and global…those who went away were no longer to be seen as traitors. They were the [nation's] resources…They had state-of-the-art skills, knowledge and capital to invest in the new areas that needed to be rapidly developed. Enter, therefore, the ubiquitous figure of the NRI – the privileged citizen of this global nation…It was the NRI who had seen the future where it was present; it was s/he therefore, who could become the engine that would power 'our' journey into that world. (Nigam, 2004: 72-3, my emphasis)

Whereas diasporas were viewed as possible "traitors" in the era of the bounded nation state, in a deterritorialized and ubiquitous notion of a global India, they are now "angels of development" (Castles and Wise, 2008: 271) and come to embody and symbolize the "new" India (Upadhya, 2012; Amrute, 2008). Thus, state policy enables and encourages literal (actual return/heritage tourism and migration) and metaphorical frontier returns (e.g. in the form of FDI and remittances) to power India's move into the 21st century (Khadria, 2012, 128-131; Amrute, 2008). However, Nigam's implication here is that the Indian state would particularly welcome frontier return and heritage migrants who had been in "First World" countries whose present was to be India's future because they have several forms of capital – economic, social, cultural – which further "globalize" India and help it "emerge" (Radhakrishnan, 2008; King, 2002; Upadhya, 2012; Myambo, 2017a).

India, like China and Vietnam and other nation-states is now actively

attempting to woo back its diasporas (Xiang, Yeoh, Toyota, 2013) and the Indian government's policies attempting to shape migration flows and take advantage of diasporic populations have borne fruit e.g. Bangalore's IT industry is partially the result of frontier return and heritage migration and many of the ongoing transnational linkages between Bangalore and Silicon Valley as two nodes in the global economy are actualized by diasporic Indian populations who regularly travel between the two (Vijayabaskar and Krishnaswamy, 2004; Radhakrishnan, 2008; Saxenian, 2006). Many of these policies and subsequent migration flows appear to be the result of how the future of India was imagined (see Appadurai, 1996) by Gandhi and his "computer boys" as Nigam asserts above. More profoundly, there has been a total shift in the notion of the nation's temporal narration of itself.

India's postcolonial nation time has been reconfigured by the country's embrace of what scholar Jyostna Kapur calls "capitalistic time" (2013). Two examples of this would be how the country's government and business sectors have fully assimilated the temporal dimensions of the instantaneous simultaneity of the internet as engine of growth and globalization's time-space compression which allows for outsourcing (see also Myambo, 2018). The 1991 decision by then Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, to liberalize the economy under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to accept a structural adjustment program has been narrated by various powerful sectors from politicians to the media to the business world as a temporal "break" between the socialist India of yore to the neoliberal capitalist present of the infinite "new" India in which the country becomes an economic superstar. While debates about how "new," post-1991 India is or is not are very important (see Kapur, 2013 and D'Costa, 2010), the majority of frontier migrants I interviewed did partake in the general sentiment that, "India will rule the future" (Mungee, 2011). Their decisions to migrate to India were very much contingent on the temporal understanding of a "new," and indeed neoliberal, India (see also Giridharadas, 2011: 254; Jain, 2012: 901-2) which in turn had various spatial effects including a new, more amenable urbanscape for them. This urbanscape is also very neoliberal, full of privatized public spaces like the upscale mall and securitized enclaves like the gated community (see also King, 2002; Amrute, 2010; Kapur, 2012; Kapur, 2013).

III. Transnational CTZs and the Globalizing Urbanscape

Figure 1. Select Citywalk Mall, Saket, South Delhi.

In Figure 1 above, we see an example of a transnational CTZ, the American-style mall, which is changing New Delhi's urbanscape. In the background of the photo is a Starbucks café and in the foreground, we see the franshise Burger King's Christmas display which allows visitors to the mall, most of whom presumably are not Christians since India is a Hindu-majority country, to take pictures with Santa Claus, the Burger King logo and the Select Citywalk, Go Shopping logo. The young lady in the photo is dutifully carrying a shopping bag from the Swedish fast fashion store, H&M.

Outside this privatized public space – several security guards man each entranceway and the mall's customers must file through a metal detector and file their bags through an X-ray machine like those at the airport – is a very different India. Across from this particular mall is Khirkee Village, a completely different CTZ (see Myambo, 2017c). There is not just one, homogeneous India in which frontier heritage migrants arrive but there are instead myriad Indias.

One of the "jumbling" effects of globalization is that, like many other "developing" nations, India combines elements of "First World" core and "Third World" periphery, "centers" and "margins" within it (Andrucki and

Dickinson, 2014). This extreme intra-national uneven development means that frontier migrants can decide to live a Western lifestyle if they have the requisite economic capital and so desire because this lifestyle is made possible by the emergence of increasing numbers of transnational CTZs. Even if they are physically located in India, frontier heritage migrants can stick to zones which are culturally quite Westernized (e.g. in terms of gender relations, the way women dress, the music playing on the loudspeakers, signage written in English etc.).

The spatial proximity of "First" and "Third World" in the same place e.g. the air-conditioned office park next to the shanty town results in vast disjunctures within nations but perversely, another of the radical effects of cultural globalization is that spatial distance between different countries no longer equals a deep chasm between similar lifestyles (Tomlinson 1999). Those living a California-like lifestyle in a gated community next to a slum or a village may appear to be culturally very "far away" from these places even when they are spatially proximate (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992; Forti, 2007; Ruggeri, 2007) because the gated community connotes temporal descriptors like "modernity" in contrast to the village which, of course is contemporaneous and co-eval with the gated community, but still represents "earlier times," "the past" and that most complex of terms, "tradition."

These spatial and temporal "jumblings" are typical of the globalizing urbanscape in which "modern" and "traditional," "global" and "local," trans- and subnational CTZs exist together cheek by jowl and directly impact the experience of frontier migrants to India. However, it is the emergence of more "modern," "global" and/or transnational CTZs which undergird the changing world in which "the lifestyle gaps between India and the West have narrowed rapidly" (Rai, 2005; cf. Kapur, 2012). This narrowing lifestyle gap is of course restricted to a certain class of people whom we might loosely call the "global middle classes" (Heiman, Freeman and Liechty 2012), a group that encompasses frontier heritage migrants who may live in India but live a "First World" lifestyle, sipping coffee at a transnational CTZ like Starbucks and shopping at Zara and H&M and working out at a fancy international gym like Fitness First or Gold's. In some senses and for some socio-economic classes, the world is more unified and homogenized than ever before.

The emergence of transnational CTZs in the form of American franchises

and Western chain stores is of course a direct result of 1991 liberalization. Prior to the 1990s, these CTZs did not exist in their current form. A frontier migrant coming to India in the 1970s would not have as many Western-style amenities as one arriving in the 21st century does. Of course, India's history as a colony of Great Britain and imperial era frontier migrations had already resulted in the creation of several Western(ized) CTZs like Delhi's famous Gymkhana Club and hill stations. The 1990s inaugurated massive cultural and economic changes that saw the influx of Western brands and built forms. That is why Nivedita, the frontier heritage migrant from the US, explained her migration to me in spatio-temporal terms:

> "I would never have been able to do this *even ten years ago*...it was *so different*...the fact that there's internet... Thank God for Google Maps!...or I don't know what I would have done...[My move to India] *wouldn't have been possible...It's a matter of circumstance* that I am able to do any of this right now...and plus all these stores are here, Zara is here, Starbucks is here...It's the only way that I can like fundamentally live *for a long time* [having spaces/ commodities] that are part of how I usually operate [in the US]...I need these kinds of luxuries."

In the passage above, I have *italicized* the many ways she stresses how contingent her migration is on a spatially-transforming, modernizing India. When I asked Nivedita what she missed from the US, she said, "My sister, Mexican food, Trader Joe's" but went on to explain that she could get "everything else" from the States in India, even if she had to "pay a little more," she felt that nearly everything from her life in the States was available during the era of globalization.

J.D., a frontier heritage migrant from the UK, expressed similar sentiments about the contingency of his migration being related to India's globalization but unlike Nivedita, he was much more negative about the changes in India even though he recognized that it enabled his migration. While the majority of frontier heritage migrants whom I interviewed were born in the 1980s or even the 1990s, J.D. was in his sixties and had first come to India in 1980 as a tourist. Before moving to the country in the 21st century, he had visited many times on holiday and described the spatio-temporal changes to globalizing India in civilizational terms (even though ironically he was critical of these changes!). He explained that as a child he was

always curious about India but only managed to come as a man of almost thirty years of age:

> "Then I came to India in 1980 actually to see what it was like...It was *a very different place then* of course. I landed in Delhi airport, newly built at that time. It was *in the middle of nowhere*. Driving through far lands on the way to Delhi itself...I was curious about what it was really like in India. Is it like people say? You get ill, it's horrible? In 1980, *it was a lot less civilized than it is now*. My girlfriend at the time [with whom I] was travelling, she got terribly ill. I didn't, she did...She was forever running to the bathroom. We were going to see the Taj Mahal...and then *in those days* the public bathrooms were also not very desirable either."

I have *italicized* above all the ways in which J.D. emphasizes the difference between 1980 India and the 21st century period in which this interview took place. When I pressed him with the question, "When you say it was not as 'civilized,' what do you mean by that?", he responded with spatio-temporal references, "There wasn't much organization in those days. There certainly wasn't much globalization in those days. You would not find a place like this for sure [a pub in an upscale mall in Gurugram]."

Despite criticizing Gurugram's hyper-modern urbanscape as one of the worst exemplars of globalization, J.D. nevertheless still equated it with capitalist-modernity and globalization and recognized that the "new" India was what had facilitated his own migration to the country. Another facilitator and indeed a transformative facilitator of migration is technology which has reconstituted the migrant experience.

IV. Technology and Virtual CTZs

Many of the younger frontier heritage migrants faced parental and/or familial resentment to their decision to heritage migrate to India. The parents left behind in the US or the UK, at times, felt that their children's choice to move to India was a rejection of their own decision to leave India. But as explored in the section above, the India that their parents' generation had left was spatio-temporally, politically and economically vastly different. Frontier heritage migrants in general expressed sympathy for their (grand) parents' decision to leave India but felt frustrated when one or more

relative, either in India or abroad, expressed a lack of comprehension about why they would move to India. For frontier heritage migrants, the answer to this question was clear: they believed that their relatives had an "old-fashioned" view of the "old" India which equated everything from "abroad" (meaning the West) as automatically superior to anything from "home" (meaning India). This view of the "old" India did not comport with their reality in which the urban globalscape of India's large cities offered them similar or even the same lifestyle choices as their home countries. Additionally, the economic opportunities were often more plentiful than in the sending country and finally, technology had eased their migration experience.

In fact, technology has fundamentally transformed the migrant experience. For frontier heritage migrants who are economically privileged, technological change has made their migrant experience considerably more palatable because:

> a)   It allows them to navigate the new city with considerable more ease (Google Maps, ride-sharing apps like Uber and Ola);

> b)   Knowledge about living in the new city such as where to eat, where to find a roommate or place to stay, where to find certain commodities and so on, is easily found through Facebook groups or review sites like Zomato.

> c)   It is easy to stay in touch with their family and friends wherever they may be through cheap or free communications technologies like calling/messaging on WhatsApp, Skype, Facetime etc. It is easy for friends and family to stay up-to-date with each other's lives despite geographical separation through the posting of photos and videos in real time on Instagram, Snapchat, Facebook etc. Some migrants also reported that they used "older" forms of communication like emails for staying in touch.

> d)   Many frontier heritage migrants also reported being able to create their own "worlds" in which they could watch movies and TV on Netflix or news clips from their home countries on YouTube.

These digitally-enabled virtual lives create virtual CTZs, online microspaces

which allow the migrant to feel connected to far-flung loved ones and also culturally closer to the everyday happenings in their old lives, whether that be politics or cultural events or their social circle's doings. For frontier heritage migrants who may have experienced familial disapproval of their migration choice, they feel that the emotional connectivity facilitated by technology can somewhat mitigate that type of negativity.

However, Anoushka, a young frontier heritage migrant from New Jersey, told me that technology could not adequately replace face-to-face interactions: "I really miss spending time with my friends, like sitting in the presence of them. You can catch up on Skype, but it's somehow not …Those conversations are great, and I would go crazy without them, but what I really miss is just like, 'I'm bored. Can I come over?' and just going over and not even talking, just sitting on your laptops, or just chilling, watching TV with someone, not doing anything, just being with them." Although the majority of frontier heritage migrants did acknowledge the power of technology in mitigating loneliness, the virtual CTZ was not always as emotionally satisfying as IRL (In Real Life) interactions. However, in sum, India's fairly constant and cheap internet access, especially in comparison to other developing countries, was a positive factor in their migration experience.

V. Micro-Economies and the Changing Global Economy

> "Okay. So I was born and raised in the US…Studied economics in undergrad. After finishing that, which was end of 2008, [it] was pretty much the worst time to be a fresh grad with no relevant experience…So I couldn't really find any jobs. I graduated in December, and I think by June, May/June, I had actually moved to India."

Siddanth, a young frontier heritage migrant, had been living in Mumbai for some months at the time I interviewed him in a trendy café in Bandra. After originally coming to India for a year in 2009-10, he had returned to the States to pursue postgraduate training and then moved back to India a second time in 2015. One of the "push" factors that compelled him to move to India in the first place was indeed the Great Recession of 2008 which tanked the US and subsequently the global economy. At that particular moment, India's economic growth was far out-pacing the US and the global

North in general. Thus, economic strength was also a "pull" factor attracting frontier heritage migrants. But this was not just a momentary change in relative economic strength. In the 21st century, long-term economic trends favor developing countries (see Myambo forthcoming) and many frontier migrants describe the economies they left behind in the West as "saturated" and "stagnant." India, by contrast, represented "energy," "volatility" and "opportunity." This is how another Bombay-based heritage migrant, Aroop, put it to me, as he tried to explain why India was more attractive to him than the West as an entrepreneur: "Tomorrow, if I come up with a drink, I have a much better opportunity of making that into a business in India than I do in the UK or in the US. I guess I'm looking from an entrepreneurship point of view. I think that there are gaps in the market in India...which are completely saturated in the West." Gaps in the market are the result of India's uneven development, which in turn presents opportunity for migrants whether they work in an NGO like Siddanth or are looking to find a niche market to exploit like Aroop.

India's growing middle class is a boon to frontier migrants who are able to exploit the increasing number of micro-economies produced by the introduction of new "global" commodities and "global" lifestyle options. They leverage their "First World" cultural capital (Myambo, 2017a) to (re) produce or sell goods and services that are often associated with the West or Western "standards" or indeed, the "global," often a euphemism for Western.

However, frontier heritage migrants (as opposed to the wider category of multi-ethnic frontier migrants) narrate their reasons for migrating to India in terms that supersede mere economic opportunity or market potential (see also Amin and Thrift, 2007; Myambo, 2017). The economic is always-already entangled with the cultural, the social, the psychic, the spiritual and issues of knowing one's self, one's history and one's roots. One frontier heritage migrant explained that he had come to India to help the country even though his parents had emigrated from Bangalore before he was born and settled in the US. Rahul, however, was excited about the cultural and economic opportunities of globalizing India, as well as the chance to spend more time with his grandparents and most of all was motivated to help India's economy flourish. When I asked him why, he said, "[India]'s where my heritage is, it's where my family is."

Conclusion

Frontier heritage migrants are finding home in globalizing India as a result of India's embrace of neoliberal globalization which has resulted in dramatic changes to the urbanscape. Their migrations are contingent on the spatio-temporal moment of India's insertion into global capitalism and technology and economic opportunity further work to ease their migration to the country their forebears had left behind "in the past." Now, that India represents the "future" of capitalist-modernity, frontier heritage migrants are leaving the West to try their luck in the subcontinent.

Notes

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